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ABSTRACT 
This document describes research undertaken to investigate strategic decision-making in 
Russian firms, and the nature of the competitive strategies adopted by Russian managers.  
Since published research in this area is sparse, a theory building approach has been used 
rather than one concentrating on hypothesis testing. 
The research has followed grounded theory methodology, using unstructured and semi 
structured interviews with Russian managers as the primary source of data.  Since the 
Russian business landscape and Russian national culture have some unique characteristics, 
in order to set the research findings in context, interviews were also conducted with British 
managers working in similar industries to their Russian counterparts. 
The data were analysed using a free coding scheme which was generated and refined as 
individual interview transcripts were analysed.  The intention behind this methodology was 
to allow theory to emerge from the data, rather than be forced into a preconceived 
theoretical framework. 
The findings indicate that there are significant characteristics of Russian strategic 
management practice which differ markedly from those found in British firms.  In particular, 
Russian managers frequently adopt strategies which are designed to manipulate the 
competitive nature of their markets as opposed to the strategies which predominate in 
mature market based economies which tend to be designed to react to market conditions 
rather than change them. 
These differences chiefly arise from aspects of the Russian business environment which, 
despite 20 years of transition, continues to be dominated by large enterprises, often under 
the control of oligarchs and members of the powerful political ruling elite.  However, 
aspects of Russian national culture also predispose managers to adopt manipulative 
strategies, and may well account for the prevalence of corruption which is seen by many as 
endemic in Russia. 
The document concludes by proposing a typology of Russian businesses, and by postulating 
that companies which work in countries exhibiting the same hypo-capitalist economic and 
cultural characteristics as Russia are likely to be predisposed to adopt competitive strategies 
which are mainly manipulative in nature.   
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GLOSSARY  
Blat The exchange of favours (or corrupt payments) to obtain 
goods or services in short supply 
Gosplan The Soviet economic planning Ministry 
Guanxi Chinese equivalent of blat 
FSB, KGB,  NKVD, Cheka, 
Ochrana 
State security bodies in the Soviet union. KGB Replaced by 
FSB after the fall of the Soviet system.  The  Ochrana was 
the pre-revolutionary secret police body. 
Hypo-capitalist economy "Less than capitalist" economy:  Term devised by Hunter 
(1999) to describe Soviet style command economies in 
transition, dominated by SOEs and ex SOEs, and suffering a 
democratic & judicial deficit 
Komsomol Russian Communist Party youth league 
Mature market based 
economy (MMBE) 
A mature economy with widely spread ownership of 
companies, a mix of large companies and SMEs, and with 
fully functioning democratic and judicial systems 
Nomenklatura ruling elite in the Soviet era (perhaps the forerunner of 
siloviki) 
Oligarch  New owners of many ex-SOEs -normally extremely rich 
Otkat "Top slicing" a government contract - one form of 
corruption 
Siloviki "Powerful people" - members or closely associated with 
the ruling elite 
Sistema The unofficial but de-facto system of governance in 
Russian society 
SME Small or medium-sized enterprise 
SOE state-owned enterprise 
Ex-SOE privatised former state-owned enterprise 
Strategy as practice The study of strategic management which concentrates on 
the day-to-day actions of managers, imputing strategic 
intent from strategic action 
SUM State University of Management, Moscow 
TSU Tyumen State University 
UWBS University of Wolverhampton business school 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
his document brings together the overall body of work which has been undertaken to 
date as part of my DBA studies.  Previous documents submitted as part of the 
programme have, as their primary objective, the demonstration of competence in critical 
thinking and the execution of realist and interpretivist research.  By contrast, this document 
is intended to describe the execution of a coherent piece of research which demonstrably 
leads to new knowledge and understanding.  
However, although documents 1 to 4 primarily demonstrated research competencies, they 
were practical pieces of research in their own right which also were linked to the central 
theme of my DBA studies and, as such, are linked to the main themes of this document.   
So although this thesis is a standalone piece of work, because of this interlinking with 
previous documents, some of the ideas and themes which were developed earlier reappear 
here.  This is a consequence of the underlying thematic structure of the DBA itself, and not 
conscious self plagiarisation on my part.  When an argument about, for example, an 
appropriate methodology or an approach to research validity has been developed in a prior 
document, and the same argument is to be applied to this work, it would be almost 
perverse not to include aspects of the original argument here.  Where substantial passages 
discussing such ideas or themes which have been developed in previous documents are 
included here they are referenced using the style "Document Three (2010)"  
1.2 THE TOPIC OF THIS RESEARCH AND ITS ORIGINS  
The American science fiction author and research biologist, Isaac Asimov, when discussing 
the origins of research is quoted as saying: 
"The most exciting phrase to hear [......] the one that heralds new discoveries is 
not ‘Eureka!’  but ‘That’s funny …"  
  (Hurley, Dennett et al. 2011 p.1) 
 
In my case, the “Asimov moment" occurred during my first visit to Siberia in the early 1990s.  
Talking to managers of construction companies in the Tyumen region I was struck by their 
almost total lack of any understanding of the concept of competition.  Discussions 
concerning how competitors might react to certain business strategies were often met by a 
blank stare in 1993. 
I suppose that one could have anticipated that, after 70 years of communist rule, managers 
in Russian businesses would not yet have relearned the rules of working in a market 
economy, but more than 10 years later, after the market economy had been thoroughly 
embedded in Russian life, I would still finish conversations about business issues pondering 
T 
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on questions about why personal relationships seem to be so much more central to the 
conduct of Russian business than would be the case in the UK, and how much of the 
attitude of managers was due to their peculiar business environment or the unique Russian 
national culture. 
These, then, were the conundrums which inspired my interest in strategic management in 
Russian businesses.  
During the course of the DBA programme, the nature of the research described in this thesis 
has evolved, but the subject of the research - Understanding Strategy in Russian Businesses - 
has remained constant throughout the programme. 
1.2 AIMS OF DOCUMENT FIVE 
The NTU stated aims for this part of the DBA programme are: 
To research a major topic or issue at doctoral level. 
To develop professional, managerial or organisational practice through research, 
analysis and development. 
To develop novel and creative approaches to issues and topics, and, [demonstrated 
via document six], 
To encourage double loop critical reflection that challenges assumptions and values 
as well as techniques and methods. 
 
As the penultimate document to be submitted as part of the DBA, this thesis draws on ideas 
developed in previous documents, but it does not repeat at length any of the logical 
arguments which were developed to justify the original conceptual framework or 
methodology.  Rather, although it builds on the outcomes of documents one to four, the 
primary emphasis in this document is on the main findings of the research themes which 
have run through all of the documents, and my interpretation of them.   
In accordance with the NTU stated outcomes for document five, therefore, the aims of this 
thesis are to develop novel and creative frameworks to aid the understanding of strategy in 
Russian businesses and to identify the issues which might require managers to modify 
practice in the light of the findings. 
1.3 DOCUMENT FIVE OBJECTIVES 
In document one I reviewed my personal areas of interest, issues surrounding the 
practicality of undertaking research in Russia, and considered the barriers which I might 
encounter in gaining access to suitable respondents.  After some reflection, at the 
conclusion of document one the theme of the research was expressed in the following 
statement: 
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“The aims of this research are to investigate the business strategies adopted by 
different categories of Russian managers.  It will seek to identify the most 
important determinants influencing managers of companies in their choice of 
competitive strategies and to investigate the links between their (resource based) 
strategic capabilities and the competitive strategies which they adopt.  The research 
will investigate the processes by which strategies are devised and adopted in 
Russian companies and will seek to gain insights into differences between 
strategies adopted by companies in developed markets and those in transition 
economies." 
 
This is a broad statement of the research aims, but could be seen as being rather imprecise 
as a definition of a research question.  From the literature review which was undertaken as 
part of document two I concluded that the main factors influencing the development and 
practice of strategic management in Russia are: 
 The characteristics of the Russian economy and markets. 
 The characteristics of the company in terms of its size, ownership, history and age, 
strategic orientation (internally or externally focused), the industry in which it works, 
the specificity of its assets and its predominant competitive strategic stance. 
 The characteristics of the decision-making manager in terms of age, seniority, 
educational background and entrepreneurial outlook. 
 The effects of national cultural characteristics on strategic decision-making. 
The existing literature is virtually silent on the subject of strategic management in a Russian 
context but extrapolation from the existing body of literature concerning western 
experience suggests that these characteristics may have significant effects on the 
development of competitive strategies in Russia, and so gives rise to some specific questions 
which can be investigated by research into Russian firms and the managers working within 
them, namely: 
 Is there a difference in the attitudes towards strategy exhibited by managers in more 
recently formed SMEs as opposed to those in larger companies and in privatised 
former state-owned companies?  
 What are the most important socio-economic and political determinants of strategy 
in Russian companies? 
 How important are resource based issues in determining competitive strategy in 
Russian companies? 
 Are there differences between strategic management processes obtaining in Russian 
SMEs and privatised former state-owned firms and what insights can be gained when 
comparing these processes with Western strategic management practice? 
And, tying these questions together: 
 Is there a model which plausibly combines the economic, cultural and behavioural 
aspects of strategic management in Russian businesses? 
11 | P a g e  
 
These were the issues which I hoped to investigate throughout the course of the DBA 
programme with the object of better understanding strategic management in Russian 
companies.  I developed a series of propositions in document two (summarised in the next 
chapter) which could be investigated quantitatively, but, given the difficulties of undertaking 
quantitative research in Russia and the rather inconclusive findings of document four, 
document five concentrates on an inductive theory building approach using grounded 
theory methodology.  Consequently, the pre-established hypothesis testing approach using 
the document two propositions was not considered appropriate for document five 
(although the original propositions are reviewed in chapter 5, section 5.3 "Bringing the 
threads together", table 5.1) 
The specific objectives of this thesis are therefore: 
 To summarise and update the relevant literature review from document two. 
 To investigate and describe strategic management processes in Russian firms. 
 To investigate and describe competitive strategy and relationship with customers in 
Russian companies. 
 To investigate and describe the strategies which Russian managers adopt to cope 
with the complex business environment and government agencies. 
 To develop a conceptual models which explains the differences.  
and 
 To draw conclusions about how these findings on might affect practising managers 
from different cultural and economic backgrounds when faced with the complex 
Russian business /cultural environment. 
1.4 ISSUES OF ONTOLOGY, METHODOLOGY AND THE EXECUTION OF THE RESEARCH 
For reasons which will be explained in chapter three, but primarily because of a dearth of 
existing relevant research in the field, I concluded that inductive research (theory building) 
was the most appropriate ontological approach to the research described in this document, 
and that the most appropriate methodology was grounded theory.  This has had some 
important consequences for the structuring of the research process.  In some senses the 
way in which the DBA is structured contravenes the central tenets of grounded theory in 
that document two, the literature review, sits before documents three, four and five in the 
overall DBA degree structure.   
This could have been problematical because one of the assessment criteria of document 
two concerns the ability to create a conceptual model, whilst a true grounded theory 
approach discourages researchers from immersing themselves in existing literature to 
obviate the chance of the data being forced into a preconceived model.  For a true 
grounded theory approach the conceptual models developed from the research are 
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supposed to emerge from the data.  This is in marked contrast to a hypothesis testing 
approach which positively requires a pre-established conceptual model. 
In my case, though, the problem was not so acute.  Undertaking field research in Russia can 
be difficult and costly but I was fortunate in that I was able to combine the task of 
interviewing Russian managers with work commitments which involved liaison with Russian 
universities in Siberia and Moscow.  The timing of my visits to Russia, though, was outside 
my control and I completed the first tranche of interviews before I had completed the 
literature review (document two), and so I can truthfully claim that I immersed myself in the 
data collection before forming preconceived literature derived hypotheses. 
The combination of work commitments and undertaking fieldwork for this research also 
created a significant problem at a later stage when an institutional upheaval at work meant 
that I had to review and radically modify my intended research strategy.  This is more fully 
described in the introduction to document four, but meant that because my employer, 
UWBS, decided unilaterally to sever links with Tyumen State University (TSU), the 
institutional support from TSU was no longer available, and I had to rely on personal 
contacts and friendship for the facilities and support which I needed for the final stages of 
the research.  I am truly moved by the generosity shown by my Russian friends and 
colleagues in providing this help and support. 
 
1.5 THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
1.5.1 LITERATURE REVIEW  
From a practical point of view, as far as this thesis is concerned, in order for this document 
to be readable1 as a standalone piece of work, the literature review which follows as 
chapter 2 is needed to set the research into context, and consequently sets out, in 
summary, the main theoretical background to the research.  However, it is intentionally 
relatively brief because the full detail of my initial literature review is to be found in 
document two.   
                                                     
1
 A note on style:  
Readers will note that for the most part this thesis is written in the first person and, wherever possible, using 
the active voice.  This is a conscious choice.  The research described in this work is interpretive, and so I have 
chosen to use "I" whenever the text speaks about my own actions, decisions and the choices I made when 
interpreting the findings - primarily because the first person form implies ownership of those actions and 
decisions.    
 
On occasion though, when the identity and opinions of a interviewee are involved, or when an existing theory 
is being discussed, it seems to me to be more appropriate to use the more formal third person and passive 
voice convention.  
 
The more informal style reflects my personal preference, and I hope leads to a more readable piece of work. 
Consequently it is the default voice even though some  conventions for academic work call for a more formal 
written style.     
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1.5.2 METHODOLOGY 
Chapter 3 discusses the research strategy and justifies the methodology chosen.  It 
describes the operational aspects involved in undertaking the research and the measures 
taken to assure the validity of the findings.  Since the research is based on grounded theory 
methodology and relies on an interpretive approach to derive the models and associated 
theories, the authenticity of the research is also considered. 
1.5.3 FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
The subsequent chapters 4 and 5 detail the research findings and the ways in which the 
findings lead to the derivation of conceptual models and theory.  These two chapters 
develop the ideas and concepts of the existing literature whilst incorporating different and 
often newer academic work in order to contextualise and explain the findings of the 
research and their relevance from a practitioner standpoint. 
1.5.4 CONCLUSIONS AND REFLECTIONS 
The final chapter identifies the most important findings of the research and considers the 
significance of the research findings for both practitioners and educators.  The limitations of 
the research are discussed along with the opportunities for extending the research in the 
future.  
So, in summary, this thesis builds upon some of the concepts and research from precursor 
documents, but in order to develop novel and creative approaches to the issues covered by 
the research, the emphasis in this work is firmly on the main findings and interpretation of 
the substantive research undertaken for this document.    
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CHAPTER 2: A THEORETICAL BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
ne of the basic tenets of grounded theory is that theory should be derived from the 
research findings without any prior influence due to the "theoryladen" status of the 
researcher.  Consequently the a priori derivation of conceptual frameworks, propositions or 
hypotheses is an anathema to grounded theory purists.  However, because of the timing of 
my visits to Tyumen as part of the British Council funded dual degree developments with 
which I was involved, I undertook the first six interviews in Russia before I had completed 
document two, and consequently I can claim, hand on heart, that the research commenced 
before I had become too "theory laden". 
2.2 A SUMMARY OF THE LITERATURE REVIEW UNDERTAKEN FOR DOCUMENTS TWO 
Document two explored and discussed the existing underlying academic theories which may 
explain the characteristics of strategic decision making in Russian businesses, and, having 
now completed the research, I have come to the conclusion that much of my original 
evaluation of the literature remains valid.  To be prudent, in the course of completing this 
thesis I have carried out a second scan of the literature, but in the period between my 
original literature review and completing the research there have been few relevant 
significant publications in the field of strategic management in Russia.   
Following the trails initiated by the research findings, though, has opened up some 
perspectives in the areas of Russian culture, and in particular concerning the political and 
economic aspects of corruption in Russia.  Following these trails has led me into academic 
disciplines not normally much associated with strategy - Russian history, and Russian 
political science.  However, I maintain that attempts to contextualise the research would be 
incomplete without taking account of these fields of study. 
2.2.1 COMPETITIVE STRATEGY 
In document two I reviewed the academic theories surrounding competitive strategy which 
considers the actions that managers take in order to create or enhance the competitive 
advantage of their organization.   There are two mainstream schools of thought in this field; 
 the market positioning school, which seeks to explain the strategies which 
managers adopt in terms of whether they achieve competitive advantage by having 
low prices or by differentiating their products and services so that consumers are 
prepared to pay higher prices for the perceived higher value -  and  
 the resource-based school, which seeks to explain how firm's resources provide a 
competitive advantage, and how managers create competitive advantage by 
growing and enhancing those specific resources which provide the advantage. 
O 
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In terms of the market positioning school I reviewed the works of Porter (1980, 1985), along 
with those authors who I felt had added substantially to the academic debate in that area, 
(Dess, Davis 1984, Bowman 1992, Bowman 1992:2, Bowman, Ambrosini 1998).   
In terms of the resource-based school, I reviewed the works of Barney (1991, 2002), Kay 
(1994) and Prahalad and Hamel (1990, 1994).  The works of Bowman and Ambrosini (1998) 
and Bowman and Faulkner (1997) were revisited for their attempts to reconcile the market 
positioning and resource-based views of competitive strategy.  (This list of sources is by no 
means exhaustive; please see document two for further detail of the critical evaluation of 
these works.)  
The research by Dess and Davis (1984) and Bowman and Ambrosini (1998) cited above 
indicates that managers rarely adopt a binary, "all or nothing" stance in terms of 
competitive strategy   (i.e. by adopting exclusively differentiation based or cost-based 
strategies; rather some form of hybrid strategy seems to be the norm) or indeed in their 
views on the relative importance of market-based or resource-based strategies.  As a 
consequence, I concluded in document two that the traditional market 
positioning/resource-based theoretical perspectives are rendered more meaningful if 
thought of in the context of the internal or external orientation in management thinking 
within the company.  This is illustrated in the following table: 
TABLE 2.1 EXTERNAL VERSUS INTERNAL STRATEGIC ORIENTATION 
 Companies with External  
Orientation  (O) 
Companies with Internal 
 Orientation (I) 
Emphasis on Markets over resources Resources over markets 
Orientation Opportunity driven (external 
potential) 
Strength driven (internal 
potential) 
The starting point Market demand & industry 
structure 
Resource-base & activity 
system 
Strategic fit engineered 
through 
Adaption to environment Adaption of  environment 
Strategic focus Attaining advantageous 
position 
Attaining distinctive resource 
Strategic moves External positioning Building resource-base 
Tactical moves Acquiring necessary resources External positioning 
Competitive weapons Bargaining power and mobility 
barriers 
Superior resources and 
imitation barriers 
   
(De Wit, Meyer, 2005, p.127) 
However, both the market positioning and resource-based schools have their roots in 
economic analysis, largely undertaken in a mature market-based economic environment, 
and it is apparent that the peculiarities of the Russian economy (and to some extent Russian 
history and culture)  have a marked effect on management thinking within Russian firms.   
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As a consequence I concluded that these traditional schools of thought, taken on their own, 
do not adequately explain strategic management in a Russian context.  
In my attempts to contextualise the theory, I therefore reviewed literature concerning the 
Russian business landscape in terms of the Russian economic environment and Russian 
national culture.     
2.2.2 THE RUSSIAN ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 
My review of the Russian economic environment in document two started with reflections 
on the characteristics of the pre-1991 Soviet economic system, and some of the changes 
which took place immediately post the fall of the Communist regime.  I noted that although 
the initial reforms in Russia took place very rapidly during the early part of the Yeltsin era, 
the flawed process of privatisation resulted in a market economy dominated by huge ex-
state-owned enterprises with relatively few SMEs in comparison with other developed 
market economies. Political and legislative changes did not keep up with the pace of change 
of ownership affecting state-owned enterprises. 
By 1998, despite furious activity and fast growth in many private sector industries, slow 
institutional reform, structural problems with the banking system, and spiraling inflation led 
to a major financial crisis and the eventual revaluation of the rouble. 
At that stage Hunter (1999, p.5) described the Russian market as:  
"characterised by growing demand, but with paucity of competition, relative lack of 
skilled economic actors, poorly defined property rights, underdeveloped institutions 
(such as capital markets and rule of law), and enduring management practices which 
are inimical to the efficient conduct of business." 
   
He termed these conditions collectively as "hypo-capitalism" ("less than" capitalism or a sub 
optimal market mechanism) and, derived from the work of Gwartney et al (1996), he 
proposed a methodology for categorising economies in terms of 16 particular 
characteristics, as shown in the following table: 
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TABLE 2.2  A COMPARISON OF MATURE MARKET-BASED AND HYPO-CAPITALISTIC ECONOMIES 
 Mature market based 
economy (MMBE) 
e.g. Western European/ 
Anglo-Saxon 
Hypo-capitalistic 
economy 
e.g. Russia 
Mechanism for command and 
control 
markets markets 
Percentage of GDP derived from 
public sector 
low high 
Presence of open flexible, capital 
markets 
widespread limited 
Strength of independent banking 
sector 
robust very weak 
Regulatory burden on business relatively low extremely high 
Inflation volatility low & stable highly unpredictable: 
moderate to 
hyperinflation 
Pervasiveness of political 
corruption 
low high 
Level of Intra market 
competitiveness 
consistently high low and inconsistent 
Transfers and subsidies as a 
percentage of GDP 
low high 
Marginal tax rate low confiscatory 
Probability of enforcement of 
contracts 
fundamental uncertain 
Protection of private property established rare 
Independence of judiciary long-established inconsistent 
Trained management Cardre very large very small 
Transparent corporate governance well-established and 
control 
rare 
Relatively unrestricted trade unrestricted severely limited 
Adapted from Hunter (1999, p.38) 
This table was developed by Hunter as part of his DBA studies and was based mainly on the 
Yeltsin years in Russia.  Political and economic developments occurring since those times 
have changed some of these factors quite considerably, and this is discussed at the end of 
this chapter. 
2.2.3 THE EFFECTS OF RUSSIAN CULTURE ON STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT THINKING 
There appears to be a logical connection between national cultural characteristics and the 
nature of competitive strategies adopted by managers.  When viewed from a "strategy as 
practice" viewpoint (or in other words by considering the everyday practices of managers 
working in a Russian business) and taking account of the particularist nature of Russian 
society, a more holistic framework can be developed which provides a richer explanation of 
Russian management practice.   
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Using this different lens to view management practice, the importance of personal 
relationships and networking comes to the fore, and consequently document two includes a 
review of the literature concerning the effects of national cultural differences on 
management practice in this context.  This is an extremely extensive area of study and I 
eventually concluded that the most relevant academic theory was proposed by 
Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1998), Hofstede (2001) and Boisot and Child (1996).  
(Once again this list is not exhaustive; - document two contains detailed discussion on these 
issues). 
I concluded that the most significant cultural dimension affecting Russian management 
practice was that of universalism vs particularism. Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1998 
p.8) state: 
“The Universalist approach is roughly: "what is good and right can be defined and 
always applies."  In particularist cultures far greater attention is given to the 
obligations of relationships and unique circumstances.  For example, instead of 
assuming that the one good way must always be followed, the particularist reasoning 
is that friendship has special obligations and hence may come first.  Less attention is 
given to abstract societal codes.”     
 
The highly particularist Russian society values relationships and friendships very highly, and 
this influences the sorts of strategies adopted by Russian companies and the actions 
undertaken by individual Russian managers.  This is seen primarily in the adoption of 
network strategies. 
Networking is recognised as being important in western societies; - western companies 
collaborate primarily in order to gain some form of competitive advantage, which may be in 
terms of "speed to market", reduced component costs, or perhaps by reaping the benefits 
of specialisation; i.e. "sticking to the knitting" allowing companies to adopt a new 
technologies earlier than their rivals by gaining the technology from an outside network 
partner.  (Child, Faulkner 1998) 
Similarly, Kay (1994) cites examples of networks which intrinsically provide significant 
strengths for their participants in terms of their competitive advantage, whilst another 
reasons identified for the apparent gain in competitive advantage by adopting network 
strategies is that network partners learn from each other, and hence improve their 
individual competitive capabilities.(Prahalad, Hamel 1994) 
However the Russian emphasis on personal relationships is seen primarily in the importance 
of networks of personal contacts used to facilitate business transactions in environments 
where conventional market forces are either inadequate or non-existent, and has its roots in 
traditional Russian society. Similar characteristics apply to the Chinese phenomenon of 
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"guanxi" which Boisot and Child (1996) view as being the normal prerequisite for 
undertaking business within China. It is claimed that firms which succeed in China are those 
with the widest guanxi networks, and Boisot and Child have termed this reliance on guanxi 
“network capitalism".  
In the case of Russia there would seem to be additional important underlying reasons for 
the importance of network strategies which seemingly have their roots in tradition and 
culture. Popova and Sørensen, (quoted in Kuznetsov, Kuznetsova 2005 p.28) state that: 
“In Russia, the tradition of relying on informal networks as an element of business 
arrangements has a long history. It emerged as a reaction to the rigidities of the 
official Soviet production system with its emphasis on technological determinism 
leaving very little space for the human factor. 
To compensate for this, certain structural, cultural and ideological norms came into 
existence to provide an informal hierarchy cementing together suppliers and buyers, 
creditors and debtors. As a result the Soviet production system relied on informal 
arrangements and networks almost as much as on the formal ones”  
 
Kuznetsov and Kuznetsova (2005 p.28) themselves identify further reasons for the 
importance of networking in Russia.  They state that: 
  “The proliferation of informal networks affects the character of market relations. On 
the one hand, they imply long-term relations with suppliers and customers that create 
zones of trust within the general environment of distrust that help to reduce 
transaction costs. On the other hand, by their nature, networks, in particular 
informal ones, seek to maintain exclusiveness. In the Russian context, networking 
does not mean getting better knowledge of business partners and their needs but 
rather pursues the goal of conspiring against outsiders and avoiding legal control over 
financial and other transactions.” 
Network strategies in Russia are evident in “blat" in business relationships, but also in 
phenomena such as nepotism in employment. To some extent the cultural underpinnings 
may also explain differences in attitudes towards the rule of law, and, in particular, attitudes 
to corruption. 
2.2.4 INSIGHTS INTO THE NATURE OF COMPETITIVE STRATEGY IN RUSSIA 
Taking into account the traditional MMBE (mature market-based economy) /Hypo-capitalist 
dichotomy, the free-market view of competitive strategy vs network theory and the 
consideration of the impact of national cultural differences, gave rise to my own insight that 
competitive strategies can be seen as manipulative or reactive:  
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 Manipulative strategies are those where the firm attempts to manipulate the market 
in which it is working, and is widely practised by the larger ex-state-owned industries 
in Russia.  
whereas  
 Reactive strategies are those where the firm attempts to react to the conditions of 
the market in which it operates (and are the strategies generally described in 
mainstream western academic theory concerning competitive strategy). 
2.2.5 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN RUSSIAN BUSINESSES AND THOSE OPERATING IN MMBES 
Having completed my initial review of the literature I concluded that the main issues 
influencing the practice of strategic management in Russia were likely to be: 
 The characteristics of the Russian economy and markets. 
 The characteristics of the individual company in question (in terms of its size, 
ownership, history and age, strategic orientation (internally or externally focused), 
the industry in which it works, the specificity of its assets and its predominant 
competitive strategic stance). 
 The characteristics of the decision-making manager in terms of age, seniority, 
educational background and entrepreneurial outlook. 
 The effects of national cultural characteristics on strategic decision-making. 
The existing literature suggests that these characteristics may have a marked effect on the 
development of competitive strategies in Russia, and at the conclusion of document two I 
went on to derive a model which I felt could describe the differences between Russian 
businesses and Anglo-Saxon/Western European companies.  At that stage (prior to the 
commencement of phase 2 of this research) I believed that the three main strategic 
management dimensions were: 
 The strategic orientation of companies.  
 The competitive strategies adopted by the company. 
 The approach to the market, 
and my views at that stage are summarised below: 
THE STRATEGIC ORIENTATION OF COMPANIES 
When developing competitive strategies some companies are more influenced by market 
conditions and attempt to attain competitive advantage by achieving a specific market 
position (Porter 2004) and these companies are likely to be more led by external market 
conditions. They will be outwardly orientated in their strategic thinking. (O). Other 
companies will believe that their competitive advantage is derived from their resource base 
(Barney 1991) and their strategic thinking is likely to be inwardly orientated. (I). (De Wit, 
Meyer 2005). 
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THE TYPE OF COMPETITIVE STRATEGY ADOPTED BY THE COMPANY 
When trying to attract new customers some companies will attempt to offer the lowest 
prices. (P).  Other companies may choose to offer highly differentiated products or services. 
(D).  These first two types of company are relying on market positioning strategies (Porter 
2004), whilst the third group of companies may choose to use strategies relying on personal 
relationships and mutual obligations to create a network which "locks in" customers and 
seeks to exclude new competitors (Boisot, Child 1996).  In the terminology I used in this 
document, these companies are adopting a so-called network strategy. (N) . 
THE APPROACH TO THE MARKET - POWER ORIENTATION OF COMPANIES 
When faced by competitive forces and the competitive environment, some companies will 
attempt to manipulate the environment, reducing competitive forces by corrupt practices or 
network exclusion strategies.  These companies are adopting manipulative strategies. (M).   
Other companies may accept the competitive environment as it stands and attempt to react 
to it by offering prices or levels of differentiation appropriate to what they perceive their 
chosen market requires.  These companies are following reactive strategies. (R)  
I felt that it was possible to categorise strategies as shown in the following table 2.3, which 
gives examples of the sorts of strategies which might be adopted in each of the quadrants 
identified: 
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TABLE 2.3  AN INITIAL CATEGORISATION OF COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES 
  
Reactive strategies: 
 
 
Manipulative strategies: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Internally 
orientated 
strategies 
 
 core competence development 
 
 lean manufacturing implementation 
 
 
 production co-operatives 
(reducing competition by 
having fewer suppliers i.e. 
increasing countervailing 
supplier power) 
 
 Mergers and Acquisitions 
to reduce competition 
 
 predatory/Mafia 
behaviour (reducing 
competition by 
threatening or eliminating 
other players) 
 
 changing market 
characteristics by 
corruption of officials 
responsible for oversight 
of competition 
 
 
 
Externally 
orientated 
strategies 
 
 product/service development to 
achieve differentiation 
 
 low-cost production development to 
achieve cost leadership 
 guanxi / Blat network 
strategies 
 
 bribing potential 
customers 
 
 marketing co-operatives 
(reducing competition by . 
increasing countervailing 
purchasing power to 
counteract supplier 
power) 
 
 
2.3 THE NATURE OF STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT IN RUSSIA 
Using these dimensions to identify the strategic stance of companies, I went on to form 
some propositions concerning the nature of strategic management in Russian businesses 
which could be used as the basis of a conceptual framework. The propositions were as 
follows: 
 
 
23 | P a g e  
 
In terms of inward (I) and outward (O) orientation, it could be predicted that: 
 Older ex state-owned enterprises (ex SOEs) are likely to be dominant in their 
markets, (P1). 
 Large Russian companies are more likely to be operating in oligopolistic markets, 
(P2). 
 Managers working in oligopolistic business landscapes are likely to be more 
concerned with resource-based strategies than market positioning strategies, whilst 
managers working in more competitive environments are likely to be more 
concerned with market positioning strategies, (P3).   
 
In terms of age and education of managers, it could be predicted that: 
 Younger managers (say less than 40 years old) who never worked in the Soviet 
business environment are more likely to be outwardly orientated and favour reactive 
competitive strategies, (P4). 
 Older managers with seniority built in the Soviet business environment are more 
likely to be traditional resource managers and hence inwardly orientated, (P5). 
 Older managers having spent their formative years in the Soviet business 
environment are more likely to favour network strategies and manipulative 
competitive strategies, (P6). 
 
In terms of the adoption of network strategies (N) and manipulative competitive strategies 
(M), it could be predicted that: 
Companies operating in particularist cultures will be more likely to concentrate on 
network strategies, (P7). 
 Particularist cultures will be more accepting of manipulative competitive strategies, 
(P8). 
 Network strategies will be important to Russian companies, (P9). 
 Manipulative strategies will be important to larger Russian companies, (P10). 
 
A logical development of these propositions led to three further second order propositions. 
 Russian managers in large firms and ex SOEs will be more inwardly orientated than 
small firms, (P11). 
 Russian managers in large firms and ex SOEs are likely to attempt to use 
manipulative competitive strategies, P(12). 
 
In contrast, Russian managers in SMEs and managers in younger companies working in non-
oligopolistic markets are likely to have a different strategic orientation, and it could be 
predicted that:  
 Russian managers in these companies will be more outwardly orientated, (P13). 
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I concluded by reviewing the literature which explores strategic typologies (Grachev, 
Izyumov 2003, Miles, Snow et al. 1978).  I felt that when the research had been completed it 
would be useful to develop taxonomy of Russian businesses in terms of their preferred 
competitive strategies, strategic orientation and their approach to the market.  The existing 
typologies proposed by Grachev and Izyumov (2003) and Miles et al.(1978)  can be 
summarised as follows: 
 
TABLE 2.4 : A COMPARISON OF STRATEGIC TYPOLOGIES AND ASSOCIATED ORGANIZATIONAL 
CHARACTERISTICS IN RUSSIAN COMPANIES 
Strategic 
Type 
(after Grachev and  
Izyumov ) 
Strategic 
Type 
(after Miles et 
al) 
Basis of 
competitive 
strategy 
Strategic 
orientation 
Approach to 
market 
Reaction/ 
manipulation 
Typically 
represented by 
      
Bureaucrat Defender N I M Large, oligopolistic 
companies, ex 
SOEs, companies in 
strategically 
important sectors 
Predator  
_ 
N O M Some larger ex 
SOEs with history 
of predatory 
management, 
smaller SMEs with 
"black market" 
roots 
Competitive 
entrepreneur 
Analyser/ 
prospector 
P/D/N O R/M SMEs, medium-size 
companies 
engaged in globally 
competitive 
industries 
_ Reactor P I R Ex-SOEs in 
declining industries 
1. Basis of competitive strategy: D= differentiation, P= competing on low price, N= network strategy  
2. Strategic orientation: I= internally orientated (i.e. driven by company’s resources), O= outwardly 
orientated (i.e. driven by external environment) 
3. Approach to market:  R= reacts to external environment, M= attempts to manipulate market. 
 
This initial typology springs from an attempt to integrate the ideas of Grachev and Izyumov 
(2003) and Miles et al. (1978) in a Russian context. 
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2.4 LITERATURE REVIEW UPDATED  
Document two has proved, retrospectively, to be quite comprehensive in its coverage of 
relevant literature, but the interpretation of the findings in chapter 4 and my attempt to 
contextualise them in chapter 5 have involved following trails into academic areas not 
covered in much depth in my initial literature review (in particular Russian history and the 
Russian political system).  
I found it necessary and interesting to review the most recent works on the nature of the 
Russian state, and the pervasiveness of corruption and "informal practices" in Russia to 
ensure that theoretical underpinnings of this work are current.  These are both rather 
arcane fields of study, but there are some key authorities in the context of this research, 
notably Puffer and McCarthy, Ledeneva, Dawisha and Fey, all of whom have published 
widely as observers of, and researchers in Russia.   
I had reviewed the work of Puffer and McCarthy in document two, and I was aware of the 
work of Fey, (although his work generally has had more of a leaning towards human 
resource management issues than competitive strategy), but Ledeneva’s  work on the 
political developments in Russia (1998, 2009, 2013) was new to me, and has been very 
useful in providing triangulating evidence supporting the significance of, for example, blat 
and corruption.  Similarly Kleiner (2012) also provides insights into the nature of corruption 
in Russia which has proved useful in interpreting the research findings, and Dawisha's (2014) 
work on the corrupt nature of Putin's sistema has helped set the context which explains the 
power of oligarchs and siloviki. 
Since some of the ideas become key parts of the analysis of my findings, it is worthwhile to 
provide a brief overview of the two areas which I think are important;  - Puffer and 
McCarthy's view of the development of the Russian business environment (Puffer, McCarthy 
2007) and Ledeneva’s and Dawisha’s works on the political governance systems in Russia. 
(Ledeneva 2009, 2013, Dawisha 2014). These later works are quoted and contextualised in 
chapters 4 and 5.  
Ledeneva's work provides invaluable insights into ways in which the workings of Russian 
society have changed during the period since the fall of the Soviet system.  Her review not 
only concerns the workings of the so-called “sistema”; the informal and unofficial political 
governance and power systems which have always been crucial to the understanding of 
how Russian society and the economy function, but also the changing nature of the informal 
practices - blat and corruption - which are endemic in Russia.   
The sistema has changed with the changing political scene.  It was always governed by 
political power, and in the Soviet era this meant the party machine, the powerful ministries 
which controlled the economy, and the nomenklatura, - people in positions of power- who 
controlled them.   
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Today the same levels of power and control exist but they are in the hands of a nominally 
different set of people: members of the government themselves, the so-called siloviki -the 
powerful individuals with access to political patronage, and the oligarchs - businessmen who 
benefited from the privatisation of state industries during the Yeltsin days.  The siloviki 
themselves are frequently drawn from the ranks of the former security services, and the 
ministries and agencies which were all-powerful in the old days.  In other words the siloviki 
today still look like those of the Soviet and Yeltsin eras. 
These siloviki and oligarchs are immensely rich and hence powerful.  The most recent 
estimates (Dawisha 2014) show Russia as being the nation with the highest levels of wealth 
inequality in the world.  110 billionaires own 35% of the total wealth in Russia, a country 
where the median level of wealth for the entire country is $871 (approx. £550).  
Dawisha characterises Putin's Russia as a kleptocracy and maintains that her research clearly 
indicates that despite government anticorruption campaigns introduced by President 
Dmitry Medvedev in 2008, the aim of the coterie which surrounds President Putin is self-
enrichment at the expense of the state, and has been so since Putin's original rise to power 
during the Yeltsin era.   (Oligarchs and siloviki seem to have realised that it is better to "toe 
the Putin line" rather than risk the same fate as Boris Berezovsky and Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky). Medvedev's anticorruption measures seem to have been more directed 
towards the lower levels of the sistema and non-siloviki rather than Putin's close associates, 
and Medvedev himself admitted in 2011 that the measures had been ineffective. 
Puffer and McCarthy's views on the way that the Russian business landscape has developed 
embrace much of Ledeneva's work.  They see the Russian business environment as a 
complex system in which the commercial sector is embedded in an all pervasive Russian 
state, and controlled by the Sistema.  They view the commercial sector of the economy as 
consisting of three main types of businesses: siloviki controlled businesses, oligarch 
controlled businesses and Western-style market based businesses. Their visualisation of the 
business environment is illustrated in the following figure: 
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FIGURE 2.2: PUFFER AND MCCARTHY'S MODEL OF THE RUSSIAN BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 
 
(Puffer, McCarthy 2007 p.4) 
On reflection, I think this describes the situation rather well and helps visualise the highly 
uneven power structures and the interlinked nature of business relationships which are the 
key characteristics of the Russian business environment.   
In the light of these later works, and using the latest data from the Economic Freedom 
Network (2013) it is possible to revisit Hunter's (1999) definition of hypo-capitalist business 
environments.  Bearing in mind that in most respects the Russian economy has become 
more open since the Yeltsin era when Hunter was undertaking his research, the comparison 
between MMBEs and a Russian style Hypo-capitalist economy needs to recognise the fact 
that the characteristics of the Russian economic landscape have changed markedly.   
Many of these economic changes have been beneficial for Russia and increased the 
openness of the Russian economy to the extent that the country has joined the World Trade 
Organisation, but other changes have had significant negative effects, most particularly 
those concerning the prevalence of corruption, the rapacious nature of the siloviki and 
oligarchs, and the emergence of powerful oligopolistic companies under the control of these 
siloviki and oligarchs who remain in thrall to the Kremlin.  The power of Putin's sistema has 
become a major issue in Russian strategic management2. (Dawisha 2014) The revised 
comparison of MMBEs and Russia's hypo-capitalist economy is shown in the following 
table,2.5 : 
                                                     
2
 The strategic importance of the small but powerful group of siloviki is demonstrated by the fact that when 
imposing economic sanctions to counter Russia's threatening moves in the east of Ukraine, the international 
community have, in many instances,  only felt it necessary to target this group. 
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TABLE 2.5  A REVISED AND UPDATED COMPARISON OF MATURE MARKET-BASED AND RUSSIAN 
HYPO-CAPITALISTIC ECONOMIES 
 Mature market based 
economy (MMBE) 
e.g. Western European/ 
Anglo-Saxon 
Hypo-capitalistic economy 
e.g. Russia 
Mechanism for command and 
control 
markets markets 
Percentage of GDP derived from 
public sector 
low Reducing, but replaced by 
oligarch/siloviki controlled 
companies 
Presence of open flexible, capital 
markets 
widespread rather limited 
Strength of independent banking 
sector 
robust weak 
Regulatory burden on business relatively low extremely high 
Inflation volatility low & stable recently stable, but highly 
dependent on exchange 
rate/oil price 
Pervasiveness of political 
corruption 
low Exceptionally high 
Transfers and subsidies as a 
percentage of GDP 
low high but reducing 
Marginal tax rate low Flat rate but regressive - 
favours the very rich 
Probability of enforcement of 
contracts 
fundamental Uncertain - subject to 
judicial corruption 
Protection of private property established Uncertain - subject to 
judicial corruption, and 
instances of expropriation 
Independence of judiciary long-established  Uncertain - subject to 
judicial corruption 
Trained management Cardre very large Small -but valued and 
growing 
Transparent corporate governance well-established and 
control 
opaque and rare in 
oligarchs and siloviki 
controlled companies 
Relatively unrestricted trade unrestricted WTO members, but 
government manipulates 
the system 
Adapted and revised from Hunter (1999 p.38) 
Further discussion on the application of these ideas to the research findings are included in 
chapters 4 and 5. 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
his chapter discusses the factors which influenced the methods which I adopted to 
undertake the research and technical aspects of the research methodology in terms of 
the analytical framework and sampling.  The operational aspects of the research;  the 
logistics of carrying out interviews in Russia and the transcription, interpretation and coding 
of the interviews, are described, as well as the methods which I adopted to ensure  the 
validity and authenticity of the findings.   
Some of these issues have been covered in detail in documents three and four, but are 
included again in summary here, in part so that this document may be read on a standalone 
basis, but also because the final part of my research - described in this document - has been 
subject to some further reflections and refinement, particularly in terms of the methods 
used to ensure authenticity. 
3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN 
This section covers the issues which influenced the choice of research methods which I have 
adopted, and justifies my choices.  The choice of research method is largely governed by the 
philosophical stance on the researcher, and at the outset of the DBA programme I was a 
confirmed realist.  A scientist by training with operations management and management 
consultancy as a career background, I only really felt comfortable when drawing conclusions 
from facts which were measurable and, for preference, quantifiable in some shape or form. 
It is fairly hard for a researcher with a "hardwired" realist paradigm to adapt easily to some 
of the more extreme interpretive research positions, but the longer I pondered on the 
research topic though, the more doubts I had about the appropriateness of realist research 
when considering the thought processes of managers from a different cultural and linguistic 
background - and who had in recent years experienced a different and massively changing 
business landscape and economic environment.  The fact that to date there has been so 
little research in the field also reduced my confidence in devising a-prioi propositions about 
the nature of strategy in Russian businesses.   
All in all, there seemed to be so many different factors which could affect the strategic 
decision-making of Russian managers when compared to their Western European 
counterparts I felt that just to measure individual dimensions of their attitudes would be 
profoundly unsatisfactory as an aid to understanding.  It seemed to me that a more holistic 
approach was called for.  By the time I had grappled with the quantitative methodology for 
document four I felt confident that this more holistic approach would lead to a better 
understanding of the complexities of strategic management in Russian businesses.   
T 
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Document two reviewed the literature surrounding the subject of business strategy in 
Russian firms and revealed that despite the large body of published work on the subject of 
strategy, to date the field of strategic management research has been largely silent on the 
subject of strategy in Russia and, in a wider context, the problems of strategic management 
in a business environment still in transition from command to free market.  As already 
noted, not only is the Russian economic business environment different from the Anglo-
Saxon/Western European business environment, but several cultural characteristics are 
markedly different from those of Western Europe and North America.  The lack of research 
concerning the effect of cultural differences on strategic thinking has been noted by several 
authors (De Wit, Meyer 2005, Puffer, McCarthy 2011) 
In these circumstances, with a dearth of existing literature, it seemed entirely appropriate to 
consider this research as exploratory in nature. It is primarily concerned with theory building 
and strengthening the fabric of understanding concerning strategic management in Russia, 
and, quite possibly, in countries with similar cultural characteristics and emerging political 
and (transitional) economic systems.  This sort of exploratory research is often interpretive, 
but in the light of the wide range of qualitative methods to choose from, the research 
design -the selection of appropriate techniques for data collection and analysis - becomes a 
significant factor in the validity of the research in terms of its trustworthiness and 
authenticity. 
In addition to the ontological stance of the researcher, though, there are several interlinked 
factors which narrow down the possible methods which can be adopted, and it seems to me 
that the consideration of what is actually operationally feasible may, on occasion, override 
philosophical preferences. 
3.3 RESEARCH DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS 
In the initial stages of my DBA studies I had intended to follow a positivist route, establishing 
a series of propositions about the nature of strategic management in Russia and 
concentrating in document five on confirming or refuting my initial ideas by undertaking a 
programme of questionnaire-based quantitative research.  I intended that the conceptual 
framework developed in document two would be investigated, initially using the 
interpretive approach required for documents three, and subsequently the positivist 
document four would act as a pilot study for the substantive work required for the thesis, 
document five.   
However, as my studies progressed, several factors made me question and revise the overall 
research design.  Firstly, undertaking the research for document three made me realise that 
the richness of the information available from face-to-face interviews was invaluable in 
interpreting the way managers think about strategy. Secondly, undertaking the 
questionnaire based research for document four, (an exercise fraught with institutional 
difficulties), made me wonder about the wisdom (and feasibility) of basing document five 
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solely on quantitative methods which were reliant on institutional partners in Russia for 
much of the work - identifying samples and administering questionnaires.  The institutional 
upheaval which, in part, gave rise to this change of direction is described in some detail in 
document four.   
Finally, having reflected on the process and principles involved in the quantitative research 
described in document four, I developed a number of doubts about the usefulness and 
meaningfulness of quantitative research in a field which is extremely nuanced and shot 
through with cultural and behavioural complexity. My experiences in working on the 
analysis in document four led me to realise that the opportunity for misunderstanding and 
misinterpreting the intended meanings of the respondents was far greater when using a 
questionnaire based survey, when there was no opportunity to probe areas of doubt by 
further questioning, than would be the case with a face-to-face interview. 
3.4 METHOD ADOPTED   
3.4.1 ANALYSIS AND THEORY BUILDING  
I finally concluded, therefore, that document five should be based on the interpretive 
approach which I had developed for document three; in other words, to base the 
methodology on grounded theory using semi structured interviews as the main data 
collection method.   
Many of the arguments which led me to this approach are detailed in document three and 
my reflections on quantitative methodology are to be found in document four, but in 
summary I was persuaded by the arguments of Glaser and Strauss (1967) that theory is (or 
at least should be) grounded in the words and actions of those individuals under study, and 
Goulding's (2005) views concerning the iterative and interactional nature of data collection.  
Having settled on qualitative research as the basis for document five, In terms of analytical 
technique, I felt that starting the analysis with a blank canvas and devising a coding schema 
by inspecting and re-inspecting the data would allow me to build theories from scratch.   In 
other words, I was persuaded that codes are nascent theory (or at least the components of 
theory) and that the process of identifying the codes from the text of transcribed interviews 
is an integral part of theory building.   
I rejected the use of data template analysis because it depends on the use of a coding 
scheme which is devised a-priori and therefore risks forcing the data into an existing 
theoretical framework rather than allowing the theory to emerge from the data.  I wanted 
to avoid analysis which would result in the research findings being forced into a procrustean 
bed - primarily because the existing beds seemed to be designed for different occupants. 
I was concerned about "importing my own preconceptions" to the analytical process, and 
although I sympathised with Glaser and Strauss's view that the research should literally 
ignore the existing literature on the area under study in order to ensure that the emergence 
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of categories will not be "contaminated", I found it harder to accept that any researcher 
involved in postgraduate-level research would not be familiar with a great deal of the 
relevant theory.  And so, in effect, this research (unlike that described in document three) is 
based on "neo-grounded theory" since it is not being approached from a completely un-
theory-laden state, but rather by an informed researcher with unformed theoretical 
preconceptions. 
However, as Goulding points out, inductive research carried out in an iterative manner 
during which literature is consulted as a continuing part of the research process at least 
fulfils the spirit of grounded theory research methodology. 
As Lansisalmi et al point out (in Cassell, Symon 2004 p.242): 
"The researchers task is not to produce a perfect description of the area he or she 
wishes to understand, but to develop a theory that accounts for much of the relevant 
behaviour.  Grounded theory developed through the constant comparative analysis 
where a specific coding scheme is used to ensure conceptual developments and 
density.  With respect to data sources grounded theory often applies triangulation - 
namely combines different types of data collected by interviews, participative 
observation and analysis of documents." 
Bearing this in mind, I have included quotations from documents, press reports, the 
published results of other cultural, political and economic studies and illustrative anecdotes 
wherever it has been appropriate to reinforce the theoretical construct which has emerged 
from the transcribed interviews. 
3.4.2 DATA GATHERING  
At the outset of the research I considered several methods of gathering information for the 
study, including the use of case studies, focus groups, structured interviews etc.  The detail 
and arguments related to the choice of methods are included in document three, but in 
summary, for mainly practical reasons involving the ability to recruit suitable respondents 
willing to be interviewed as part of the study, I eventually decided that the majority of the 
information gathering should take place through face-to-face interviews with Russian 
managers.   
The first interviews were quite unstructured: I was anxious to explore and identify the issues 
concerning strategic management which were important to Russian managers, and so the 
conversations were wide-ranging and steered by the issues raised by the managers 
themselves with just a few prompts from me to ensure that current issues in strategy were 
included in the conversation.  Later interviews were slightly more structured in that I 
deliberately raised themes which were identified in prior interviews in the conversation.  
Even so, I tried to maintain a conversational feel to the interviews rather than deliberately 
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asking questions.  I felt that this "light touch" approach was the most appropriate when 
trying to uncover issues and attitudes amongst the Russian interviewees. 
The interviews themselves were arranged on my behalf by colleagues from Tyumen State 
University (TSU) and the State University of Management (SUM) in Moscow.  This enabled 
me to take advantage of existing institutional links between the University of 
Wolverhampton (UoW) and TSU, and to build on existing personal friendships and 
acquaintances with people in the Moscow region.  Key assistance in the recruiting of 
interviewees came from the then rector of SUM, who was known to me socially (since he 
had undertaken some of his doctoral research whilst on sabbatical at UoW), and the head of 
the Institute for Continuing Professional Education at TSU.  Both were asked to recruit a 
cross-section of managers from small and large companies and from a variety of industrial 
sectors.  From a practical point of view it would have been completely impossible for me to 
recruit managers in Russia without this assistance.  
Following the normal practice of grounded theory research, as the interview process 
progressed I immersed myself in the data and compiled handwritten notes consisting mainly 
of bullet points identifying the themes which had been discussed in each interview.  As the 
basis of grounded theory is to elicit information from observations in an iterative manner 
before achieving theoretical saturation, I used these informal notes to "steer" subsequent 
interviews.  This was in addition to the recording and subsequent transcription process 
which, necessarily, took place sometime after the interviews were recorded.  Work 
colleagues who had undertaken similar qualitative research stressed to me how time-
consuming the coding process could be, and after attempting to annotate the transcriptions 
and use post-it notes to sort and identify themes, I invested in QSR Nvivo software to speed 
up the coding process. 
3.4.3 SAMPLING STRATEGY 
Strauss and Corbin (1998) advocate the use of theoretical sampling; as themes become 
apparent as analysis progresses, interview candidates who are likely to throw further light 
on to the emergent themes are sought out.  I attempted to follow this guideline as far as 
possible by discussing the interview findings and emerging themes with my Russian 
colleagues and asking them to find suitable candidates.  I think that this was only partially 
achieved because there are other constraints on the availability of managers to be 
interviewed - in particular the fact that I was visiting Russia infrequently and at times which 
were dictated primarily by my work commitments.  As a result many of the interview 
candidates were selected, in part, by their and my availability. 
It should also be noted that it is possible that managers who are contacts of University 
academics will not necessarily represent those in the population as a whole.  However, the 
arguments in favour of using such a sample are similar to those put forward by Hofstede 
(2002)  when justifying using a sample of IBM managers to develop his theories concerning 
national cultural differences, namely that it would have been unfeasible to undertake the 
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research without taking advantage of the opportunity.  One could also argue that the 
managers that I interviewed, because of their existing contacts with TSU and SUM, were 
more likely to be aware of, and informed about the issues that I was interested in discussing 
with them.  Nevertheless, as I have already noted, sometimes research design is greatly 
influenced by practical issues, and in the analysis phase I have tried to take into account the 
nature of the sample when considering the context and the Interpretation of the findings. 
3.4.4 SAMPLE SIZE  
Since the object of the research was to provide an in-depth analysis of the practice of 
managers engaged in strategic management, and in particular the generation of competitive 
strategies, it is focused on explanation rather than generalisation, and such inductive, 
interpretive research typically relies on a relatively small sample. (Ritchie, Lewis 2003) 
Ritchie and Lewis note that there are several reasons given to justify these smaller sample 
sizes: 
 There is a point of diminishing return to a qualitative sample - as the study goes on 
more data does not necessarily lead to more information.  This is because one 
occurrence of a single piece of data or a single code is all that is necessary to ensure 
that it becomes part of the analysis.   
 Frequencies are rarely important in qualitative research as one occurrence of the 
data is potentially as useful as many in understanding the process behind a topic. 
 Because qualitative research is very labour intensive (particularly in terms of 
transcribing interviews), analysing a large sample can be very time-consuming and 
often simply impractical. 
(Ritchie, Lewis 2003)                                                                                                                                                  
I would add that, particularly for international studies, access to suitable interviewees may 
be restricted by the economics and logistics of conducting overseas research (in terms of 
funding visits and arranging translating and interpreting facilities) and the administrative 
difficulties associated with recruiting managers to participate in the study. 
Although it is generally recognised that the sample sizes in qualitative research will be 
smaller than those for quantitative studies, there is some discussion, and uncertainty 
concerning how large samples should actually be.  Qualitative samples must be large 
enough to assure that all of the perceptions or the themes which are important to the study 
are revealed, but at the same time must not be too large so that the data becomes 
repetitive and cumbersome to analyse.  Mason (2010) maintains that the principles 
underpinning qualitative research imply that the sample size should generally follow the 
concept of saturation, i.e. when the collection of new data does not shed any further light 
on the issue under investigation.  This issue of theoretical saturation is discussed in more 
detail in a subsequent section.   
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Unlike quantitative studies, where the sample size can be established as a mathematical 
function of the desired validity or confidence level, this qualitative concept of saturation 
provides no such guidelines as to what constitutes a sufficient sample size.  In fact there 
seem to be no generally accepted or definitive rules concerning sample size, and indeed 
there are some strong indications of "rules of thumb" being adopted in qualitative research 
practice.  Mason cites several guideline figures for qualitative or interpretive research 
samples, without them displaying much consistency: 
 Ritchie and Lewis ( 2003 p.84) state that qualitative samples often lie under 50 
 Morse indicates that a sample of 30-50 interviews is appropriate, but  
 Creswell (1998, p64) suggests that 5-24 interviews will often suffice for grounded 
theory research 
 Charmaz (2006, p114) suggests that 25 participants are adequate for smaller projects 
 Bertaux (1981, p35) suggests that 15 is the smallest acceptable sample for 
qualitative studies. 
 Green and Thorogood (2009, p124) state that "the experience of most qualitative 
researchers is that in interview studies little that is "new" comes out of transcripts 
after you have interviewed 20 or so people." 
In a study of 560 Ph.D. studies using qualitative methodology Mason (2010) found that the 
distribution of sample sizes was bimodal, described by a pattern with modes at 20 and 30 
samples.  For those studies using grounded theory methodology, the mode was 25 and the 
mean 32 interviews (the mean was skewed by a very small number of studies using very 
large samples).   
Mason's study suggests that in many instances, sample sizes in qualitative research are 
chosen as convenient numbers (10, 20, 30, or 40 etc interviews) without the researcher 
having developed any logically consistent reasons for choosing that sample size.  He 
maintains that this is contrary to the principles of qualitative research where the sample size 
should be governed by the point at which theoretical saturation is achieved. (At this stage it 
needs to be remembered that figures quoted above are total reported sample sizes, not the 
number of interviews which had been undertaken at the point at which saturation was 
achieved.) 
3.4.5 THE SAMPLE USED IN THIS STUDY 
The data collected for this research are mainly obtained from interviews with Russian 
managers working in the Moscow region, Tyumen city and the wider Tyumen oblast in 
Western Siberia.   The aim of the research was to investigate the strategic management 
practices of Russian managers, rather than undertaking a formal comparative study 
between British and Russian managers in terms of their attitudes to competitive strategy.  
However, the results of the study cannot be understood without setting them in context 
with the views and behaviours of Anglo-Saxon counterpart managers as a reference point 
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(primarily because to date competitive strategy has been almost exclusively researched in 
an Anglo-Saxon/Western European context).   
In order to provide the contextual background, therefore, after the Russian interviews had 
been completed I also undertook a series of in-depth unstructured interviews with British 
based managers working in the same industries as their Russian interviewee counterparts 
and subjected them to the same analytical process. 
In all, I conducted 31 interviews with a sample made up of 23 Russian managers, two 
expatriate Americans living in Moscow3 and six British managers.  The interviews were 
carried out in five distinct tranches carried out during separate visits to the Russian 
Fedaration and one tranche of interviews undertaken in the UK. 
Russian Interviews took place in Tyumen city and Moscow, but some of the managers were 
based in other regions of the Russian Federation (St Petersburg and Kursk), and other cities 
within the Tyumen oblast.  The sequence and location of the interviews were as follows: 
TABLE 3.1 THE SEQUENCE AND DISTRIBUTION OF INTERVIEWS 
Tranche Location Number of 
interviewees 
Comments 
1st Tyumen  4 Individually transcribed and analysed 
interviews (undertaken at TSU). 
2nd Moscow  5 Individually transcribed and analysed 
interviews (undertaken at SUM). 
3rd Tyumen  4 Group interview/focus group (later 
individually transcribed and analysed) 
4th Tyumen 6 Individually transcribed and analysed 
interviews (undertaken at TSU and other 
Tyumen city locations). 
5th Moscow 3 Individually transcribed and analysed 
interviews undertaken in central Moscow 
6th UK 7 6 individually transcribed and analysed 
interviews with British managers + one 
Russian consultant based in the UK and 
Ekaterinburg. 
The characteristics of the sample in terms of the size and type of organisations employing 
the interviewees are described in the following tables: 
                                                     
3 The two expatriate Americans were personal friends living in Moscow who had significant in-depth understanding of the 
Russian economy and business landscape.  One of them was the chief operating officer of a leading  American bank in 
Moscow and the other had been one of the OECD's experts  on the Russian economy (with a Ph.D. in the Soviet intellectual 
property system), seconded from the US Dept of commerce and based at the organisation's Paris headquarters until his 
secondment finished.  He subsequently moved to Moscow for a few years in order to complete a book.  
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TABLE 3.2 THE SIZE OF COMPANIES EMPLOYING THE INTERVIEWEES 
Company Size Russian interviewees British/US interviewees 
Micro 2 2 
Small 6 3 
Medium 5 1 
Large  6 1 
NGO 1 1 
Academic institutions/ government   3  
Total 23 8 
 
From this table it can be seen that the Russian managers interviewed in this research 
tended to be employed by larger organisations when compared to their British counterparts 
and this is to be expected since, as noted in document two (2009), smaller businesses are 
rather underrepresented in the Russian business environment when compared to Western 
European economies.  The non-Russian interviewees were purposely selected on the basis 
of their comparable industry experience rather than company size or ownership 
characteristics.   
The industry background of the interviewees is shown in the following table: 
TABLE 3.3 INDUSTRIES IN WHICH THE INTERVIEWEES WERE EMPLOYED 
Industry Sector Russian interviewees British/US interviewees 
Banking 1 1 
Consulting/Business Services 5 3 
IT & Communication Systems  4  
Construction 1 2 
Manufacturing & Distribution 3 1 
Transport 1  
Wholesale Distribution 1  
Retail 1  
Health & Personal Services 1  
NGO  1 1 
Government Adviser 1  
Academic institutions  3  
Total 23 8 
 
The spread of industries is generally appropriate given the make-up of the Russian economy 
- with the proviso that some sectors are underrepresented.  Specifically, oil and gas, raw 
material extraction and large-scale heavy industry are sectors still dominated by oligarch 
owned or siloviki managed ex-state-owned industries where research access to decision-
making strategic managers is practically impossible to achieve. 
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The overall sample size of 31 interviewees is close to the upper mode (30) of the bimodal 
distribution identified by Mason (2010) for all interpretive research, and exceeds the mode 
for grounded theory research studies (25), (although to some extent this is a post hoc 
justification of the sample size used in this study because the most important factors in 
determining the sample size in my case were the costs and practical arrangements required 
to undertake the interviews in Russia).   
However, although costs and logistics were the main determinants of sample size, in 
practice I was confident that saturation had been achieved relatively early in the study and 
consequently the final sample size appears appropriate, and lay within the normal range of 
grounded theory sample sizes. 
In addition to conducting interviews with the formal sample which is reported in this 
research, I also had several informal conversations with academic colleagues both in the UK 
and Russia, and some conversations with working managers and postgraduate students in 
the course of my normal work.  Whilst I did not record or transcribe these conversations, I 
have no doubt that they have had some influence on my overall interpretation of the 
ongoing research.  I think that this is a normal situation, and may ultimately lead to greater 
confidence in the authenticity of the research - by providing a degree of educative 
authentication.   
Details of interviewees making up the sample of are to be found in table A1 in Appendix 14 
 
3.4.6 THEORETICAL SATURATION 
One of the important features of grounded theory research is that the data are gathered 
through iterative sampling.  Strauss and Corbin (1998) recommend that the selection of the 
sample and conduct of interviews be guided by the development of the concepts as they 
emerge, so that once additional data does not appear to be adding to the particular concept 
which is emerging, "theoretical saturation" has been reached and the theory has been 
developed sufficiently to be considered "ready".   
In other words: 
 no new or relevant data seem to emerge regarding a category,  
 the category is well developed in terms of its properties and dimensions,   
 and  
 the relationships among categories are well established and validated. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
                                                     
4
 NB: The names of interviewees contained in table  A1 in earlier drafts of this document have been redacted or replaced 
by initials in this publicly accessible version in order to maintain the anonymity of interviewees 
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The context in which themes are uncovered as part of the interpretive process is evidently 
important and is attracting attention in the fields of interpretive research and public sector 
strategy evaluation (Pawson, Tilley 1997).  
Dick, (in Cassell, Symon 2004 p.206),  maintains that in attempting to identify a specific 
theme it may also be  important to be able to demonstrate that theme is found in 
discussions with respondents from several different organisational and personal contexts 
(for example age, seniority, role, industry type and so on).   
One could also argue, of course, that in certain studies, the fact that a theme is found in 
only one particular group rather than several different groups may be equally significant.  
For example the fact that a younger manager, or one working for a smaller company may 
express more entrepreneurial attitudes may be significant in its own right by suggesting that 
entrepreneurialism maybe more common in certain age groups and types of business.  
These sorts of contextual issues are considered in the discussion of the findings in the next 
chapter. 
Clearly, the point at which theoretical saturation has been reached depends to a certain 
extent on the judgement of the researcher.  Mason (2010) points out that whilst one 
researcher might point out that a particular theme or category is saturated very quickly, 
another researcher may explore the context of that theme in more detail to gain insights 
into meanings or origins. 
This is one of the issues which could potentially lead to questions about the authenticity of 
research, and whilst there do not seem to be any definitive guidelines as to the number of 
interviews required to achieve theoretical saturation, there have been several studies which 
investigate the typical numbers involved and which discuss the issues and criteria that 
influence the saturation decision on the part of the researcher. For example, having 
undertaken a review of 100 grounded theory-based pieces of research, Thomson (2011) 
found that “saturation normally occurs between 10 and 30 interviews.” 
So, although not precisely quantified, there is some consensus in the idea that saturation 
can be reached fairly early on, with some researchers claiming that saturation has been 
reached with as few as six interviews enabling the development of meaningful themes and 
useful interpretations. 
 Although saturation might occur, for example, after the tenth interview, it is good practice 
to test the level of saturation by conducting a few more interviews. Also these extra 
interviews act as a form of validation of the patterns, concepts, categories, properties, and 
dimensions that the researcher has developed from the previous interviews.” 
(In practice, all new interviews and conversations will inevitably present new viewpoints and 
insights to some extent, but I think a key feature of grounded theory is that the judgement 
about the point at which theoretical saturation is achieved is a personal one on the part of 
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the researcher, and notwithstanding Thomson's review of grounded theory practice, the 
assessment of theoretical saturation relies on an holistic view of the research findings;  
primarily by living with and wallowing in the data.  There must, of course, remain a  doubt, 
though, that with small sample sizes and theoretical saturation dependent on a personal 
judgement on the part of the researcher, that the data could be incomplete - that the next 
interview could contain a "killer fact" or vital insight.  In this respect interpretive research 
requires that the researcher not only has to interpret the meaning of the various discourses 
which represent the raw data, but also the point at which that interpretation is complete.) 
3.4.7 ANALYSIS OF THE DATA 
Grounded theory methodology involves an iterative process whereby interview results are 
coded and interpreted as a continuing process as the research progresses rather than 
waiting until all interviews have been completed before analysing the results with an a-
priori developed coding scheme.  In this instance, the results of coding the first five Russian 
interviews were reported in document three and the analysis is continued in this document 
with the addition of the later Russian interviews and those conducted with British 
managers.   
I adopted an open coding scheme and used Nvivo software to analyse the transcriptions and 
identify the initial nodes (emergent themes).  This first pass through the interview 
transcripts identified 55 significant ideas and practices, and in addition, identified the issues 
which proved to be problematic for their businesses.   
As part of this initial analysis I felt that it would be useful to review the statistics produced 
by Nvivo which show the number of documents, passages and paragraphs which were 
coded to the various nodes.  The statistics were manipulated in an attempt to determine the 
importance of the various themes.  However, having gone through the exercise to 
determine the significance of themes using the frequency of coding of individual themes 
and the amount of text coded, I concluded that because really significant themes or ideas 
may be mentioned only once, the exercise was not particularly meaningful.  This issue is also 
identified by Ritchie and Lewis (2003) in their views on sample sizes in interpretive research. 
A second pass through the initial data identified the overarching themes which were 
emerging from the interviews and enabled the links between the various nodes to be 
established. The results of this first stage of the analysis are summarised in Table 4.1 in 
findings, and appendix 2 contains the detailed node tables. 
The first five interviews determined the general direction of the subsequent elements of the 
research by identifying the most significant themes which were emerging.  The discourse 
which occurred in the subsequent interviews probed and elaborated on these emergent 
themes until significant variations and insights ceased to be evident in the conversations.  At 
this point I judged that theoretical saturation had occurred.  In the subsequent chapters 
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which report findings and discuss their implications I have attempted to use triangulating 
evidence to support the judgement about theoretical saturation having been reached. 
3.5 OPERATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
3.5.1 INTERVIEWS 
Interviews took place in Tyumen on University premises at the Regional Institute for 
International Cooperation (RIIC) and in workplaces, cafes and bars in Tyumen city.  During 
my second visit, one of the interview sessions was conducted more like a focus group 
because TSU colleagues had assembled a group of managers willing to be interviewed.  
However subsequent review and transcription of the recording was exceptionally difficult, 
firstly because it was occasionally impossible to determine who had actually made a 
particular statement or comment, and secondly because the conversation was largely in 
Russian and the interpreter sometimes used consecutive translation which made it difficult 
to use follow-up probing techniques.   In addition, when it came to NVivo coding, for 
technical reasons it was necessary to repeat the coding of the group conversation 
separately for each participant which proved cumbersome. Subsequent interviews were 
undertaken on a one-to-one basis which was much easier to transcribe and code. 
Interviews in Moscow took place at the State University of Management campus and in 
cafes on the Arbat near my Moscow base.  With the exception of two social encounters 
(which were not recorded), all of the Moscow interviews were one-to-one and recorded for 
later transcription.  The one-to-one interviews were about 35 to 40 minutes in duration, 
(although several minutes of each were generally taken up with introductions and 
icebreaking conversation).  When transcribed, the interviews from the focus group-like 
session held in Tyumen proved to be rather shorter, with the whole meeting lasting 
approximately 1 hour 15 minutes. 
3.5.2 RECORDING AND TRANSCRIPTION  
Nearly all the interviews were recorded and transcribed for later analysis and coding.  The 
only exceptions were those which took place in a social setting where it would have been 
inappropriate to use the recorder.  In these instances notes were made soon after the social 
event as possible.  Although it was a very time-consuming exercise, I transcribed all the 
interviews rather than using a professional transcription service.  This is primarily because 
many of the interviewees had strong accents and even with translators present at the 
majority of the interviews, it was frequently necessary to listen to a particular passage two 
or three times in order to make sense of what was being said after the event.  Sometimes, 
even with repeated listening it was still impossible to transcribe a passage without some 
doubts or queries, and in these instances, the passage was occasionally omitted or a note 
concerning the doubt in meaning was appended.  This detailed clarification would simply 
not have been possible with a commercial transcription service. 
 
42 | P a g e  
 
3.5.3 INTERPRETING AND TRANSLATING  
The majority of the interviewees spoke English, but many were not confident enough to 
conduct the entire interview in English, and so in all cases of interviews with non-
Anglophone managers I arranged for an interpreter to be present.  I was fortunate enough 
to be able to call on the services of colleagues at the state University of management in 
Moscow and TSU in Tyumen to act as interpreters.  In TSU two colleagues were involved in 
the interviews.  One was a member of the English faculty who had spent time in the UK, had 
facilitated many English courses for Russian managers and had acted as one of the course 
administrators for the English-language MBA programme delivered at TSU.  The other was a 
business graduate student at TSU who had spent one year of his undergraduate business 
degree studying in the UK.  As a result, both the Tyumen interpreters were completely 
familiar with the specialist vocabulary and terminology used in the study. Similarly, the 
interpreter at SUM, was a part-time doctoral student in a management discipline and so was 
equally conversant with the interview topic. 
The interpreters in Tyumen favoured a simultaneous interpreting style (where the 
interpreter attempts to provide an English version of the conversation on the phrase by 
phrase basis as the conversation is taking place).  The SUM interpreter however was more 
comfortable using a consecutive style (where the interpreter waits until the speaker has 
finished a statement before providing its English translation.)  From a purely practical point 
of view I much preferred the simultaneous approach which made interjections and probing 
for clarification much easier.  In addition, it made me much more confident that the English 
version represented a truer version of what the Russian interviewee had intended because 
there was less opportunity for the interpreter to forget parts of the Russian version prior to 
delivering the English version. 
3.6 CRITERIA FOR JUDGING THE VALIDITY OF THE RESEARCH  
From the outset of my DBA research I have been at pains to ensure that my research 
methods and the application of analytical frameworks would be able to withstand the close 
scrutiny which is the essence of the peer review process.  Consequently, both for 
documents three and four I have looked carefully at the published work on research quality 
criteria in an attempt to identify the criteria which I felt were most appropriate for the type 
of research which I was undertaking for those documents.  In document five, since it is the 
main document subject to external scrutiny, I have reviewed the quality criteria which could 
be applied and selected those which I think are the most important in convincing the reader 
of the research that the findings and conclusions are valid and credible. 
The criteria for assuring the quality of the interpretive research undertaken in document 
three were described there in some detail.  (Document three (2010)  Similarly, document 
four contains detail of the procedural approach which I adopted to assure the quality of 
quantitative research, and in particular the ways in which inferential statistical methods 
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could be used to validate the generalisability of the research findings.  (Document four 
(2013) 
The challenges for assuring the validity of the research in document five are broadly similar 
to those for document three, namely to ensure that the research is trustworthy and 
authentic, and that the models and frameworks developed from the findings of the research 
have value in explaining phenomena in a wider context than just the population 
investigated in this specific research.  I have been anxious therefore to ensure that the 
model which I had developed can be seen as robust, and I have used Krugman’s (2012) 
description as the standard by which the model can be judged: 
“[…..] And one more point: what we learn from this story is that a model may be 
created to answer one question, or defend a particular position, but if it’s a good model 
it can be used in multiple settings, The point is that a helpful […] model is not a 
propaganda slogan, to be discarded whenever the party line changes. It is, instead, a 
structure that can be used to improve your understanding in many contexts.   
The development of the model is described in chapter 5, and covers not only the 
explanation of the research findings detailed in chapter 4, but also some wider aspects of 
strategic management. 
In Document three I adopted Maxwell's (2002) approach to quality in which he suggests a 
set of criteria against which the acceptability of the research may be judged. These were: 
 Descriptive validity; which refers to the factual accuracy of the account as reported by 
the researcher. 
 
 Interpretive validity; which judges the extent to which the qualitative researcher 
accurately portrays the meanings given by the participants to what is being studied. 
 
 Theoretical validity; which refers to the degree to which a theoretical explanation 
developed to explain the data actually fits the data.  
 
 Generalisability; which refers to the extent to which the research findings may be 
extended to groups other than those which have been the direct subject of the 
research. This is divided into two parts, internal generalisability and external 
generalisability. In this instance internal generalisability refers to the extent to which 
the findings could be applied to other Russian managers, whilst external generalisability 
would be concerned with wider populations - for example all managers working in 
particularist societies. 
 
In that work I described how I had attempted to meet these criteria as follows: 
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3.6.1 DESCRIPTIVE VALIDITY 
The descriptive validity measure is probably the criterion most easily satisfied. All of the 
interviews were recorded using a digital voice recorder and were transcribed by me. 
Wherever any doubt existed as to the meaning of what was being said in an interview I took 
the opportunity to probe the meaning there and then. The transcriptions and the digital 
audio files are available for reference. 
3.6.2 INTERPRETIVE VALIDITY 
I was anxious to make sure that my interpretation of the ideas and themes captured in the 
interviews was valid.  Conventionally, interviewers are encouraged to confirm with 
interviewees after the event that the interpretation is valid in terms of what they 
interviewee had intended as meaning. In practice, this is not really feasible when interviews 
are carried out abroad, since there is commonly no time to reflect on what they interviewee 
meant by a particular reply or statement. 
However some triangulation evidence was sought by conducting conversations and 
interviews with knowledgeable third parties and experts in some aspects of Russian 
business, notably banking, industrial relations and human resource management. I was also 
able to discuss with the Russian interpreters whether or not I had correctly understood the 
sense of the conversation. This was particularly useful for understanding the Russian 
cultural context.  
Furthermore it did occur to me, as an insight whilst I was transcribing the interviews, that 
although the literature stresses the importance of validation by reference to the original 
interviewee or by triangulation, in many instances the normal probing that one has 
undertaken as part of an unstructured interview means that there are only a few instances 
when the validity is in doubt -most doubts should have been eliminated by the process of 
probing for clarification. 
3.6.3 THEORETICAL VALIDITY 
The research process is iterative from its outset, and from the outset I have made efforts to 
discuss findings with peers both in the UK and in Russia. I have also attempted to find 
triangulating evidence and sought academic underpinning material as a concurrent activity. 
3.6.4 GENERALISABILITY 
Internal generalisability is not easy to demonstrate in any form of interpretive research, 
although the fact that common themes emerged amongst the unrelated managers 
interviewed as part of the process of reaching theoretical saturation does tend to point 
towards the research findings being applicable to the wider body of Russian managers.  
There were few notable areas of dissent amongst the managers whom I interviewed, 
whether from small or large companies or Moscow or the provinces.  
Nevertheless, external generalisability remains an issue.  I have been at some pains to avoid 
falling into a fallacy of composition by claiming more for the research than can legitimately 
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be deduced from the research findings, and having concluded the research described in 
document three, I noted that:  
"It seems clear at this stage that external generalisability cannot be satisfactorily and 
completely established. Further international research will be required in order to extend 
the findings to other national groups of managers with any degree of confidence.  
Nonetheless, the conclusions drawn from the research are plausible and consistent with 
other strands of research in the fields of cultural studies and strategic management, and so 
it can be safely claimed that the research provides some positive direction for future 
studies." 
The following table summarises the measures which I took in document three to ensure 
validity. 
TABLE 3.4 DOCUMENT THREE RESEARCH VALIDITY - INTERPRETIVE RESEARCH 
Aspect of validity Measures taken 
Descriptive validity Recording of interviews, transcription of 
recordings carried out personally, 
contemporaneous clarification by probing 
during interviews, consultation with 
bilingual subject aware interpreters 
(present & available for all interviews) 
Interpretive validity Confirmation of correct interpretation of 
data by discussion with bilingual & subject 
aware interpreters 
Theoretical validity Discussion with UK peers & Russian 
academic colleagues 
Generalisability Discussion with initial interviewees & 
second phase interviewees (from 
subsequent research phase) 
(Document_three 2010) 
3.6.5 THE CRITERIA WHICH APPLY TO THE PROCESS OF INTERPRETING THE DATA 
The final criterion which needs to be addressed in any interpretive research concerns the 
trustworthiness of the interpretation of the research.  As Bowen (2009) notes, qualitative 
research has been criticized [by quantitative researchers with a positivist ontological 
outlook] as lacking scientific rigour, as being merely a collection of anecdotes and personal 
impressions, and for being strongly subject to researcher bias.   
Schwandt (2007 p.12) states that: 
"The central principles of the philosophy of interpretivism stand in sharp contrast to 
what is, more or less, a standard epistemological account of establishing the 
objectivity and truthfulness of claims that we make about the world.  [According to] 
that account, a claim is considered objective and true to the extent that it is free of any 
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biasing influence of context or background beliefs, and accurately mirrors the way in 
which the world really is” 
However, he makes the point strongly that interpretation is not simply an individual 
cognitive act but a social and political practice, and is an omnipresent feature of all human 
attempts to understand and evaluate observations and evidence.  As a consequence, the 
researcher cannot help but always be situated relative to social circumstances - a web of 
beliefs, practices and standpoints - that he or she has learned as ways of living in, and 
understanding the world.  In other words, all interpretation depends on the cultural 
grounded-ness and personal experience of the researcher him/herself.   
This issue of perceptions and interpretation being culturally grounded has become a very 
important consideration for me during the course of this research, and has already been 
alluded to in some depth in both documents three and four. The central principle of much 
sociological research is that it is only possible to know the meaning of an act or statement 
within the context of the discourse or world view from which it originates. 
The importance of this aspect of interpretive research has led me to consider whether the 
traditional criteria for assessing research (as discussed in the previous section) are 
sufficiently rigorous, particularly in instances where, like mine, researcher and subjects 
come from different cultural backgrounds and with very different experiences of their native 
business environment.  To reassure myself on this point I have attempted to ensure that the 
interpretation of the interviews which I undertook can be considered by the reader as 
credible and truthful. 
The most prolific authors on this topic, Lincoln and Guba (2007), put forward two sets of 
criteria, one of which, Trustworthiness, mirrors the conventional realist paradigms: internal 
validity, external validity, theoretical validity, reliability and objectivity.   
The issue of generalisability is not considered by Lincoln and Guba presumably because of 
the inherent conceptual difficulty of generalising interpretive findings.  They assert that for 
interpretive research: 
" [….]the nature of "truth" statements demands that inquirers abandon the 
assumption that enduring, context-free truth statements - generalisations - can and 
should be sought.  Rather, [……] it asserts that all human behaviour is time and 
context bound; this boundedness suggests that the inquiry is incapable of producing 
nomothetic knowledge but instead only idiographic "working hypotheses" that relate 
to a given and specific context.  Applications may be possible in another context, 
but they require a detailed comparison of the receiving context with the thick 
description [of the original context]" (my emphasis) 
(Lincoln, Guba 2007 p.17) 
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They suggest that there are four elements which go to make up the criteria of 
trustworthiness.  These are: credibility as an analogue to internal validity, transferability as 
an analogue to external validity, dependability as an analogue to reliability, and 
confirmability as an analogue to objectivity.  Their proposed requirements to achieve these 
criteria include: 
 For Credibility:  
Prolonged and persistent observation, triangulation, peer discussion and debriefing, 
negative case analysis and continuous informal testing of information by soliciting 
reaction of respondents to the researcher's conclusions. 
 For Transferability: 
Thick [rich] descriptive data - narrative developed about the context so that 
judgements about the degree of fit or similarity may be made by others who may 
wish to apply all or part of the findings elsewhere. 
 For Dependability and Confirmability: 
An external audit requiring an audit trail and the carrying out of an audit by a 
competent external disinterested auditor. 
In addition to these trustworthiness criteria which mirror conventional positivist criteria, 
Lincoln and Guba propose a second set of criteria - Authenticity - which addresses some of 
the problems of interpretive research that are not adequately or properly covered by the 
trustworthiness criteria.  These are primarily the problems which arise from research which 
involves multiple value structures, social pluralism and the like.  Lincoln and Guba believe 
that these additional criteria are required for these more complex forms of research 
because the conventional criteria refer only to methodology and ignore the importance of 
context.  In my own research, the problems of context loom large, so I have tried to consider 
these criteria along with those which deal with more conventional research validity issues. 
The criteria which contribute to the overall authenticity measure are: 
 Fairness 
 Ontological authentication 
 Educative authentication 
The measures which concern themselves with bringing the results of research into some 
form of effective practical outcome are: 
 Catalytic authentication 
 Tactical authenticity 
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The final two criteria have little relevance to this research, but I have considered issues of 
fairness (ways in which interviewees and respondents are treated ethically, and with respect 
as stakeholders), ontological authentication (most obviously in the reflection required to 
increase my appreciation of the complexities of cultural impacts which were, at the outset 
of this research, appreciated relatively poorly), and educative authentication (developing an 
increased understanding of how different opinions, judgments and actions are evoked, by 
discussing these areas with other research stakeholders - colleagues in Tyumen, Russian 
managers in informal social surroundings, academic colleagues and English managers.) 
In order to demonstrate that these criteria for trustworthiness and authenticity have been 
applied in a rigorous manner, Bowen (2009) advocates maintenance by the researcher of an 
audit trail which documents chronologically and systematically what they did, how they did 
it, and how they arrived at their interpretations.  Carried out in this way, he maintains that 
audit trails are an effective trustworthiness technique which helps researchers to establish 
the dependability and confirmability of their research outcomes, and also helps readers of 
research reports to assess the research process and the emergent theory. 
In case of the research described in this document, the whole of the research process is 
covered by such an audit trail because the DBA programme itself records all of the items 
which Bowen recommends for inclusion as an audit trail, and the documentation is 
comprehensive, sequential and academically assessed at each stage. 
It is true to say that definitive criteria to be adopted for interpretive research should be 
considered to be still a work in progress, but I have chosen to adopt the criteria which have 
seemed to me to be the most important to ensure the "believability" of my research.  As 
with the issue of sample size, to an extent this process has developed over the course of my 
study, and consequently this area represents a reflective, post hoc justification of my 
research activity.  Nonetheless, the foregoing discussion does accurately describe my 
concern for, and attempts to realise valid (and interesting) research outcomes. 
3.6.6 MY RESEARCH QUALITY CRITERIA SUMMARISED 
When developing quality criteria for the quantitative research which forms the basis of 
Document four I concluded that the generic criteria for assessing the quality of research 
which has been developed by the Southwest Educational Development Laboratory (SEDL) 
(National Center for the Dissemination of Disability Research (NCDDR) 2005) would be 
useful as a form of check list, and despite the fact that I used this check list when 
undertaking the positivist quantitative research described in document four, I think that this 
comprehensive check list is generic in nature and remains applicable for document five as 
well.   
 
NCDDR (2005) maintains that quality research most commonly refers to the scientific 
process encompassing all aspects of study design; in particular, it pertains to the judgment 
regarding the match between the methods and questions, selection of subjects, 
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measurement of outcomes, and protection against systematic bias, non-systematic bias, and 
inferential error.  Despite the interpretive nature of this research, I feel that this check list is 
still broadly applicable.   In summary the authors conclude that good research should: 
 
• Pose a significant, important question that can be investigated empirically and that 
contributes to the knowledge base 
• Test questions that are linked to relevant theory 
• Apply methods that best address the research questions of interest 
• Base research on clear chains of inferential reasoning supported and justified by a 
complete coverage of the relevant literature 
• Provide the necessary information to reproduce or replicate the study 
• Ensure the study design, methods, and procedures are sufficiently transparent and 
ensure an independent, balanced, and objective approach to the research 
• Provide sufficient description of the sample, the intervention, and any comparison 
groups 
• Use appropriate and reliable conceptualization and measurement of variables 
• Evaluate alternative explanations for any findings 
• Assess the possible impact of systematic bias 
• Submit research to a peer-review process 
• Adhere to quality standards for reporting (i.e., clear, cogent, complete) 
In reflecting on the research for document five I have attempted to use the above criteria, 
modified to include Maxwell's views on interpretive research, Lincoln and Guba's views on 
trustworthiness and authenticity and Krugman's views on model building in order to 
compile a comprehensive research quality checklist.  
The criteria for assuring the validity of the research in this study and the measures which I 
have undertaken to meet the criteria listed above are summarised and reviewed in Table 5.3 
in Chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
he findings detailed in this chapter build on the work which was described in document 
three and which marked the first phase of the grounded theory research described in 
this document.  At the completion of the first phase 55 themes had emerged from which I 
had identified seven overarching themes.  However, by the time I had completed the 
transcription and analysis of all of the interviews including the British managers, and 
considered the triangulating evidence which I then sought, the "shape" of the findings had 
changed somewhat.  Instead of seven main themes, the findings divided themselves 
naturally into three main areas. 
4.2 STAGES OF RESEARCH 
The first phase of the research, reported in document three, involved the analysis of the 
transcripts of the first six (of 31) interviews, but since it forms part of the overall research 
and was a precursor to phase two, the findings are included here.  The second phase elicited 
much more detail concerning the actual beliefs, practices and behaviour of the managers 
and therefore produced a good deal of "rich" or "thick" data.  This has been used to validate 
the initial coding, and since the outcomes of the coding process itself represents nascent 
theory, the additional themes and detail from phase two have enabled a more complete 
model to be conceptualised. 
Of the overarching themes which emerged from the initial Russian phase of the research, 
four (the process of strategic management, issues concerning the age of managers, aspects 
of the Russian business environment affecting the company, and existing corporate 
strategies; other than competitive strategies) had reached theoretical saturation at that 
point and no further significant comments or issues were noted in the textual analysis of the 
remaining interviews with Russian respondents.  However, some relevant points - often 
contradictory to the prevailing Russian view - were made by the British managers 
interviewed.  These specific British views are identified in the following narrative. 
The initial discussion of findings for those Russian themes which did not alter materially 
after the first phase of the research (and were contained in document three) are shown in 
the following section, with additions and comments where differing British views require 
clarification.  
However, phase 2 of the research revealed some significant information concerning the 
importance of network strategies, corruption and informal practices, - so much so that the 
two themes need to be considered in more depth and through the lens of strategic intent 
and the intended strategic action.  This was an attempt to link outcomes with processes in 
the context of the Russian business environment and national cultural characteristics. 
T 
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4.3 ANALYSIS OF THE INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS 
The following section summarises my attempts to interpret and understand the origins and 
significance of the main themes which were identified during the coding process. The coding 
itself is only a means to an end in interpreting the interviews - helping to produce an 
account which does as much justice as possible to the richness of the data within the 
constraints of this document.  Even so, the codes themselves represent nascent theory 
building blocks and so deciding on the codes to be applied and subsequently how the codes 
link together to form concepts and theories has been undertaken with a lot of care and 
reflection, and has proved to be the most time-consuming aspect of the research.  It took a 
long time to conduct and transcribe the interviews, but at least as much time again has been 
spent on reflection and theory building. 
King (2004) (inCassell, Symon 2004)   recommends the inclusion of short quotes to aid the 
specific points of interpretation and discussion as well as a more extensive passage giving a 
flavour of the original transcripts, and I have tried, wherever possible in this chapter, to 
include appropriate quotations and to demonstrate the link to the academic underpinning 
of the conclusions which I reach. (Much of the academic discussion and theoretical 
development is covered in depth in document two, and as a consequence some, at least, of 
the discussion of academic underpinning is rather brief in this document.) 
The brief quotations are selected from the passages coded in NVivo, and a report showing 
all of the coding of one sample transcript is included in appendix 1 of document three.   
For ethical reasons I have chosen to preserve the anonymity of the interviewees and so they 
are referred to by their first names, or in the case of the British interviewees, initials only 
(and also so that they are readily distinguishable from Russian interviewees).  In one 
particular instance, where some of the revelations from the conversation were particularly 
frank on the topic of corruption, I have changed even the first name to ensure anonymity.  
In line with NTU ethical guidelines, any material identifying individual respondents will be 
destroyed in five years, and if released to a third party beforehand, any identifying details 
will be redacted.  As an additional measure to ensure anonymity, the locations of companies 
and any other details which might allow the identification of any interviewee making self-
incriminating remarks have also been omitted or redacted. 
4.4 FIRST PHASE OF THE RESEARCH 
After I had conducted the first tranche of seven interviews in Tyumen and Moscow, using 
Nvivo I coded and analysed the first six of the transcripts.  The results of this first coding 
pass were the basis for the research described in document three and allowed me to 
identify the emerging themes (with greater precision than would be possible by using the 
handwritten memos and post it notes) for subsequent interviews and the later stages of 
analysis.  A description of the mechanics of this coding process, including screenshots of the 
software in use, is to be found in document three. 
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In this first coding pass I identified 55 themes (nodes in Nvivo terminology) and these are 
listed in appendix 2 as Table A2 which lists the titles and descriptions of all 55 nodes.   
Nvivo produces comprehensive coding statistics which detail the numbers of documents 
coded, and the numbers of paragraphs contained in each of the passages which have been 
coded to a particular node.  The coding statistics are shown in document 3. 
My hardwired positivist alter ego took control for a while, and I attempted to rate the nodes 
in terms of their significance by manipulating the coding statistics.  The data was imported 
into Excel so that it could be manipulated to derive some more meaningful measure of 
importance.  This was not entirely successful as a method of assessing the significance of 
particular nodes since it takes no account of the importance of the statement being made in 
the context of the overall conversation or the emphasis on that particular idea which was 
intended by the interviewee.  In the end I concluded that, in isolation, it was not useful as a 
method of assigning importance to various conceptual themes.  (And so I have not pursued 
it at all in this document) 
Instead of pursuing measures of significance, I concentrated on identifying links between 
the nodes and interpreting the importance and significance of ideas and more holistic 
manner, taking account of the rest of the interview to set things in context. In order to 
identify the links between the themes I carried out a second pass through the transcripts, 
and  at the completion of document three I had identified seven substantive themes which 
recurred in discussions with the Russian managers interviewed in the first phase.  These 
overarching themes were each covering several sub themes which describe the day-to-day 
activities and nature of strategic management in Russian businesses concerned.   
The themes are described in Table 4.1 below: 
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TABLE 4.1: OVERARCHING THEMES FROM DOCUMENT THREE 
Main Theme Sub theme 
1. The process of strategic management  1.1 strategies emerge rather than planned 
1.2 strategising is intuitive, not formal 
1.3 an increasing awareness of the 
importance of strategy 
1.4 strategising is confined to a few people 
1.5 large companies are internally 
orientated 
 
2. The importance of network strategies 
and networking practice 
2.1 business depends on social networking 
2.2 relationship with local government is 
important for business 
2.3 relationship with local government can 
prevent or impede business 
3. The impact of corruption 3.1 corruption involving government bodies 
3.2 corruption involving buyer-supplier 
relationships 
4. The source of the company's 
competitive advantage, and its 
current competitive strategies 
4.1 differentiation through quality of 
service 
4.2 differentiation through branding 
4.3 differentiation through quick response 
4.4 competitive advantage from low price 
4.5 competitive advantage from superior 
resources 
4.6 small businesses more customer 
orientated  
4.7 older, larger Russian businesses 
uncompetitive 
4.8 larger Russian businesses' strategy is to 
dominate markets & suppress competition 
4.9 Moscow much more competitive than 
provinces 
5. Issues concerning the age of 
managers 
Younger managers are seen as more 
entrepreneurial (No significant subgroups) 
6. Aspects of the Russian business 
environment affecting the company 
Russian economy is business unfriendly   
( No significant subgroups) 
7. Existing corporate strategies (other 
than competitive strategies) 
No significant subgroups 
8. Outliers and significant miscellaneous 
comments. 
No significant subgroups 
(Document_three 2010) 
NB. These are the themes which emerged in phase 1 of the research as a result of coding the 
first tranche of six interviews and before the remaining Russian interviews and those with 
counterpart British managers had been undertaken.  This stage of the research constituted 
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the part which was reported in document three, and was concluded well before the point at 
which I judged that theoretical saturation had been achieved. The second stage of the 
research, reported here in the following section, involved the analysis and interpretation of 
the remaining tranche of 25 interviews - including those with British managers. 
4.5 SECOND PHASE OF THE RESEARCH 
After I had completed transcribing and coding the remaining interviews with all the 
managers (including the British managers) I reached the point where no new themes were 
being identified and I was confident that theoretical saturation had been achieved.  At this 
point, although no new substantive themes had been identified, several more sub themes 
had emerged and a great deal of detail concerning the day-to-day activities of the managers 
had been collected.  This is the rich (thick) data which provides the "strategy in action" 
perspective and hopefully contributes to the trustworthiness of the research.   
Following the same process as I used for the research in document three, I consolidated the 
newly discovered themes, and, as is evident from table A3 in appendix 3 which details the 
codes which were identified in the first stage of the research and those which were 
identified in the final stage of the coding process, the additional themes could be classified 
under the existing main themes which I had identified during the initial phase of the 
research.  Whilst not claiming that theoretical saturation had been achieved after analysis of 
the first five interviews, it is clear that, to some extent, the "shape" of the findings was 
already emerging from the data at the conclusion of the first phase (which is consistent with 
the findings described in Mason's study (2010).  However, although the overarching themes 
remained important, the emphasis and importance of the themes are significantly changed 
by the analysis of the new, later data. 
When analysed in a more holistic way than I had adopted in document three (re-reading all 
of the old nodes along with those which emerged during the second phase of the research), 
I found it necessary to regroup the themes.  
The revised groupings, shown in Table 4.2 below were: 
 The practice of strategic management and factors affecting strategic management in 
Russia. 
 Competitive strategies and relationships with customers. 
 Coping with the Russian business environment and local and national government 
agencies. 
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TABLE 4.2: CONSOLIDATED THEMES AND SUB THEMES AT THEORETICAL SATURATION  
Overarching Themes Having 
Reached Theoretical Saturation 
Main Themes identified 
in Document Three 
 
Sub themes: 
Individual node titles when 
all coding was complete 
The practice of strategic 
management and factors 
affecting strategic management 
in Russia . 
   
 Existing corporate 
strategies (other than 
competitive strategies) 
 
   diversification strategy 
   regional expansion 
 Issues concerning the 
age of managers 
 
   characteristics of older 
managers 
  large companies 
unappealing for young 
entrepreneurial managers 
  Younger managers 
   attitudes to corruption - 
young managers 
   UK companies often value 
older managers 
   young managers more 
entrepreneurial 
 Outliers and significant 
miscellaneous 
comments 
 
  cash flow not a problem 
  difficulty finding qualified 
staff 
  importance of social 
approbation 
 The process of strategic 
management 
  
  big companies  internally 
orientated 
   big companies have 
centralised strategy 
management 
   emergent strategies 
predominate 
   hierarchical command 
management style 
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Overarching Themes Having 
Reached Theoretical Saturation 
Main Themes identified 
in Document Three 
 
Sub themes: 
Individual node titles when 
all coding was complete 
    
impact of Russian culture on 
management 
   instability of  business 
environment 
   intuitive strategic 
management 
   Russian companies' growing 
awareness 
   strategic plan exists, but 
changed as circumstances 
demand 
   strategising confined to 
trusted few 
   risk averse attitude 
   
Competitive strategies and 
relationships with customers. 
  
 The source of the 
company's competitive 
advantage and its 
current competitive 
strategies 
  
  big companies try to 
dominate market 
   competitive advantage -
differentiation 
   competitive advantage from 
quality 
   competitive advantage from 
store location 
   competitive advantage good 
resources 
   competitive advantage -
quick response 
   competitive advantage 
through innovation 
   competitive advantage-low 
price 
   cooperative -low price 
strategy 
   customer orientation 
   difference between Moscow 
& provinces 
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Overarching Themes Having 
Reached Theoretical Saturation 
Main Themes identified 
in Document Three 
 
Sub themes: 
Individual node titles when 
all coding was complete 
   good reputation 
   good service 
   importance of tacit 
knowledge 
   important to build a brand 
   lack of competition 
   market less demanding than 
EU market 
   older, larger Russian 
companies uncompetitive 
  luxury goods market very 
demanding - Twin Peaks 
  younger generation 
demanding world-class 
goods 
  service & high-tech sectors 
more competitive 
  SMEs successful in service 
sector & high-tech 
   resource-based competitive 
advantage 
 The importance of 
network strategies and 
networking practice 
  
  good relationship with 
Administration avoids 
problems 
   good relationship with 
Administration less 
important for small 
businesses 
   importance of friends  - 
social groups 
   importance of networking 
   importance of local contacts 
to penetrate markets 
  importance of networking to 
UK companies 
  manipulating the market 
  network strategies less 
important for UK companies 
  networking practice 
  networking to reduce the 
competition 
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Overarching Themes Having 
Reached Theoretical Saturation 
Main Themes identified 
in Document Three 
 
Sub themes: 
Individual node titles when 
all coding was complete 
   
importance of relationships 
with UK local authorities etc 
  influence with local 
administration 
  networking with important 
gatekeepers 
   
Coping with the Russian business 
environment and local & 
national government agencies 
  
 Aspects of the Russian 
business environment 
affecting the company 
 
   external factors affecting 
the business 
   impact of bureaucracy 
   influence of the Komsomol 
   Mafia like activity 
   political power influences 
business environment 
 The impact of corruption   
  cartel activity 
   companies discuss and 
agree prices 
   corruption dealing with 
customers 
   corruption is pervasive 
   corruption is unacceptable 
to UK companies 
   criminality 
   impact of corruption - local 
Administration 
   The nature of corruption 
   bribery via third parties 
  business gifts 
  corruption is embedded in 
Russian culture 
  examples of attempted 
corruption uk 
  unacceptability of business 
gifts uk 
  what constitutes corruption 
uk 
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In document three I used a systematic and mechanistic mode of analysis, analysing each of 
the main and subsidiary themes in order and attempting to assess significance by statistics 
and node counting.  However at the end of the first phase - document three,   I concluded 
that assessing significance by statistical methods was not really useful, and so in this 
document I have chosen a more discursive style in order to reflect the complex inter-
relationship between some of the themes which emerged from the textual analysis.   
So that the themes are analysed in a coherent manner, linked where necessary and 
supported by triangulation where appropriate, I have tried to interpret the findings and to 
create theories based on the three main overarching themes which emerged from this 
regrouping exercise.   
The following section, then, describes and analyses the interview findings. 
4.6 THE FACTORS AFFECTING THE PRACTICE OF STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT IN 
RUSSIA  
This is rather a wide-ranging first section, covering not only the practice of strategic 
management in Russia but also the apparent structural differences between large and small 
companies, the age of managers and some of the comments and anecdotes which provide 
context for ensuing themes. 
4.6.1 THE STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT PROCESS 
All the respondents spent some time discussing the process of strategising in Russia.   The 
managers were clearly aware that Western received wisdom is that companies need to 
undertake strategic planning, and coming from a country where, historically, all aspects of 
the economy were subject to state planning, they accepted that, theoretically at least, 
strategic planning is the norm.  
The most significant subtheme to emerge was that in Russian companies, strategising was 
largely an informal process as a result of which strategies emerged over a period of time (a 
form of entrepreneurial learning), and the process was often intuitive rather than analytical. 
In this respect, Russian managers appear to behave very much like SME managers in the UK. 
(McKeown 2007) 
Interviewees stressed that amongst smaller businesses at least, emergent and intuitive 
strategising predominates largely due to the fact that the instability of the Russian business 
environment makes planning difficult and consequently strategising becomes an ad hoc 
process. This theme is typified by the following three quotes from Valentina, Maxim and 
Stanislav: 
Valentina: “............  I have noticed that after the soviet union there was a period 
of stability, but now you can't plan for more than one or two years.  And for this 
what kind of strategy can we speak of.  We can't imagine for example.  For me 10 
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years ago I spoke to a Finnish businessman, and he had his organiser, and I asked 
him what he would be doing any year, and he opened his organiser and showed me 
that in a year he would be there and there and there.  But for Russian it's 
impossible - we can't imagine that because we don't just know what sort of 
President we've got or what sort of country we will have.  We went to sleep in the 
Soviet Union and woke in Russia.  For this reason it is very difficult to plan.” 
 
Maxim: "...well actually, the partners they meet once a month.  But they do not 
discuss only strategical questions, but also technical information and so on.  
Strategical questions arise from time to time according to the situation so it isn't 
planned, it depends on what's happening." 
 
Paul: "Is it you that makes the strategy or is it other people as well?" 
Stanislav: "no no, of course when I think about strategy, the future purpose of 
that, I make on my own.  I don't like to read books, I don't like to search the 
Internet, it's inside of me, some sort of intuition.  I feel that the market changes, 
some political situation also changes and I try to, to run.  Because if you don't run 
you will die."  
 
Although there is strong evidence indicating the prevalence of emergent and intuitive 
strategising in Russia, it was evident that there is an increasing awareness of the importance 
of strategic management amongst larger Russian companies, as typified by this exchange on 
the subject of the Russian automotive industry: 
Elena:  "yes, and as they are huge they could use it [market power], they have the 
power, but this power is not absolute as it used to be.  It is not absolute because we 
have some foreign companies, as it is in the car industry for example.  Autovaz for 
example, not only Autovaz, but some three or five companies Russian companies, 
they had absolute power in the car market and now they do not have.  They are 
powerful but not absolute, and they are losing their power because they do not 
know how to cope with the situation.  How to cope with this competition.  And 
they have to think of it, despite the fact that they are huge, they have to think about 
the market."  
Paul: "[. ] ......If your instructions come from Moscow, then maybe you don't 
worry too much about competition.  So if you're making a Lada 2107 in Togliatti 
and nobody says you have to compete with Volga in Nizhny Novgorod then you 
don't need to compete, so why would you need to change the model?" 
Elena: "it used to be so, yes." 
Paul: "but what do the managers think now who are working in Lada.  How do 
they think about strategy now because their situation has changed hasn't it?" 
Elena: "of course, of course.  And I must say that they are thinking about their 
strategy and they are making researches and [using] consulting companies, 
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Russian consulting companies, they are researching for Autovaz how to make a 
strategy appropriate for competitiveness." 
 
This increasing awareness can almost certainly be attributed to the increasing liberalisation 
of the Russian economy which is introducing hitherto unknown levels of competition, but 
large companies have traditionally been internally orientated, as indicated by this quote: 
Elena:"......I think it must be just as you say to think about some inner situation in 
the company, but I think till this time we were just huge companies.  They thought 
about their national market opportunity, and if they had 100%, they didn't know 
what to do because everything is okay, everything is ours, and what to do?  And 
this is a crisis for them -  it is critical" 
 
The final subtheme which has emerged concerns the involvement of managers in the 
strategising process. It seems clear among smaller companies that the process is confined to  
few managers, and is a hierarchical activity rather than a participative one. There is a strong 
feeling amongst all the interviewees that strategising is the preserve of senior managers, 
and relatively few of them. The following quotes characterise the view held by most 
interviewees: 
Paul [talking about strategy]: so it's mostly you -but you listen to what your team 
managers have to say. 
Stanislav:  yes it's mostly me and I listen to what they have to say.  But really I 
listen to them, have my alone in thinking and then come to a decision.  So if there 
will be some problems it will only be my mistake. 
Paul:  when the company grows a little bit more, is that the way you still want it - 
that strategy will be your responsibility?  Because you are the general director of 
the company and it is your responsibility. 
Stanislav: yes because I want to be with the company and if it is for example 
10,000 people I also will stay in the company because if you go a little bit out there 
will be some manager who will want to take this company from you.  You put in 
some good manager and he thinks oh it is a very good profit, I will take it by 
myself. 
 
Paul: who makes the decisions in your company? is it only you or do you 
sometimes consult your employees about the future of the business.  Is that always 
you that makes that decision? 
Alexander: no it's not always me, because I can't make a really good decision 
every time...... 
Paul: so who do you trust, who do you think is a good adviser?  Out of your 
friends, your employees who do you listen to most??  Your wife? 
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Alexander: no, she can't make a good decision every time.  In Russian [we say] "if 
you have a problem ask a woman and do the opposite" 
Paul: if I said that at home my wife would kill me.   
Alexander: if I have a really hard decision sometimes I ask my father.  I can't say 
that every time they make a really good thing but it's better to ask him. 
Paul: does your father have his own business or what does he do? 
Alexander: he was a director of a collective farm so he had to manage between 800 
and thousand people.  
 
It seems to me that this rather hierarchical process, confined to a small group, is entirely 
consistent with a society which scores highly in terms of the cultural dimension of power 
distance (Hofstede 2001), and that it would be unusual to expect consultative models of 
strategising in a society which has traditionally been controlled by a small elite ruling class. 
However, another interpretation could be that the managers who raise this topic during 
interviews might well have been recounting their experience in Russian SMEs, where this 
type of strategic management might be expected to dominate. This hierarchical form of 
strategic management is also found in British SMEs as the following exchange with two 
directors of a British construction consultancy firm demonstrates: 
GN: We report to the board of eight people. 
PMB: are they family mostly? 
GN: yes, but they do not do strategy, they let us run the business as long as we 
show a profit they are happy.  The strategy has traditionally been agreed between 
Steve and myself.  And then we very often involve our works director who then 
gives his opinion 
PMB: so it is in fact confined to 3 people. 
GN/SB: yes 
In the case of the British managers quoted above it is most likely that the fact that 
strategising is confined to a few trusted individuals reflects the fact that the interviewees 
were directors of a small family business rather than being a consequence of a national 
cultural characteristics. 
However, this view that strategy is confined to a small cadre was also expressed by Roy, the 
managing director of one of the larger companies interviewed: 
PMB:….well that's the question isn't it?  How do you get the other people 
involved in strategic decision-making?  Or do you do it all? 
RT:  no, as a chap says this morning, it's not my decision it’s your decision so I 
have to act as an autocrat and you look around and you say Willie Walsh is an 
autocrat isn't he.  So I'm afraid I do actually believe I have to be an autocrat, but I 
do encourage my people to get involved and do things. 
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PMB:   so what the Russian said, and I think this is the case with companies in the 
UK as well, so this is where they're pretty much the same, they said that thinking 
about the strategies is confined to very few people in the company and I think 
that's the case in this country as well 
RT : I agree.  One of the things that I think we do reasonably well is that I listen to 
people.  Rather than saying no and jumping down their throats I will let them 
carry on and develop the thoughts, and sometimes there are some kernels of 
information there which you can use 
 
4.6.2 STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT IN LARGE RUSSIAN BUSINESSES 
In general terms, although this research did not identify significant differences between the 
process of strategic management in Russia and that to be found in the UK, it should not 
really be concluded that because strategic management processes are very similar in the 
SME sector of both countries, the processes are identical throughout Russian industry.   
Although I interviewed some managers from larger state-owned/oligarch owned 
organisations, in the main these managers were relatively junior and freely admitted that 
strategic decision-making was "above their pay grade".  For example, Dmitri, the Tyumen-
based manager of a large National bank was quite clear that strategic decisions were taken 
centrally at a high level: 
Paul:  You could have one branch and let everybody queue and wait and have very 
very low interest rates. Or you could have slightly higher interest rates and many 
branches, so you could offer people very good service. And somewhere you have to 
make your mind up. Who makes that decision? 
Dmitry:  the head offices in Moscow, and we have special instructions. 
 
And later in the same conversation: 
Paul:  So, I'm still not sure, I can't make my mind up, who is responsible for 
competitive strategy - how you, what it is that you do to get new customers, and 
how you decide what to do? You say that's decided partly in Moscow, and partly 
here,  
Dmitry:  its head office - we have to put reasons and our recommendations and we 
put it forward [to] the head office 
Paul: so it's sort of local and sort of Moscow, a bit of a mix? 
Dmitry: the final decision is Moscow 
 
The centralised nature of decision-making and influence exerted by "important people" is 
implied in this exchange: 
Paul: [in conversation with a Tyumen-based focus group] ….. I've talked to a steel 
stockholder from near Moscow, and I've talked to a steel stockholder from St 
Petersburg, and they said it's not the same [as in the UK].  [They said] " There's 
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one big supplier that we both buy steel from in Magnetogorsk and we don't have 
many many competitors. There is only two or three steel stockholders selling our 
sort of steel in St Petersburg]. And that's very different because in England they 
advertise a lot, they provide services to their customers and they are very very very 
competitive, and it's not the same here in Russia. That set me thinking, I wonder 
what it is that makes people decide how to compete. Is it because there are many 
competitors, or is it because head office tell me I have to compete in a particular 
way or is it because there is a law that says I must conduct my business like this. 
How the hell do people make strategy in Russia. It's not the same as in England 
you know. And we need to understand that. 
Dmitry:  It's not a very good example of steel 
Paul:  why, tell me why 
Dmitry:  the question is who uses the steel in production in Russia. 
Paul:    big companies? 
Dmitry: yes, - big companies -  you're right, 
 
It was clear from the context of this conversation that Dmitry's view was that strategic 
decisions in Russia are often governed by the interests of the siloviki or oligarchs; in this 
case the powerful stakeholders in the steel consuming companies.  The major users of steel 
are, of course the automotive industry, the defence industry white goods and construction, 
all dominated in Russia by oligarchs or state interest. 
It seems quite likely that with Russia's history of operating with a planned economy, these 
large silovicki/oligarch controlled  companies  will have recognisably different strategic 
management practices driven by the arcane needs of the powerful (but sometimes shady) 
stakeholders; the Kremlin, siloviki and oligarchs.  This view is certainly supported by Puffer 
and McCarthy (2007) and Ledeneva (2013). 
I was anticipating that these large businesses would have planning systems which looked 
much more like latter-day Gosplan organisations, but access to the most senior strategic 
managers in this sector who would be able to comment from first-hand experience was not 
available, so definitive findings are not really possible in this context.  Nevertheless, the 
comments by Elena (quoted earlier) do indicate that these larger companies have more 
formal planning systems which are reacting to current market changes: 
Paul: "but what do the managers think now who are working in Lada.  How do 
they think about strategy now because their situation has changed hasn't it?" 
Elena: "of course, of course.  And I must say that they are thinking about their 
strategy and they are making researches and [using] consulting companies, 
Russian consulting companies, they are researching for Autovaz how to make a 
strategy appropriate for competitiveness." 
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(Maybe this change comes a little late for some - after my interviews took place Autovaz 
became insolvent and its Russian shareholders and French joint-venture partners have been 
subject to considerable Kremlin "strong-arming". (Reed 2012). ) 
 
4.6.3 ISSUES CONCERNING THE AGE OF MANAGERS  
This theme, when raised in conversation, did not elicit strong reactions amongst the 
managers interviewed. It seems as though younger companies value more youthful 
managers because they are perceived to be more entrepreneurial and less set in their ways: 
Andrei:  okay, if we speak about the new generation of managers, not those who 
reaped the benefits of privatisation.  There are young managers, for example in 
banking and investment-millionaires-not millionaires-billionaires with their 
fortunes reaching 3 1/2 billion dollars.  And they are from 30 to 35.  I could give 
you the names. 
Paul:   but why are they billionaires?  Is it a profit and loss thing or is it balance-
sheet thing?  But how many Russian billionaires […..] have started a business and 
it has grown and grown and become first-class?   
Andrei:  this is the issue that interests me.  I read quite a lot about it and I can tell 
you some stories if you want.  Young millionaires-those in their early 30s-for 
example if you walk round Moscow you will see these yellow kiosks selling mobile 
phones.  The guy was selling clothes in Luznikir?? market by himself, dressing in 
women's dresses to sell his goods.  And now the revenue of his company last year it 
reached $5 billion and he has about 5000 of these outlets.  All over the former 
Soviet Union.   
 
But there is a tendency to value younger managers for their educational background as well 
as their alleged entrepreneurialism: 
Ludmilla:[…..]..  When young people rule the company or become the top 
managers of different businesses, young people could get good education, they're 
quite different people.  For example I told you about the banker of a foreign branch 
in Tyumen.  He belongs to a new generation of young business people and they 
have another ways, maybe in this case something will change in the country. 
 
 This is evident even in older ex-state-owned enterprises as this extract suggests: 
Elena:[..]……..and speaking about age I would like to say, now in Russia we have 
a very hard situation with managers because companies they have a sort of fashion 
that it is fashionable to have young managers  - 28 and in top management, 30 for 
a general director, it's normal. 
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Paul:  is this in recently formed companies, newer companies?  Or is this in the 
older companies as well? 
Elena:  in older companies as well,  
Paul:  I think that's quite surprising really because I would have thought perhaps 
that in the privatised companies, the older companies that are not state-owned 
anymore, that they would still have the same general director that they might have 
had before who will be taking on new people, but top managers I would have 
thought would be quite senior in age still.  Is that not true then? 
Elena:  it is true for some companies, yes it is true, but for new companies it is 
absolutely true that managers will be younger. 
. 
British managers did not seem to share the Russian enthusiasm for youthful managers to 
the same extent, as illustrated by this exchange with the directors of a small but progressive 
UK construction industry company: 
PMB: I think it's a Russian thing: there is a feeling in Russian companies that 
younger managers are valuable to them and I think this is a reaction to the old-
fashioned Russian business structure you know.  I think they think that younger 
managers are more entrepreneurial and so on.  Do you think that view exists in the 
UK? 
SB: I think it depends on what industry it is to be honest. 
GN: we have always been a young company in the beginning, but the people that 
we are dealing with, and I made managing director in my mid-20s, and I found it 
very difficult to gain respect amongst the older managers.  Because most of the 
companies are dominated by middle-aged, older managers....... Michael has the 
same problem, the guy you met earlier, he started with us doing an apprenticeship 
here and he is going on the next course soon, and in three or four years he's going 
to make technical director.  We have already discussed his future here.  But he has 
some difficulty with older people because they look at him and say you're young 
aren't you. 
PMB: so in that respect it's probably the reverse then in the UK and by the sounds 
of things there isn't necessarily a preference, maybe there is a bit of resistance 
perhaps 
SB: The financial industry is full of young highflyers, or was, so I think as far as 
the construction industry is concerned there are a number of older wiser people 
still in the industry. 
 
 
No significant subthemes emerged from the analysis of the Russian phase 2 interviews, and 
since the age of managers seems to have a minor impact on the process of strategising, it 
can probably be discounted as a significant issue in terms of Russian strategic management 
at this stage. 
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4.6.4 ASPIRATIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
When the conversations turned to the strategies which the companies would be following in 
the next five years, some of the managers felt that their best opportunities were in regional 
expansion strategies, as typified by this quote from Dmitry, director of the Internet and 
cable TV company in Tyumen: 
 
Paul:   “where would you like the company to be in five years time, what would it 
look like?” 
Dmitry:  “a big regional company” 
Paul: “doing the same thing but in more than the Tyumen region?” 
Dmitry:   “yes….[….]..We have towns in the Tyumen region, for example 
Surgut,-  it's a very rich town.” 
 
Some, like Alexander, general director of the steel stockholding company in *******, felt 
that diversification was the most appropriate strategy: 
Paul:   “what would you like the company to be like in 5 years?  What will it be 
doing?” 
Alexander:  “same sort of company bit with approximately 10 more types of 
business -  10 directions of business which will have a lot of opportunities in 
*******.  And we will be able to choose the most profitable kind of business and 
move in that direction.  This is a plan for three years because to plan for five years 
is rather difficult.” 
 
In many respects these longer-term aspirations mirror those identified in Hunter’s (1999) 
study of Russian business strategy. However whilst it is interesting to note that this study 
replicates Hunter's (2003) findings, diversification and regional development should be 
considered more as corporate strategies and consequently not really relevant to the study 
of competitive strategies and the strategising processes. 
In my judgement, the themes identified in discussions with the Russian managers were 
really no different from those which might have occurred in similar discussions with British 
managers, and there were no further significant comments referring to these themes in the 
interviews undertaken as the second phase of the research. 
4.6.5 MISCELLANEOUS COMMENTS  
Some of the outliers and miscellaneous comments which I recorded provide insights in their 
own right. For example I interviewed three steel stockholder companies and in my 
interviews I assumed that they would be subject to the same sorts of business influences as 
those with which I am very familiar in the UK. The following quote from Alexander, the 
manager of a steel stockholding company in ******* illustrates this: 
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Paul: " if you asked somebody from England  - a steel stockholder  - I assume that 
when I talked to Maxim it would be the same - it's about making sure that 
customers pay, and that the cash flow is good.  If you ever ask an English company, 
number one will be cash flow.  And number two will be government bureaucracy.  
And here it sounds to be government bureaucracy number one and cash flow 
doesn't seem to be a problem.  Is that really true?" 
Alexander:  "…[…]  ..But it [cash flow] is not actually a big problem.  This is a 
problem but it isn't big.  We have to compete with companies who have made an 
IPOR and they have cheap money actually, but relations with banks and our 
customers they find they can run a different kind of model." 
 
This quotation illustrates one of the problem which King (2004) (in  Cassell, Symon 2004 
p.13)  identifies when undertaking interpretive research;  namely that of applying an 
inappropriate frame of reference when interpreting an interview  response.  King stresses 
the importance of: 
"The need for the researcher to consciously set aside his or her presuppositions about 
the phenomenon under investigation - a process sometimes referred to as 
"bracketing". This of course means that the researcher must reflect on the 
presuppositions he or she holds, and remain alert to how they may colour every stage 
of the research process."  
In this case I had assumed that conditions in the Russian market for steel stockholders 
would be equivalent to that found in the UK where cash flow is indeed a major issue. 
However with a virtually unreconstructed market, dominated by a few massive steel mills, 
which have traditionally (during the Soviet era) provided almost unlimited inter-enterprise 
credit, cash flow management does not assume the same importance as it does in the UK. 
A second illustration of a traditional Russian value (this time correctly interpreted by me) 
arose in a conversation with Dmitry, the financial director of an intranet and cable TV 
company in the Tyumen region. Dmitry raised the idea that it may be important for 
companies to seek social approbation to improve their marketing image.  
Dmitry:  you know, in my lifetime [ I've been ] very interested in this social 
partnership between business and local authority, it was [ inaudible], it's a joint 
stock company, Russian and American Amoco, and I know that they had some act 
between the authorities and company to provide some social services for some 
citizens for example.  And after that I see, I saw it between TNK BP and 
authorities… 
 
This idea of company seeking social approbation was also initially proposed as a source of 
competitive advantage in Russia by Hunter (2003), but his subsequent research (as part of 
his DBA thesis) found little evidence of the importance of this factor. 
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Other comments in this general area tended to mimic the sorts of grumbles that one hears 
frequently when talking to SME managers in the UK. (Difficulties of finding appropriately 
trained staff etc.) 
4.7 COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES AND RELATIONSHIPS WITH CUSTOMERS 
My interviews with Russian managers all commenced with discussions concerning how their 
company was able to gain new customers at the expense of their competitors - in other 
words, a discussion of their perceived competitive advantage.  The initial responses were 
often quite conventional in that the companies were overtly trying to offer either cheaper 
products or services or, more frequently, claiming to compete by offering a better, quicker 
or otherwise superior service.  These conversations were not dissimilar to those which I 
might have had with managers of similar companies in the UK. 
However as conversations progressed, and in particular in later interviews, the discussions 
turned to the subject of networking strategies, blat, gifts and payments and 
"unconventional practices" - a less emotive term used by Russian academics for corruption. 
This section, then, commences by discussing competitive advantage, and then moves on to 
discuss network strategies and practices used in Russia to develop personal relationships 
and in particular the development of the personal relationships and personal 
“indebtedness" required to manipulate markets. 
4.7.1 THE SOURCE OF THE COMPANY'S COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 
Competitive strategies are concerned with increasing the company's competitive advantage, 
and strangely, like many British managers, the Russian managers who I interviewed did not 
seem to have spent much time reflecting on the source of their company's competitive 
advantage. 
When asked to identify the source of their company's competitive advantage (in terms of 
conventional Western thinking), two significant themes emerged:  
Firstly, competitive advantage is often seen as being gained by having superior resources, 
either physical, e.g. plant and equipment, or managerial - having a superior management 
team.  
Valentina, for example, attributes her company's competitive advantage to, in part, its 
superior plant, equipment and operators: 
Valentina:   “…at first we had some difference from Russian companies because 
for example 10 years ago we had the construction business in this form but is only 
developed in Russia and Russian companies had no, for example, modern 
machines,  modern excavators, modern tractors-or if they had, they had no 
operators.  But we have both and now we have well-qualified [operators].” 
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Paul:   “you say that you've got lots of new equipment and skills-is that very 
important to the success of your company? 
Valentina:    “to be sure” 
 
Dmitry, director of a cable TV and Internet company in the Tyumen region, however, was 
more inclined to think that the key resource in his high-tech company is the quality of the 
management team: 
Paul: “why are you successful at the moment, why have you grown quickly?  And 
done so well?  Is it just because it was the first?” 
Dmitry:  “no” 
Paul:  “so why do people choose your company?  What's the magic ingredient?” 
Dmitry:  “it's a really difficult question.  I don't know.” 
Paul:  “Why is your company successful?” 
Dmitry:  “it is successful because we've got good management, our director is 
very good” 
 
Secondly, however, competitive advantage is gained by low prices resulting from superior 
relationships with suppliers (a networking explanation).  For example, Maxim, director of a 
steel stockholding company stressed the importance of forging relationships to achieve 
purchasing power: 
Maxim:  “Because companies that worked previously in this regional market were 
not working with producers of the steel, but with wholesalers - other stock 
companies, because they couldn't afford huge bulk purchases, they could afford 
only small, and the producer doesn't work with small quantities.  And that's why 
the company became part of the holding company so we could buy at the same price 
as the holding company and could work with the producers directly.  So this was a 
competitive advantage.” 
 
Overall, in terms of conventional competitive strategy, and the perceived roots of their 
competitive advantage, there seems to be little difference between the views and attitudes 
of the Russian and British managers.  They clearly understand the capabilities of their main 
competitors, and, when they thought about it, they come to similar conclusions about the 
basis of their company's competitive advantage. In this respect most of the managers seem 
to be in the "resource-based" camp when considering the roots of competitive advantage 
(Barney 1991).  
These findings appear to be very similar to those which can be drawn from the qualitative 
research described in document four, which, although it had some shortcomings in terms of 
the sampling strategy that I was compelled to adopt (described in detail in that document) 
does provide an overview of the views of the Russian managers with respect to competitive 
strategy.   
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4.7.2 CURRENT COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES TO ACHIEVE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 
Managers representing the newer, smaller companies seem to be more market orientated 
than the older companies or those, like steel stockholders, operating in less developed 
markets. They seem to be much more aware of their competitive advantage and what they 
needed to do in order to maintain their competitive position. They were also aware of the 
shortcomings of their main competitors.  
Some chose to compete by differentiation, typically by providing a better or quicker service, 
as typified by these quotations from Valentina, manager in a construction company founded 
by a Finnish expatriate:  
Valentina:  …you know that Russian people like very much foreign things, and 
this is the reason they knew that-after the ruin of the Soviet Union-they knew that 
Soviet work wasn't good, and Finnish, it was good.  Because the quality.  And now 
I can say that our quality is[ good].  Our prices are higher, but at first we had a lot 
of constant customers in spite of our prices they would come always to us because 
they knew that our price and our quality is the same[ as Finnish companies]. 
 
Those choosing to compete by differentiation often chose to compete on speed and 
convenience of service, as described by Alexander, owner manager of a project 
management company: 
Alexander:  “very often our customers are having a short time, and they would 
like for [need] me to make my job in this short time”. 
 
This is not significantly different from the competitive stance chosen by Western managers, 
and described by Stalk and Schulman (1992). 
Those choosing to compete by differentiation often chose to offer very high quality products 
at premium prices in just the same way as their Western counterparts would.  For example, 
Irina, owner manager of a chain of jewellery stores in the Tyumen oblast describes a 
competitive strategy which would be familiar to premium jewellery stores in the UK: 
Irina:  it's very difficult because if people have enough money they travel a lot, and 
they often buy something abroad, and we've got people who sometimes buy things 
abroad - in Austria - and their rings get broken and they come here to have them 
repaired..... we tell them to take them to where they bought them![ probably a joke]. 
We sell the same things that people can buy abroad, and we have almost the same 
price because we would like to tell them that they can buy everything in Tyumen.  
It's not necessary to go abroad to buy it. 
Paul and Ludmilla accompany Irina to one of her shops (in her Mercedes S class 
coupe).  The shop is on the main street in Tyumen, but has no window display, just 
a very exclusive entrance into a very luxuriously appointed shop with expensive 
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beautifully displayed jewellery.  It would not be out of place on the Avenue George 
V in Paris 
 
At the other end of the competitive spectrum, other companies choose to compete by 
having low prices as typified by these remarks from Dmitry, regional manager in Tyumen for 
a large National bank  
Paul:   But why do customers want to come to your bank, why do you get new 
customers? What is it that you do in order to get new customers? You must be 
doing it right because you've got so many customers 
Dmitry:  low interest rates 
 
and from Stanislav, an importer and supplier of bathroom fittings in *******: 
Paul:  “Stanislav, answer me a question,- how do you compete, why do customers 
come to your company? 
Stanislav:  “ah, okay, nowadays is low prices - $50 for a toilet -  it's a very low 
price, and now we are working in this sector of the market.” 
 
And subsequently: 
Stanislav:  [talking about the poor quality of imported taps from China]  “it's no 
good, you are right, and also my goods are not very good, but we think a lot about 
this problem, and we made a lot of service stations - we have about four service 
stations in *******, and if you have a problem with your equipment you can come 
and we will fix it.  So our main idea to help customers who don't have a lot of 
money, who cannot buy Grohe [the leading German manufacturer] which costs 
here in Russia about €300  - but not many people here in Russia can afford that." 
 
This second response by Stanislav indicates the these newer, more entrepreneurial Russian 
managers act very much like their Western counterparts (as described by Bowman (1991)) 
in recognising that a particular combination of price and service level marks out their chosen 
competitive strategy in the marketplace in which they choose to compete.  
Like their counterparts British managers, Russian managers seem to be well aware of how 
their competitors operate and what their shortcomings are. In several cases managers 
stressed the poor quality of service offered by their Russian competitors. For example, 
Valentina recounted the following anecdote: 
Valentina: “For example when we began we have a lot of work and one day we 
needed a subcontractor and we had found a Russian subcontractor and we told him 
about how works and you need to start tomorrow from seven o'clock and you need 
to work Saturday and Sunday and he told us no no, never never -only from nine to 
five, and for this reason they have no work and we have lots.” 
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A recurrent theme was that the larger, older Russian companies were less competitive and 
that bigger companies attempt to use their dominant positions to suppress competition.  
For example, Stanislav pointed out: 
"[.]…..Because maybe after two five years here in Russia there will be maybe five 
or 10 big companies in this field.  And other companies will die.  Because these 10 
companies will have a lot of money, some government help, and they will kill every 
small company." 
 
Although Russian companies identify the need to compete either by having better products 
and services or lower prices, I gained the impression in most interviews that price 
competition was seen by many companies was the first line of attack, and this view is 
supported by the findings reported in the WEF global competitiveness report (Schwab 2013) 
which uses a survey of executive opinion to rate various aspects of national economic 
performance.  In this case the survey utilises a semantic scale to rate the National basis of 
competitive advantage, and the findings indicate that Russian companies are much more 
inclined to the low cost/natural resource end of the continuum, as indicated by the 
following table: 
TABLE 4.2: NATURE OF COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 
 Russian 
companies 
British 
companies 
Score  
(1 = low cost or natural resources, 7 
= unique products or services) 
2.7 6 
International ranking  
(out of 144) 
125th 6th 
Extracted from: WEF global competitiveness report (Schwab 2013 p.505) 
So although Russian managers understand their competitive position and profess to adopt 
strategies which mirror those adopted by British companies, in practice I believe that the 
Russian managers rely rather more heavily on resource-based cost advantages than do their 
British counterparts.   
However, despite the fact that the interview answers directly relating to competitive 
strategies do not really show marked differences between British and Russian interviewees, 
there are clearly significant differences in the importance of network strategies in the UK 
and Russia, and networking practices. 
4.8 THE IMPORTANCE OF NETWORK STRATEGIES AND NETWORKING PRACTICE 
Although personal networking is considered as a normal business practice in the UK, it is 
considered in a qualitatively different way in Russia.  The importance of network strategies 
emerged as an important theme amongst all the Russian managers interviewed, and in 
phase 2 of the research it was one of the two areas which were expanded upon greatly 
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during the second tranche of interviews.  In phase 1 - the initial research - two important 
subthemes emerged, namely, the importance of maintaining networks as a source of 
business and the importance of maintaining good relationships with local authorities both 
for gaining new business and facilitating the normal day-to-day conduct of business.  These 
supply chain networks and the facilitation of good relationships with local authorities relied 
on blat, the generic Russian term for providing mutual favours and consequently building up 
mutual indebtedness. 
As phase 2 of the research progressed it became clear that rather than consider networking 
as two important themes, it was in fact much more complex than that, and that the range of 
informal practices involved in creating and maintaining these informal networks was at the 
heart of Russian business culture.  Several of these business practices were often 
indistinguishable from what Western researchers would consider as corrupt practices but 
are perceived by managers in Russia as being critical for the development of blat. 
The following sections, then, investigate networking practice in Russia and analyse the 
extent to which Russian managers use these informal practices to manipulate the markets in 
which they operate - and tolerate the ensuing corruption. 
4.8.1 CONVENTIONAL NETWORKING STRATEGIES 
Puffer and  McCarthy (2007) consider that because of the breakup of the Soviet planned 
economy and the dismantling of its institutions during privatisation, managerial decision-
making has also become decentralized. Despite the increasing political stability and the 
growth of market mechanisms, there is still an imperfect system of transmitting and 
codifying market knowledge and consequently the country still relies, to some extent, on a 
"clan organisational form of capitalism".  This is normally characterised by a dependence on 
networks and personal relationships to undertake transactions which can be trusted.(Boisot, 
Child 1996). 
Practically all of the Russian managers interviewed identified networking strategies as being 
extremely important to their business, but British managers also are aware of the 
importance of networking.  Both groups recognise that building trust in the business 
relationships is important, and only the emphasis on reciprocity is different with the Russian 
managers placing a greater emphasis on this strategy.  
In Russia, networks are important since they provide a group of people who can be trusted 
and who will or may provide mutual business opportunities in turn. The following quotes 
from the managers interviewed support this interpretation: 
Maxim:  “but the situation is strange because all of the members of the holding 
company they know each other as well, and the principle of opening a new 
company or taking a company in two, is not a theoretical one, but because they 
know this person and they have worked together.” 
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Valentina:   "yes we have the same clients - just now we have Yugoslavians and 
we have co-operated for nine years and six years.  A lot of;-most of, our clients are 
constant. 
 
Alexander:   “[ we have ] not a big quantity of new clients because my usual 
customers can say to his friend, for example, we are all of us friends, we are talking 
every day, every Saturday drinking beer, you for example you said I have a 
program, I have to make this and this and this, but I can do it myself, or I can say I 
can't do it but I know someone who can. 
Paul:  do you make a distinction between work friends and your own family 
friends  
Alexander:  "…….It doesn't matter to me if it's a friend from job from home, I 
can go to a cafe or to restaurant with my friends from job, business partners or my 
family it doesn't matter.  Sometimes we go to a restaurant with a big crowd from 
job, from family and from university friends." 
 
Paul: "you've got quite good prices but very good contact with customers.  So is 
that your strategy?" 
Stanislav: "this is our strategy.  To every people who come to us, to our company 
will find service and good relationships - a cup of coffee, and maybe a cigarette and 
this way, we found a lot of clients.  But of course I have some communications with 
Moscow government. Mayor Luzkov - they of course give us some big orders, and 
some big builders.  And that's why." 
 
The quotation from Alexander, owner/manager of a project management company in 
Tyumen also indicates that Russian business culture can be categorised as rather diffuse 
according to Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner’s (1998) specific-diffuse cultural dimension.  
(This dimension seeks to distinguish between cultures in which a person's business role is 
specific to their business occupation and contained in their role at work, or whether their 
business role "spills out" into their personal and everyday lives.) 
In general terms there seems to be little difference between the attitudes of Russian  and 
British managers in terms of the importance of maintaining good personal relationships, 
although  some British managers seem to consider networking strategies to be only one of 
several important components in business transactions and may therefore consider 
networking rather less important than do their Russian counterparts.  This exchange, with 
Roy, the managing director of one of the largest UK steel profilers and stockholders 
expresses the view that price and quality considerations are more important than close 
personal relationships to UK companies: 
PMB: "[….].. networking then, it's not a big deal for you?  - [………] but it's the 
same in China and India, you don't get business unless you know somebody.  They 
call it guanxi in China. 
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RT:  "in this country that doesn't apply, no.  You're judged on all the other proper 
matters including the main one, being price.  There is a degree where you have to 
say we have got ISO 9001, we have got ISO 14,000 before they will let you in the 
door, so there is that degree of having to show that you've got some substance 
about you.  Some companies will only trade with companies who themselves have 
also got some degree of surety that they will be here next year and the year after, for 
reasons of quality.  When we supply steel we have to keep our test certificates for 
10 years.  That test certificate would not be worth the paper it was written on if 
indeed the company went bust, so people need to know, like Rolls-Royce, these 
companies need to know that you're going to be here next year and the year after." 
 
However having made the point that whilst price, quality accreditation and similar reliability 
factors are the most important issues in establishing UK business transactions, once trust 
has been established, networking through recommendations is also recognised as an 
important source of new business development by British managers.  Firstly, Roy, the 
managing director of the large steel stockholder again: 
RT: "a lot of our work comes from recommendation as well, which is another 
interesting one as well.  People who have worked with us can trust us, but when 
someone wants a new supplier, then we get a lot of work through word-of-mouth." 
 
Similarly, GN, the managing director of a British construction services company: 
Paul: "the importance of networking.  Now I think that's quite important in the 
UK, but I think it's like, essential, in Russia...." 
GN: "also Europe to be honest.... the old saying it's not what you know, it's who 
you know.  I don't do business with companies, I do business with people.  I've 
been 18 years in this company, in this industry, I'm very very known in the 
industry and.... you build up a relationship, you go out for coffee, drinks, you meet 
at exhibitions.... I just worked an exhibition in January in Munich, and it is a 
"must go" you need to be seen there, and this is very important in the UK, but also 
in Europe - customer relationship management and networking." 
 
The attitudes of both Russian and British managers to the importance of network strategies 
and personal relationships were investigated in document four. 
The results of that research (which sought to investigate Russian and British attitudes to 
competitive strategies qualitatively) tend to confirm that both groups consider relationships 
important, with Russian managers indicating that their business relationships tended to be 
longer lasting.  This is illustrated by the responses to two particular statements namely: 
 In our market/industry, personal relationships are very important for business , and 
 We have long-lasting business relationships with our customers 
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The responses shown in the following two charts from document four illustrate that whilst 
both groups value personal relationships, Russian relationships are seen as somewhat 
longer lasting. 
FIGURE4.1:  IMPORTANCE OF PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS IN BUSINESS 
 
 
FIGURE4.2:   DURATION OF PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS IN BUSINESS
 
(Document_four 2014) 
However, although both Russian managers and British managers recognise the importance 
of personal relationships, there exist real differences between the ways in which managers 
attempt to build up and foster their networks.  
4.9 NETWORKS, BLAT AND CORRUPTION 
I noted in document three that there was some overlap in terms of the interpretation of the 
issues of network strategies in practice and corruption, and as the phase two interviews 
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were analysed it became clear that not only is the overlap considerable, but this topic is 
probably the most significant area of the research in terms of the effects on strategic 
management.  Consequently this has necessitated a revision of the original classifications as 
described in document three.  In order to understand the interaction of the various themes, 
it has been necessary to review the theoretical literature underpinning the nature of 
networking, blat and the wider aspects of corruption in Russia.  At the stage when the 
literature review was completed this topic was seen to be relevant and consequently was 
covered in document two, but not to the extent to which becomes apparent when analysing 
the findings of phase 2 of the research. 
4.9.1 BLAT AND NETWORK STRATEGIES FOR ESTABLISHING BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES  
Blat has been defined by Ledeneva (2009 p.261) as "the use of personal networks for 
obtaining goods and services in short supply and for circumventing formal procedures."  It 
became completely ubiquitous in the Soviet era as a means of acquiring the necessities of 
everyday life.  Ledeneva (2009 p.261) states that: 
 "Blat can be effectively conceptualised as the know-how of the Soviet system, and the 
reverse side of the over controlling [Soviet] centre.  On the one hand, the Soviet 
regime was penetrated by widely spread informal practices, depended on it [sic], and 
allowed them to compensate for its own rigidity.  On the other hand informal 
practices served individual needs and facilitated some personal freedom and choice." 
 
In the Soviet era blat had its roots in the everyday situation of shortage of common 
consumer goods which gave rise to any number of Soviet era jokes:  
A woman walks into a food store. "Do you have any meat?" 
"No, we don't." 
"What about milk?" 
"We only deal with meat. Across the street there is the store where they have no 
milk." 
(Mrost 2010) 
 
Over time cynical humour became transmuted into folklore - like this description of the "six 
paradoxes of socialism", which, amongst other things, emphasises the significance of blat: 
 There is no unemployment but no one works [absenteeism] 
 No one works but productivity goes up [Soviet reporting] 
 Productivity increases but shops are empty.  [Shortages of consumer goods] 
 Shops are empty but fridges are full.  [Blat] 
 fridges are full but no one is satisfied [unfair privileges] 
 no one is satisfied but everyone votes yes [cynicism] 
(Ledeneva 2009 p.260) 
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In the post-Soviet era, however, the command economy, once characterised by these 
widespread shortages, has given way to a market economy red in tooth and claw, and in 
these circumstances - where the market for goods and services now works adequately well, 
blat loses its widespread relevance for enabling everyday consumption. 
But a new shortage has emerged in Russia; money, and as a consequence blat is now likely 
to include monetary payments instead of (or as well as) assistance in "filling the fridge".  As 
Ledeneva (2013 p.10)  notes: 
"In Soviet society, money played only a small role, and access to goods and services 
meant everything.  Now that capital and commodity markets work and goods and 
services are available, it is access to money, secure investment and getting a well-paid 
job that have become the new terrain of personal networks.  Not only have networks 
re-orientated themselves to serve this new type of shortage, the use of contacts has 
become monetised in the sense that money is not excluded from personal 
transactions."                                                                                           
However, as she points out, blat is still important to get access to jobs, medical care, 
education etc, and many Russians still associate blat with an exchange of favours, the 
circumvention of formal rules and procedures, problem solving and access to administrative 
[government provided] resources.  
Ledenava (2009) quotes a survey undertaken by the Russian Levada Centre which shows 
how blat has developed since the Soviet era.  When asked how widespread is blat in your 
city or region, 66% of Russians stated that that was widespread or quite widespread, and 
only 4% that it was practically absent.  When further questioned about the common use of 
contacts in the post-Soviet era, responses were as follows: 
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TABLE4.3:  USE OF CONTACTS AMONGST THE MEMBERS OF THE RUSSIAN PUBLIC 
What did you use your contacts for in the last seven years % 
(Multiple choices possible) 
Medical services: local surgery, hospital or bed and operation  24 
Solving probiems with the traffic police, registration of a 
vehicie and MOT 
18 
Finding a job 12 
Education; Places in primary-secondary and higher education 12 
Legal services and courts (2+3) 5 
Army conscription 4 
Everyday services at better quality or better price (3 +1) 4 
Repairs of housing, garages, dachas 3 
Tickets for events, theatre, concerts 2 
Hobbies 1 
Consumer goods 1 
Foodstuffs 1 
Other/incorrectly specified 3 
Source:Levada centre survey, 2007   (Ledeneva 2009 p.262) 
This table shows a situation which is the reverse of that which obtained during the Soviet 
period.  Then blat was essential for securing foodstuffs, consumer goods, books, theatre 
tickets etc., and was more or less an omnipresent practice.  The services requiring blat 
nowadays are the public goods which would, under the Soviet regime, have previously been 
provided universally (although with the favoured nomenklatura receiving the “best of the 
universal"). 
In the UK the predominant method of building long-term relationships seems to be by the 
establishment of mutual trust between buyers and suppliers, built up and maintained by 
creating buyer supplier relationships where the buyers recognise that the suppliers provide 
products and services which are tailored to their requirements and competitively priced, so 
that in the longer term this recognition creates a trust based relationship.  The relationships 
are a byproduct of the suppliers reacting appropriately to the demands of the buyers -i.e. 
the suppliers are following reactive strategies. 
By contrast, when manager were working in the Soviet era command economy, market-
driven competitive strategies were almost completely irrelevant, and the relationship 
between managers operating in the industry supply chain was based largely on the ability of 
the various actors to take advantage of the imperfectly-functioning state-owned enterprise 
supply system in order to "grease the wheels" to make the machine function.  This provided 
one form of blat (one based on facilitation rather than the supply of scarce goods). 
In other words, the development of blat was based on the ability of people being able to 
take advantage of their own access to a particular supply chain (through their job) to 
provide needed products for friends or business colleagues, using informal practices and 
unofficial channels.  Factors such as quality and price were not a consideration in making 
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business decisions about supplies because of the inefficiency of the Russian enterprises and 
the supply chain as a whole - being characterised by a network of rather few state-owned 
monopolistic suppliers.  In these circumstances making the machine work to your advantage 
was more important than the much less important issues of quality or price issues. 
Blat is still needed in post-Soviet business life when dealing with authorities and when using 
intermediaries for introduction and recommendation. Blat is also used both in the spheres 
of state education and in unprivatised state industry where the old ways of thinking and 
behaving still remain important.  (Ledeneva 1998). 
Since the end of the Soviet era and the introduction of market economies, then, blat has 
become monetised (Ledeneva 2009) and the nature of the informal practices has changed 
as new, market-based business systems have emerged.  These changes have given rise to 
market-based behaviours which rely on a monetised form of blat, and the main focus of 
these new (post-Soviet) behaviours and informal practices is to manipulate (reduce) the 
competitive nature of the market in which firms are operating. 
4.9.2 BLAT FOR MANIPULATING MARKETS TO REDUCE COMPETITION 
Markets can be manipulated to reduce competition by two main routes; by reducing the 
number of players in the market and by conspiring to keep prices artificially high.  Reducing 
the number of players itself can be achieved by creating blat-based barriers to entry, either 
by establishing a strong personal relationship with buyers - to effectively freeze out 
potential competitors, or by creating some legislative impediment for potential new 
entrants.  This latter requires blat to be built up with legislative bodies, either locally or 
nationally.  So these manipulative strategies can be thought of as: 
 reducing the number of players in the market, by -  
 developing strong personal dependencies with buyers to freeze out 
competitors 
 using third-party government officials to exclude new entrants 
 conspiring to keep prices artificially high 
4.9.3 DEVELOPING BLAT TO REDUCE  THE NUMBER OF PLAYERS 
Boisot, and Child (1996) stress the importance of trust and mechanisms for transferring 
information as being important aspects of guanxi, the Chinese equivalent of blat, and it 
appears to be an analogous situation in Russia.  However, these relationships based on trust 
are not easily established, and once they are, they are effective in reducing the threat of 
new entrants to the market, and in this respect, therefore, blat and guanxi can be seen as 
the basis for manipulative strategies.  This is best illustrated by the following quotation from 
Andrei, a management consultant (with previous family business experience) in Moscow: 
Andrei: “What we normally do on the eighth of March which is a woman's day in 
Russia and I was with the directors of the supermarkets and I bought them 
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personally presents - how is the wife? how are your children?  And Paul, even if 
my prices were higher she will purchase from us because we have a good 
relationship, and you can't overestimate the importance of this relationship.  I've 
done a lot of such things.” 
 
This quotation illustrates two aspects of blat, firstly that the relationship builds trust (the 
aspect identified by the British managers and one of those identified by Boisot and Child) 
but secondly it raises the manipulative strategy of reducing the competitiveness of the 
market by reducing or eliminating the threat of new entrants -"even if my prices were higher 
she will purchase from us because we have a good relationship".  This manipulative strategy 
is stressed later in the same interview: 
Paul:  “..what would happen if a new competitor appeared on the scene.?” 
Andrei: “there is no way a new competitor can appear because of the start-up 
costs, established relationship links -it's impossible. “ 
 
The differences between the Russian attitudes revealed in this exchange and the views of 
UK managers are discussed later in this section. 
4.9.4 CARTEL LIKE ACTIVITY TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF PLAYERS 
As well as securing customers to reduce the possibility of new entrants, there is another, 
closely linked, aspect of strategies designed to reduce competition which is markedly 
different between Russian and British managers, namely cartel like activities designed to 
eliminate new or smaller competitors.  Collusion between larger players in markets seems 
to be entrenched in the Russian business environment.  Amongst the largest companies - 
which may be oligarch owned enterprises, those enterprises like Rosneft which are still 
owned by the state or those which are run by “Siloviki” ("people of power" - members of 
the ruling elite with close links to the Kremlin and the FSB) -it is taken as a given that the 
Russian "Sistema” (elite-based power structures) will ensure that competition does not 
upset lucrative markets or harm monopolistic structures. (Shlapentokh 2003).  Stanislav, 
owner manager of a ******-based SME summed up this widely held view: 
Stanislav: […..] ..Because maybe after two or five years here in Russia they'll be 
maybe five or 10 big companies in this field.  And other companies will die.  
Because these 10 companies will have a lot of money, some government help, and 
they will kill every small company. 
 
This quote supports the contention of Kuznetsov and Kuznetsova (2005 p.28) who, when 
describing the object of network strategies in Russia, state: 
 
83 | P a g e  
 
"On the other hand, by their nature, networks, in particular informal ones, seek to 
maintain exclusiveness. In the Russian context, networking does not mean getting 
better knowledge of business partners and their needs but rather pursues the 
goal of conspiring against outsiders." 
 
And the risk of tangling with the sistema was reiterated by Andrei: 
Paul: [talking about politicians exercising business power] “…except Kordokovski, 
he didn't manage it did he?” 
Andrei: “ yeah but that's another matter” 
Paul:   “but in itself that's quite interesting isn't it, because on a smaller scale that 
must be true - you have got to keep politically on the right side of people as well 
don't you?  You can't afford to make political enemies I guess.” 
Andrei: “ exactly, that's common sense  - that's the rule in Russia.  Don't get 
involved in politics in a big way - you can run your business, have good relations 
with politicians, but don't try to change things - especially in this area”  
 
4.9.5 CARTEL LIKE ACTIVITY TO REDUCE PRICE COMPETITION 
This anti-competitive cartel like behaviour is not confined to the larger companies though.  
Even relatively small SMEs engage in these market manipulating strategies.  Andrei again: 
Paul:  “is there a better word than blat?-it's sort of implies bribery doesn't it, blat?  
Is mir a better word?.” 
Andrei:  “ you can just say its equivalent with social networking.  It's just all 
right, yeah.  There is some blat in it of course, but it's not merely blat, it something 
more.  And this one-[ points to marketing cooperatives] -this is working.  
Marketing cooperatives, we've just done it.  I'll give you an example: my parents 
invite many kinds of joint ventures with competitors, one of the competitors, to 
push out of the market another competitor, we've done it and shared the market, we 
have an agreement, we are not conducting a price war.  Each of the companies has 
the possibility to earn money: you cannot go and offer your services to our 
supermarket, but at the same time we cannot go to yours.  We have our network.  
Each of us has.  There are two wholesale companies-official representatives of the 
two biggest plants in Russia in the ***** region, and we have one competitor, and 
the market is shared-I mean we just shared the market, the prices are stable, and 
sometimes we are increasing the [ prices together ].....”   
  (****= redacted) 
 
It would be naive to imagine that this sort of activity was unique to Russia, and in many 
respects the desire to manipulate markets is a commonly found feature of capitalism - even 
remarked upon in the 18th century by Adam Smith (Smith 1780 p.80): 
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"People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, 
but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some 
contrivance to raise prices. It is impossible indeed to prevent such meetings, by any 
law which either could be executed, or would be consistent with liberty and justice. 
But though the law cannot hinder people of the same trade from sometimes 
assembling together, it ought to do nothing to facilitate such assemblies; much less 
to render them necessary" 
 
However, cartel like behaviour is policed quite strictly in most jurisdictions, and whilst it 
might be known about, it is widely thought of as being unacceptable behaviour by British 
managers, as indicated by the following quote by Steve, the sales director of a specialist 
construction industry service business: 
PMB:  “Where I'm up to is that I think the Russians compete by manipulating 
markets when they can. I don't think we do that in this country to the same extent. 
But here are three or four articles [indicating construction trade press magazine 
articles provided by SB] that say that perhaps we do a bit.” 
SB:  “I think it's probable, I don't know the Russian market so well, Gaylord 
probably knows it better than I do, but it's probably, as you say, quite 
commonplace [ there], whilst here it is [rare], or has been known by some of the 
larger companies the ****, the ******* *******, that it has gone on. I would think, 
rather than call it corruption, I would call that a cartel, and there is a difference 
between the two.” (****= redacted)   
 
Steve makes the distinction between corruption and cartel like activity, which is, in his view, 
a matter of degree  and later on in the conversation, his colleague, the managing director, 
agrees that the construction industry is one of the industries most likely to be subject to 
corrupt behaviour (because of the high value of construction contracts): 
PMB:  “and yet, if you were talking about any industry in the UK where you 
might expect..... it would be construction.” 
GN: “ mmm” [signaling assent]  
 
He also makes it clear that corruption is generally considered to be unacceptable behaviour 
in the UK: 
GN: “But just to conclude this, we do […] have one or two cases [of bribes being 
offered to our employees] a year, but the policy within the company where money 
has been offered -they come to us, -  I hope they come to us all the time and tell us, 
because it's not worth their job.  Because we're independent, and the moment we 
jeopardise that, we've only got one reputation to lose, - you build it over 20 years 
and lose it in a second.” 
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When transcribed, some of these exchanges with British managers perhaps sound a little 
pompous or self-righteous, but that certainly was not the impression which I gained whilst 
conducting the interviews.  I really felt that the managers I interviewed were stating their 
views quite sincerely, and that they genuinely felt that corrupt practices were completely 
unacceptable.   
These exchanges with Russian and British managers highlight the differences in attitudes 
between the two.  It is clear that, as Ledeneva (2009) has pointed out, blat is considered by 
the vast majority of Russians as just a day-to-day fact of life with no major ethical or moral 
considerations.  In the Russian context it is just the "know how", the mode de vivre 
inherited from the Soviet era, and its use in a business context is neither shocking nor 
unexpected.  
4.9.6 FROM BLAT BASED ON EXCHANGE OF FAVOURS TO OUTRIGHT CORRUPTION - A FINE LINE 
The exchange of favours is only one example of the informal practices which were normal in 
the Soviet and in many cases, the Czarist era. 
Several of the commonly found business practices in Russia relate to the methods by which 
blat is established and, in particular, the way in which gifts and payments play a role in its 
development.  Several Russians mentioned payments and gifts to customers as normal 
practice to secure their business.  The recipients of these gifts were often middle level 
"gatekeepers" in both private sector and state sector organisations.  
The practice of gift giving or offering payments to potential customers and gatekeepers is 
frowned on in the UK Even quite small business gifts are now considered to be 
unacceptable.  For example, this exchange with Jimmy, the director and co-owner of a 
specialist consultancy working with local authorities in the UK clearly illustrates that even 
modest corporate entertainment is, for some companies, on the borderline of being 
unethical: 
PMB: “well I recall sitting in a meeting discussing pricing strategies of 
Birmingham, and my suggesting that you might want to go out for a drink or a 
meal or something with the person, and you all went "whoooa, we can't do that" 
you know, "how corrupt is that?"  And you know I thought to myself at the time, 
gosh if that was Russia, they wouldn't even, you know, blink at that sort of thing.  
But you've got a very strong ethical......” 
JJ:    “- we have, and also tendering conditions are very very clear - there should be 
no attempt in any way to influence or to try to endear yourself to the local 
authority” 
 
and later in the same interview: 
JJ:   “we have a very clear policy for our organisation about anyone offering a gift 
or anyone offering an opportunity.  We have a very clear policy on that because the 
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kind of work we do, if we were ever challenged about being influenced to give a 
recommendation in a piece of work, and assessment or a recommendation, or some 
sort of consultancy work our reputation would be in tatters.” 
 
There is no such reticence in Russia when it comes to corporate gifts.  The following 
attitudes to business gifts were expressed firstly by Roy, managing director of a large steel 
stockholder and profiler: 
PMB:   “[there was this morning a report] on the BBC saying exactly the same this 
morning saying for example that IKEA won't pay bribes.  The consequences they 
get held up for years building new stores because they're not prepared to pay 
bribes.” 
RT :  “But we don't do we?  I mean we don't” 
PMB:  “no, we don't do it” 
RT:  “the farthest I will ever go is a bottle at Christmas and we've reduced that 
because of the recession, and the odd lunch for proper commercial discussion on 
matters, and that's as far as it goes.” 
 
By contrast, Alena, the marketing manager of a Russian steel stockholding company in 
Tyumen held completely different views: 
Paul:   “… [In the UK) We don't give customers Christmas presents..... what's it 
like here do you give presents to your customers at Christmas?” 
Alena:  [very surprised]  “it's half my budget!” 
 
And Andrei, talking about a family business: 
Andrei:   “I'll tell you a story probably to make it clearer.  In ****, let's say **** are 
involved are in business and they needed some connections in the city 
administration, and let's say there is a person in the administration, let's say trade 
department, who is really powerful who has really strong connections and if you 
had good relations with that person you automatically get ahead of your 
competitors.  What do you do Paul?  I know you can call it bribery-we just bought 
her the latest mobile phone for her birthday.  We are in a good relationship.  Really.  
My father sometimes goes with her to the restaurant just discussing some stuff -
how is the family, how are things and it's nothing like you know "bring me the 
money in an envelope.....”. 
Paul:  “ it's a fine line to draw isn't it?  In the UK 20 years ago, for example, [a 
business acquaintance] used to run a day at the races for his customers, and he 
invited me along from time to time.  There was nothing you couldn't have that day 
at the races-he used to hire a box at the local racecourse, wonderful food, drink etc.it 
was a really good day out, but it must have cost a fortune.  Was that bribery?” 
Andrei:   “that's the question, where is the line?.  The only difference with Russia 
is Russians are more sophisticated in these kinds of things: for example, you won't 
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probably buy him a mobile phone, you can organise a party but you won't buy a 
mobile phone-but we will.  That's the difference.  We will, and you know it's like 
silent agreement.  Everybody knows that we are in a good relationship.  It’s not like 
its formal-giving money and getting some services from the person back.  No, it's 
not like this.  It's just personal relationships and sometimes you have to, like, pay 
for it.” 
Paul:  “so are business gifts and important part of Russian life then?” 
Andrei:   “business gifts, and being a good person-every tiny detail can be 
important.  Like if you see a person standing on the pavement and you drive him 
home-that's the beginning.  And you see him somewhere and you drink a cup of 
coffee and then it starts, and you call them up and tell them happy birthday or 
happy New Year-and bring some presents-show you're interested, that's really 
important.  And the mistake of some Western companies is in Russia is they come 
with this formal approach,-we do the business, and we just stay apart.“    
  (**** = redacted) 
 
 
From these exchanges it seems clear that attempts to gain business by providing gifts - 
sometimes expensive - to gatekeepers (a manipulative strategy intended to exclude 
competitors) is much more embedded in Russian business culture than it is in the UK where 
gift giving seems to have virtually disappeared.   
"Brown envelope" payments, - actual monetary payments - are considered to be completely 
corrupt in the UK, even in industries like construction (where there is suspicion amongst 
smaller players that these payments are sometimes made).   Indeed, the phrase "brown 
envelope" itself is widely understood to imply that corrupt practices are involved in the 
transaction.   
However, the practice of making monetary payments to gatekeepers is much more common 
in Russia as this quote reveals: 
Andrei:  “My mother's wholesale company was seeking to get the contract for one 
of the biggest grocery retail chains in the region.  And the head of the trade 
Department for the chain was a woman in her 50s I think that.  What we've done - 
it was my specialisation I think- dealing with women of this age - I mean it's easy 
for me, it's always easier for men to deal with women, but anyway, the first time I 
met her I introduced myself and told her my name is Andrei blah blah blah, that's 
what we have, these are our prices, but she was like reluctant to change her 
previous supplier.  So I just kept coming, being polite, not being annoying.  The 
first thing I did, I dropped her home once, we had like a conversation, so I just 
started a relationship. Next time I drove her home with my mother and we had 
another conversation, and we started supplying.  And then we - in Russia and 
there is an expression called " kormit'”which means to feed - so to feed the person, 
88 | P a g e  
 
it means to give them money from time to time -  I can compare it to paying salary, 
or she gets a commission from the turnover or something.  So she had a commission 
of I think 1% from the whole turnover which was quite a lot.  And that's what I'm 
trying to explain Paul.  It's not like just bringing money in an envelope and 
getting something back in return, it doesn't work like this.  First establish a 
relationship, step-by-step, and you cannot distinguish - for example, the previous 
example I gave you was this woman in the trade Department in the city 
administration, I can't even say whether we are friends or or we are bribing her.  
You know what I mean, we are both in good relationships - and what you call it- 
bribing or "feeding" as we call it.” 
 
"Feeding" then is another form of manipulative strategy intended to secure business by 
reducing the impact of the local competition.  From being reluctant to change her previous 
supplier, the beneficiary of the " kormit'” becomes a loyal customer.  Like other forms of 
blat, direct payment of bribes seems to be institutionalised as demonstrated by this quote 
from Alena: 
Alena:  “such bribes from the company - anyway for my company its legal and we 
have budgets for such things.  We call it such things as agent payment, and for 
example if you want a big contract with government., you can't get a big contract 
without some sort of...” 
Paul:   “but how do you keep that transparent so that it isn't corrupt.  [……] Do 
you think it is a problem?” 
Alena:   “it's a part of business, it's not a problem for us to find a way.  I know, 
I've heard - I know all clients that we've paid….” 
 
The fact that there is a universally understood the Russian term, " kormit' ”, to describe this 
form of bribery  reinforces the view that it is endemic in Russian business culture, and, once 
again, there seems to be little perception amongst the Russian managers that gifts and 
"feeding" are in anyway unusual or outside the bounds of acceptable behavior.  I got no 
sense during the interviews that Russian interviewees had ethical concerns about it.  This 
contrasts markedly with the anticorruption sentiments of a large proportion of the general 
Russian populace. 
4.9.7 KICKBACKS AND TOP SLICING 
Sometimes "feeding" is initiated by the company trying to get new clients - the process 
described by Andrei in the passage above, but on other occasions the transaction can be 
initiated by the potential client/customer.  Once again, this practice is widespread enough 
to have spawned another word to describe it - "Otkat" (Williams 2013) - which seems to be 
best translated as "kickback" or "top slicing".   
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This seems often to be the case with companies doing business with local or national 
government organisations, and introduces a whole new class of potential corruption, 
namely corruption of employees of government or quasi-government organisations, and 
probably best describes the "commission" arrangements described above by Andrei. 
Both the following quotes from Stanislav, owner manager of a company supplying bathroom 
fittings in Moscow and Dmitry, finance director of an Internet company in the Tyumen 
region, indicate the importance of network relationships with local government officials, 
both to facilitate business directly with the local authority and to enable licences or 
permissions to be obtained.  The quotes also imply the importance of some sort of 
payments to build blat for gaining new business - sometimes overt Otkat, as implied by 
Stanislav,  
Stanislav: "….most of our customers are builders.  And some government 
because, as you understand, in Russia if you have a good contact with the 
administration or government, it's very good to you because they give you orders, 
you give the money, and everything is okay [in an ironic tone of voice] 
and, as already noted but in a different context 
Stanislav: "this is our strategy.  To every people who come to us, to our company 
will find service and good relationships - a cup of coffee, and maybe a cigarette and 
this way, we found a lot of clients.  But of course I have some communications with 
****** government. ********* - they of course give us some big orders, and some big 
builders.  And that's why." 
 
Sometimes a more subtle approach seems to be in order, as described by Dmitry: 
Dmitry:  "I agree with you Paul, because, for example you are going to use some 
net [networking?] in the new town, if you are from another region for example it's 
very difficult to do that.  But, but, [inaudible] everything is possible I think, it 
doesn't [just] depend on money.  For example you're going to start your business 
in a different town and you've got money to do it, yes?  And in conversation you 
can supply some resource to the town for example such as free Internet for schools 
for example, even if it's the one side and it benefits another side.  Might not work 
completely but after some negotiations it will be possible." 
 
The type of activity described by Dmitry was also mentioned by British managers, although 
confined to those working in the construction industry, and was not viewed as overt 
corruption as the following quote indicates: 
SB:   “[……]  we were talking about bribery and corruption before, well often, in 
Asda, Sainsbury's, Tesco's whoever it may be, they'll agree to put a store here as 
long as they upgrade the roads here, here and here.   [……]  but that wouldn't be 
called bribery, that would be called a  sweetener.  I would think as far as we are 
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concerned, we don't have to have the relationship with local government, but 
customers probably do.” 
 
My interpretation of this different perception is that SB did not perceive the exchange as 
corruption because there was no benefit to a particular individual, but rather to the 
community as a whole. 
 
4.10 COPING WITH THE RUSSIAN BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT AND GOVERNMENT 
AGENCIES  
4.10.1 UNOFFICIAL PRACTICES TO FACILITATE WORKING WITH GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS 
The changes in the nature of blat-based relationships with local authorities and government 
departments since the monetisation described earlier have led to significant changes in the 
way companies deal with government.  These changes are evident both in the way in which 
companies obtain government business (discussed above), and in the way that they are 
compelled to work with the regulatory bodies with which they regularly come into contact. 
Despite the reduction in the importance of blat amongst the general public and the 
changing emphasis in its use, in the business sector blat, in a range of guises, remains 
extremely important.  Several studies have identified the prevalence in some societies of 
behaviours which aim to manipulate the market place and the ways in which companies use 
networking to take advantage of this manipulation, ((Luo 1997, Lynch 2006, Hunter 2003), 
with Luo stating explicitly that one of the aspects of guanxi (the Chinese equivalent of blat) 
is to:  
“Circumvent rules through exploitation of personal relationships and Achieve 
governmental assistance and support.” 
 
4.10.2 CORRUPTION AND RELATIONS BETWEEN BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT 
Every Russian manager interviewed identified corruption as a significant issue in Russian 
business life. The majority of managers identified corruption most strongly with 
relationships involving the local administration (local government) although the term "the 
Administration" may have been intended as a generic reference to other forms of 
government such as the tax authorities. The following quote, from Andrei, one of the 
younger generation of managers, typifies the views of managers on this theme, namely that 
corruption is endemic in Russia: 
Andrei:  “ actually I think you're really close.  I wouldn't hope for the changes in 
the way the business is done in Russia, I wouldn't hope, even my generation.... 
[…..] and I tell you honestly that I used to bribe some people, because there is no 
way round, and it's not because they are bad and I am good, I am its same bad, and 
there is no resistance.  Okay, here there are a lot of talks on the TV about the 
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negative events of corruption and bureaucracy but, Paul, the first one who realises 
that's just the way things are done in Russia will succeed.  And you cannot change 
it on your own -it's just the system and I don't see any changes, because I'm 
mentally the same as my father was.  When I was telling you about the new 
generation of people, I didn't mean that they were going to change the system.  I 
just meant that this new coming managers-or whatever you would call them-they 
just have a conscience unlike those who just steal without giving anything back to 
the country.  And the thing is, there is corruption in the police, authorities, I don't 
know,- the medical service, - in the Army- the corruption is in the mind” 
 
and expanding on the theme, to emphasise how wide spread the problem is, he continues: 
Andrei: “….I will tell you a story - about legislation issues -  about that.  In 
Russia we have an expression which is that there is a price for everything.  Okay, 
in my city - in my region - a great deal of my friends are policemen - I mean top 
end police in the region, some in the courts - I mean it happens like this.  My 
sister's boyfriend's father is a judge, and my friends have all this kind of 
connection .  The thing is if I get into trouble, I mean something like some problem 
with some controlling organisation like local tax department, I can solve it, I can 
solve it easily - I mean I will have to pay but I can solve it.  So that's just giving 
you an example.  Everything has a price in Russia  - you can imagine  - I mean you 
know because my friends are policemen I know approximately the price our mayor 
paid to be released - not to be convicted for some fraud - I know the price is 
approximately $1 million, so everybody knows it in Russia.  Shell, BP or some 
other Western companies can be fined in Russia for some enormous sums of money, 
but Russian companies in most cases can find a way round it.  They can sort it 
out….” 
 
Later in the same conversation I discussed with Andrei whether or not the latest generation 
of managers had a more "Western" attitude towards corruption and manipulating markets 
and his response indicated that the attitudes were embedded and the younger generation 
would be likely to engage in the same practices: 
Andrei:  “how they do their business?  They may feel like western managers” 
Paul:  “yes.  I think they feel much more like western managers than a generation 
back.  And so maybe your generation of managers will be more interested in 
competition rather than trying to manipulate the market-you know -  maybe” 
Andrei:  “just my personal view-I doubt it--they may look like western managers, 
they say the right things, but ask them and I'll bet that each of them once in their 
life bribed somebody.” 
 
If this view is correct, then these issues surrounding corruption will remain significant for 
companies investing in and doing business with the Russian Federation, and as a result, the 
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ways in which Russian managers can deal with the corruption endemic in the Russian 
business environment is beginning to receive attention from the academic 
community.(Denisova, Ledeneva et al. 2013, Fey, Shekshnia 2008) 
The prevalence of corruption in the relationship between companies and government 
organisation arose in the following conversation (over lunch) between two academic 
colleagues from TSU who both undertake consultancy work for local businesses and local 
authorities organisations: 
Paul: “ yes exactly, I think that's right, I agree you can't separate the politics.  
And that's what makes it different to Russian businesses because you can't 
separate the politics, and who you know in the regional administration and your 
relationships etc and that's just as important for making strategy as deciding 
whether to have low prices or a better product.  The success of the company of the 
corporate strategy is driven by different things in Russia” 
Ludmilla:   “some people from our local government have shares in some 
companies, and that's why they allow these companies to ……. [inaudible]” 
interview pauses to allow meals to be served. 
........... 
Paul:  “so you are saying, about the problems of corruption, you're right, but what 
does a business do about that?  Because the tax authorities can make life very 
difficult for a company if they want to, and if you're wanting to open a new 
business and you need a licence  it can be very difficult.  But worse than that, and 
it's a lot different now, but in the 1990s people used to get shot didn't they, in 
Moscow, not here but in Moscow” 
Ludmilla:  yes,  “in Tyumen also.” 
Paul:  “really, by competitors?  By companies?” 
Ludmilla: “ well it's very difficult to say but there was a lot of...  [Inaudible. … 
possibly "Mafia"]  And dividing the same business among different people” 
Paul: “ I don't think it's anything like it was in the 90s.  What do you think?” 
Ludmilla:  “I suppose it is another form now-maybe more civilised, but the 
concept I suppose is the same.” 
Olga:   “in the 1990s when children are asked who they would like to be in future 
they answered "we want to the Mafia in future, because Mafia, they are rich and so 
on, they rule the world.  Now, when children are asked what they want to be in the 
future they say "we want to be authorities [local administrators/local government 
officials] …..  All changes in the world!” 
Ludmilla:   “because if you are a deputy in our duma or in the local duma you are 
protected by the state.  I suppose you can do what you want, it depends on your 
moral standards” 
 
The Russian think tank INDEM estimate estimates that only 10% of the overall corruption is 
nowadays directed at ways of "beating the system" (old-fashioned Soviet style blat), whilst 
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about 90% of bribes in Russia are paid by businessmen to facilitate dealings with 
government agencies; export licensing and quotas, state budget transactions, tax transfers, 
customs duties, privatisation deals and servicing debts to the federal budget.  (Satarov et al 
in Ledeneva (2013).   
The implication in Satarov's work is that bribery is initiated by businessmen and in a recent 
INSEAD faculty working paper considering the difficulties and tensions in leadership faced 
with endemic corruption (Denisova, Ledeneva and Shekshnia. 2013), the authors estimate 
that in a survey of "informal practices" - i.e. those associated with blat and corruption - the 
vast majority (76%) were initiated by corporate executives whilst government officials come 
a distant second, initiating slightly less than 20%.  Most of these informal business practices 
are intended to manipulate the workings of markets and the mechanisms used by 
government to regulate those markets and control abuses. 
However, during all of the interviews which I undertook in Russia I gained the distinct 
impression that bribery was most often initiated by the government employee rather than 
the interviewee (or the person in the anecdote being related by the interviewee).  
One interpretation which could possibly explain the disparity between my impressions and 
those proposed by Dennisova et al could be that the corporate executives who were 
identified as initiating corrupt practices could merely be initiating them because they 
realised that without such an approach they would stand no chance of achieving their 
desired outcomes - in other words, it is just a recognition of the fact that the public 
employee with the power to grant or obstruct their project will not grant it without 
payment.  (Alternatively, and less charitably perhaps, the situation in which managers claim 
that corruption is initiated by state employees is explained more simply - "they would say 
that wouldn't they?") 
I had informal conversations on more than one occasion with Russian friends and colleagues 
to discuss the reasons why bribery was so widespread.  In these conversations the extent of 
the bribery problem was often attributed to traditional low pay in the public sector, (leading 
to the prevalence of "feeding" referred to above) although it was recognised that the more 
recently the situation has changed and that people working in the public sector are 
beginning to recognise that their power and influence can be easily monetised rather than 
being traded for everyday goods and services as used to be the case under the old Soviet 
economic system.   
Whoever initiates the "informal practice", this research certainly confirms that 
government/local government corruption is endemic in Russia, and is seen as a major 
problem when companies are developing strategies.   
The following quotes give an indication of the significance of the corruption experienced 
every day by Russian managers: 
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Paul:   “so it's a real problem that there is corruption?  Well I think that's true, 
but it also happens in England -  I live in a little town near Wolverhampton and 
there's one supermarket and another supermarket wants to open in the town, and 
they have a contract with a landowner…….” 
Valentina: “… [gestures passing money] …..yes but in Russia it is awful.  I'm 
sure that in every country sometimes it's like that.-  And we have a lot of our 
problems because I can tell you a lot about our bureaucracy and of course 
corruption is awful, and we need to pay to everybody to the authorities of course,.  
And it is a problem of ours, and our customers” 
 
Stanislav:  “my field, where I'm working now, is very interesting.  But what 
about the strategy?  My opinion is that the Russian Federation, it doesn't matter 
what business you're in, it's very hard to make a strategy because our government, 
our laws, our corruption - you understand corruption?  It's when you pay money - 
the corruption in Russia - a very big part, very big part…[…. ]             
 - but about your question, what is my dream - I don't want to be like 
Abramovitch, because it's very bad for my heart - you have to be thinking where 
can I put this million, where shall I put that million.” 
Paul:   “he looks a happy man” 
Stanislav:  “ it's only visual .... it's not I think - inside him it's not like this. “  
 
There seem to be two broad reasons why this endemic corruption exists, firstly because of 
commercial issues concerning the ability of government bodies to place orders and secondly 
because of the enormous power of national and local government agencies to interfere in 
the day-to-day running of companies.  This pervasive government interference ranges from 
the enforcement of business tax legislation to the various licensing, approval and legislative 
control of things like geographical planning/zoning of new enterprises.  On occasion 
corruption amounts to little more than expediting a government decision, as for example 
described by Maxim, manager of a steel stockholding company in ******: 
Maxim: "… well of course you have good relations with government but in our 
case the local government doesn't disturb or interrupt our business.  We have to 
connect of course, for example if we need some licence for construction.  But it's 
not a huge problem, -  of course corruption takes place - but if you want to solve 
some questions very quickly you have to pay." 
 
However, in other instances the power of the government agency can be such that it it can 
be a make or break barrier for business project, as illustrated in this quote from Andrei: 
Andrei:  “And you are totally right, the lack of competition, which comes from 
some bureaucratic constraints-for example you won't get a lot [building plot] to 
build a new hotel because the owner of [ a competitor] hotel is somehow turns out 
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to be the wife of the local mayor.  It's horrible-the level of bureaucracy is terrific in 
a negative sense you know, and how do we deal with it?  I think in Russia […..] 
you need to use punishment really.  Explanations appealing to common sense do 
not work because..... I can tell you all the schemes our mayor uses to earn money, 
establishes his own payments-producing plans for somewhere in the region, and 
then giving the orders to his own company which is registered to his brother.  So 
everybody knows...[ that corruption is pervasive] “ 
 
and it certainly seems as though the size and scale of the company dictates to some extent 
the interference from local and national government bodies.  Companies operating in the 
spheres where government has some direct interest can expect a greater degree of 
interference. For example, Maxim, the owner manager of project management company in 
Tyumen, who generally found little problem with corruption in the Tyumen region, did state 
however: 
Maxim: "….there's one thing I ought to mention, it's fortunately not connected 
with my market and my business, but present, and different here.  So some Russian 
[local] governments, they have their own affiliated companies, and of course if our 
company was a competitor to such a company, in that case we would have 
problems with the government."  
 
The threat of government bodies seeking corrupt payments appears to be more prevalent 
with larger companies, and there is a feeling amongst SME managers that it is somehow 
better to be a smaller company and so to be "underneath the radar" when it comes to the 
attention of government bodies as exemplified by this quote from Stanislav, 
owner/manager of a Moscow-based building supplies company: 
Stanislav: "….But I want to have stability, I forget the word in English, so in five 
years - in the future I want a little bit to grow, but not very much.  Security in my 
place, because now I'm not very big and the government looks at me and they 
understand that I'm not big so they cannot take a lot of money from me, but when 
if I grow the Administration will come to me and say give me money, give me 
money because this is Russia.  And unfortunately this is Russia.” 
Perhaps the most often cited complaints were concerned with the impact of bureaucracy 
and the cost of complex business regulation (red tape), in particular the complex tax 
regulations. Typical quotations from managers include: 
Alexander:  “one problem is that our legislation is not ideal and that is why the 
company has to have a lot of accountants.  And this legislation doesn't allow the 
company to become larger.” 
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Valentina:  “yes, yes for example in Finland you only need to pay the tax in the 
end of the year but here we need to pay it every month and we need to make a lot of 
documents and give it to the tax department and so on.  It's a lot of work for us-for 
this reason for example we have four accountants.” 
 
Evidence from other studies is available to substantiate these findings.  Dennisova et al 
attempt to classify the sorts of informal/ corrupt practices which are commonly found in 
Russian businesses, and whilst their framework for the classification of the practices is 
different from that used in this study (their paper concentrating on ways in which endemic 
corruption can be reduced by appropriate management), the list appears to be 
comprehensive, even to the extent of including some seemingly innocuous items which may 
not be considered to be particularly out of the ordinary in a western business context (for 
example funding press articles and local TV and radio broadcasts). 
The following table shows the many of the informal practices adopted by Russian companies 
identified by Dennisova et al, including an additional column in which I have attempted to 
classify the apparent motivation of the practice described: 
TABLE 4.4: THE MOST AND LEAST SYSTEMATICALLY USED PRACTICES (IN THE DESCENDING ORDER BY 
WEIGHTED POINTS) 
 
Practice Points 
(out of  a possible 555) 
Apparent Motivation  
(personal or company) 
Extorting bribes by regional 
regulatory agencies: tax 
inspectorate, sanitation service, 
police etc. 
278 Facilitation of business 
processes 
Funding of publications in regional 
press and broadcasts on regional TV 
and radio 
278 Normal commercial 
practice 
Disregarding ‘conflict of interest’ of 
regional managers, e.g. their use of 
companies affiliated to them, 
recruitment of relatives etc. 
266 Personal gain – 
by company employee 
Selecting vendors/contractors with 
whom regional managers have 
informal relationships or 
arrangements 
263 Manipulative competitive 
strategy  
 
Paying for the services of regional 
regulatory agencies: tax 
inspectorate, customs, sanitation 
service, police, fire inspectorate, 
standardization agencies etc. 
262 Facilitation of business 
processes 
Receiving kickbacks or other 
informal rewards (for example, 
220 Manipulative competitive 
strategy  
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Practice Points 
(out of  a possible 555) 
Apparent Motivation  
(personal or company) 
expensive gifts) by regional 
managers from vendors, suppliers, 
buyers 
 
Using company staff to carry out 
personal assignments from regional 
managers (assistance to family 
members, construction and 
decoration of housing, organization 
of holidays and entertainment) 
213 Personal gain – 
by company employee 
Using informal connections and 
networks to obtain state orders 
(state procurement) and loans from 
state banks 
202 Manipulative competitive 
strategy 
Paying salaries and bonuses to staff 
of regional subdivisions in cash 
without paying social tax 
197 Financial gain for the 
company  
   
some practices are omitted here 
…[by the authors] 
[….] - 
   
Using informal tools (compromising 
documents and information, 
material from security services, 
krugovaya poruka) to manage 
company staff 
99 Unethical HR technique 
Paying for tax audits and other 
inspections in regional subdivisions 
with preagreed results 
80 Facilitation of business 
processes / 
financial gain for the 
company 
Using informal tools (compromising 
documents and information, 
material from security services, 
krugovaya poruka) to exert pressure 
on regional authorities 
57 Facilitation of business 
processes 
Leasing of the company’s 
production or office premises or 
production equipment by regional 
managers for personal gain 
41 Personal gain - 
by company employee 
Receiving commissions or other 
material benefits from job 
candidates by heads of regional 
subdivisions 
24 Personal gain – 
by company employee 
   
Adapted from Denisova et al (2013 p.8) 
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The points system which the authors have adopted to rank the practices in this table have 
been established using a weighting system which seeks to score  each of the practices listed 
in terms of the frequency of usage as classified in the findings of the original study, so that 
the most systematically used practices could be identified.  Although it is somewhat 
speculative to use these weighted scores because the table is not complete and the 
weighting system could be seen as being rather arbitrary, nonetheless I have attempted to 
analyse the apparent motives for undertaking the practices, and, as a rule of thumb one 
could conclude that the main motives are as follows: 
TABLE 4.5 APPARENT MOTIVATION FOR THE USE OF "INFORMAL PRACTICES" (CORRUPTION) 
Apparent Motivation Sum of frequency points 
Facilitation of business processes 737 
Manipulative competitive strategy 685 
Personal gain by employee or manager 543 
Financial gain by company 277 
Adapted from Denisova et al (2013 p.8) 
The frequency points used above  are only rough and ready indicators of the common 
motivators for engaging in the informal practices above and should be considered as such.  
They do however indicate that the facilitation of normal business processes is probably the 
most common reason for bribery, whilst a significant number of informal practices are 
undertaken as part of a manipulative competitive strategy. 
All of the above views expressed by Russian managers and also contained in Denisova et al 
(2013) are  reflected in the findings of The WEF Global Competitiveness Report 2013: 
FIGURE 4.3: WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM REPORT FINDINGS - RUSSIAN FEDERATION
 
(Schwab 2013  p.304)                      
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Quite clearly, the problems of a cumbersome government bureaucracy with its attendant 
opportunities for corruption pose the biggest problems for Russian businesses, particularly 
those small and medium sized companies without the alternative of relying on political 
patronage through siloviki/oligarch influence. 
The most recent indices published in the Economic Freedom of the World Report (Economic 
Freedom Network 2013) show that although Russian economic freedom has been gradually 
improving overall, it is still ranked at 101st place out of 152 countries, and a detailed 
examination of the factors making up the index shows that business regulation (by local and 
national government bodies) presents the most significant difficulties and is ranked in 127th  
position out of 152.   
Set in this context, the comments emphasising the difficulties of operating in the Russian 
business environment made by the Russian managers interviewed in this research are 
understandable, and the attitudes which they have developed in response to the local 
business environment have led to significant directions of overall company strategy 
(discussed in the next chapter). 
4.11 SUMMARY OF THE MOST IMPORTANT FINDINGS 
4.11.1 SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS ON THE PRACTICE OF STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 
Most of the managers interviewed in this study reported that strategic management in 
Russian businesses was undertaken by a relatively small group within the company, that the 
process was largely an informal one and that much of the development of strategies tended 
to follow in emergent pattern rather than by the use of a highly structured process.   
There were indications that larger businesses tended to be more inwardly orientated in 
their approach to strategy, and that they were becoming more systematic and formal in 
their strategic management processes.  These large companies had much more centralised 
approaches to planning as.  These factors were mainly attributed to the necessity to 
improve the competitiveness of big ex-state-owned enterprises in the light of an 
increasingly free market environment. 
There were also indications that the power of oligarchs and siloviki (as important 
stakeholders) had significant effects on the strategies of large companies, (and because of 
their market power, they can also affect SME strategies as well) but although the group of 
managers which I interviewed included some from large companies, they tended to be 
relatively junior and could only comment on the strategic management processes in their 
companies "by observation from afar".   Indeed, it seems very likely that in practice, insights 
into strategy processes in these vast ex-SOEs can only be inferred by observing the actions 
of the companies and their decisions.  Gaining direct access to siloviki/oligarch decision-
makers in these companies who represent massive concentrations of commercial and 
political power is, to all intents and purposes, impossible. 
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There was a general feeling amongst the Russian managers that Russian companies, even 
large ex-SOEs tended to favour younger managers, It seems likely that this Russian 
preference may well reflect the view that younger managers will more easily adapt to the 
rapidly changing business environment because many will have had an appropriate 
educational background, and there is certainly the view that younger managers are more 
entrepreneurial.  However this preference was not mirrored by the UK managers 
interviewed.   
Overall, although the issues affecting strategic management practice in large oligarch 
owned or siloviki directed companies are found in Russia but seem hardly evident at all in the 
UK,  in most respects the process of strategising in smaller Russian companies appears to be 
broadly similar to that found in British companies of similar size.  The differences which are 
evident in the strategies followed by Russian companies are mainly a result of different 
attitudes to relationships between people, other companies, and the government agencies 
with which companies are compelled to interact. 
4.11.2 SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS ON COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES AND RELATIONSHIPS WITH 
CUSTOMERS 
In some respects the views of Russian managers (particularly those working in SMEs) on the 
subject of competitive strategies and relationships with customers are similar to their British 
counterparts.  It is evident that Russian managers realise that they need a coherent 
competitive strategy and understand what is required to achieve it.  The matching of their 
competitive positioning with the requirements of their customers often leads smaller 
businesses to follow reactive strategies. 
However, it is also evident that, unlike their British counterparts, Russian managers of both 
small and large businesses are also likely to use manipulative strategies, both to secure new 
customers (by establishing blat either by social methods or by payments) and to reduce the 
degree of competition in a market by excluding competitors.  This may be by the use of 
cartel like arrangements or by taking advantage of political connections with governments 
or suppliers to make market entry difficult for potential new competitors. 
In either case it seems that nowadays it is seen as normal commercial practice in Russia to 
build blat by the extensive use of business gifts and often by direct payments in the form of 
kormit - “feeding" or Otkat - top slicing contracts.  These practices, involving some forms of 
payment, have replaced the older forms of blat which were ubiquitous in Soviet times at a 
personal rather than corporate level. 
4.11.3 SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS ON COPING WITH THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES  
The significance of corruption in Russian business life was stressed by all the managers 
interviewed, and identified by several recent studies (for example the World Economic 
Forum Global Competitiveness Report (Schwab 2013) as being the largest single problem 
facing Russian companies.  Transparency International ranks Russia 136th out of 174 
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countries in its corruption perception index -  in comparison with the UK which is ranked at 
14th. (Anon 2014) 
 The topic of corruption has been analysed in some depth  (Ledeneva 2009, Denisova, 
Ledeneva et al. 2013) and it is apparent that it is a blanket term that includes many 
activities, sometimes referred to as informal or unofficial practices, and covers a wide 
spectrum of levels of malfeasance - from misuse of company property to outright large-scale 
bribery. Denisova et al identified 27 different practices which can be classed as corrupt. 
There appear to be three main motives for corrupt practices, namely: personal gain at an 
individual level, financial gain for the company as a result of implementing manipulative 
competitive strategies, and facilitating dealings with government bodies which have power 
to regulate companies.  Russian research indicates that more than 70% of bribes paid by 
companies to facilitate some aspect of their business dealings with government are initiated 
by corporate managers rather than government employees. 
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION  
5.1 A MODEL TO EXPLAIN THE ACTIONS OF THE MANAGERS INTERVIEWED.   
his chapter seeks to explain the some of the findings detailed in the previous chapter. 
From the outset, this study of strategy in Russian businesses has been intended as 
exploratory with the object of developing theory concerning the practice of strategic 
management in Russia.   As discussed in chapter 3, interpreting qualitative data is a complex 
process: Schwandt (2007) points out that all interpretation depends on the cultural 
grounded-ness and personal experience of the researcher him/herself, but it surely also 
rests on an understanding of the history and social structure of the society in which the 
study is taking place.  The discussions which follow might be thought of as quite wide-
ranging, but are intended to explain some of the unexpected findings.  This requires an 
understanding of the features of Russian society and the economy which may affect the 
ways in which Russian managers think about business issues. 
As the findings stand, they are really just data unless one develops a model which 
satisfactorily explains the observed phenomena of market manipulation, and which could be 
predictive - explaining how the nature of the business environment and culture shape 
competitive strategy.   
Krugman defines a model: 
“What do I mean by a “model”? The answer is, I’m pretty generous on that front – it 
could be solved equations, it could be a computer simulation, it could be a physical 
apparatus like the Phillips hydraulic Keynesian model, or it could just be a carefully 
written verbal discussion like Hume’s essay on the balance of trade.  What makes it a 
model is that however it’s presented, it involves careful discussion of micromotives 
and macrobehavior – that is, it describes what individuals are doing (not necessarily 
out of perfect rationality), and how that individual behaviour adds up to some 
aggregate outcome . Now, having a model is no guarantee of being right […] Still, 
writing down a model rules out certain kinds of error, the kind that come from not 
thinking about [how] things add up. […] Having a model lets you avoid that sort of 
thing. (Krugman 2012 online blog) 
I have attempted to develop such a model (based on a carefully written discussion), and in 
particular one which can be generally applied and explains several observed phenomena, 
but at the end of the day one should not forget that when considering such a complex issue 
as customers' perceptions of value and the strategic intentions of managers, any such model 
will have limitations and shortcomings, and its main purpose is to aid understanding.  It is 
based on my understanding and on my interpretation of the research findings, and is 
consequently open to debate. 
T 
103 | P a g e  
 
5.2 INTERPRETING AND CONCEPTUALISING THE FINDINGS 
The following sections discuss the findings in the three main areas and seek to provide 
plausible explanations as to why strategic approaches and practices discovered by the 
research have come into being and are so deeply rooted in Russian society. 
5.2.1 STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT PRACTICE 
Chapter four has reported the detailed findings in each of the three areas, but the first 
category of these findings, those concerning the practice of strategic management (in terms 
of who is involved in management decision-making, and what processes are involved -i.e. 
highly planned or emergent strategic decision-making), whilst interesting in their own right, 
do not really bring to light any novel or unexpected insights into the management of Russian 
businesses.  The strategic management practices described by the Russian managers 
interviewed in this study largely resemble those adopted by British managers. 
This is not to say that there are no significant differences between British and Russian 
managers in this respect; in fact in siloviki/oligarch directed businesses it seems certain that 
both corporate and competitive strategies are dominated by powerful vested interests, 
often concentrating on maintaining monopolistic powers (as evidenced by recent events at 
Gazprom, Rosneft, BP-TNK etc., and recent referrals to the WTO dispute resolution 
mechanisms), and the strategy processes will almost certainly reflect that fact by being 
hierarchical, autocratic and non-participative.   
However, access to strategic decision-makers in these large businesses is close to impossible 
for western researchers and it must be acknowledged that the insights and findings relating 
to the siloviki and oligarchs businesses described in the previous chapter are only the result 
of second-hand information based on observation of their actions "from afar" by the 
managers I interviewed. 
Nevertheless, in other respects the findings do highlight distinct areas of differences 
between strategic thinking in UK firms and those Russian companies which have been 
researched at first hand in this study.  Primarily these differences concern firstly, the 
perceived needs of Russian companies to form special exclusive relationships with 
customers in order to maintain market power and a favourable competitive position rather 
than "letting the market do its work”, and secondly the acceptance among Russian 
managers that it is necessary to influence government agencies and people in positions of 
power within local or national government agencies.  The evidence for this comes from the 
common use of network strategies, manipulative strategies, and the prevalence of 
"informal" or corrupt practices. 
5.2.2 COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES AND NETWORKING 
The attitudes and values concerning networking, competition and corruption evinced by the 
managers interviewed strongly suggest that there are cultural dimensions which govern 
these differences in strategic management thinking as well as the straightforward economic 
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causes commonly discussed in western textbooks.  This is an aspect of strategy which has 
not hitherto been researched in much detail, (De Wit, Meyer 2005, Puffer, McCarthy 2011) 
but which has far reaching consequences. 
The use of networking strategies and Manipulative strategies were much more in evidence 
amongst Russian managers than their British counterparts.  It seems most likely that the 
prevalence of these strategies can be attributed to three main factors: 
 the continuing peculiarities of the Russian business environment 
 the hangover of aspects of the old Soviet business culture  
 aspects of Russian national culture 
These three factors are inextricably interlinked, so that often the origins of managers' 
actions cannot be easily unpicked.  However, it is worth considering each of the factors in 
turn. 
5.2.3THE RUSSIAN BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 
The Russian business environment was discussed at length in document two, and having 
now reviewed the research findings it is clear that despite continuing moves in Russia 
towards a functioning market economy, aspects of the business environment continue to 
affect the nature of business strategies. 
Although the days of the lawless "wild East" business environment of the post-soviet union 
90s are now well past, the fact that the business landscape is dominated by large companies 
(the siloviki/oligarch controlled sector identified by Puffer and McCarthy) means that 
competitiveness in many markets is rather limited.  
I noted in document two that there was a dearth of SMEs in Russia, and it remains the case 
that SMEs are underrepresented in many industrial sectors.  In newer and service industries 
SMEs are growing but Russian SME managers interviewed mentioned that large companies 
in Russia still operate with the intention of "killing" potential new competitors, and are 
reported to be unscrupulous in following that strategy.  (The managers of large companies 
who were interviewed or who completed the questionnaire in document four (not 
unnaturally) failed to mention this strategy, but several of the SME managers interviewed 
reported that their large competitors followed the strategy to dominate their market).   
There is certainly evidence, then, that larger, well-connected, Russian companies actively 
use strategies to reduce intensity of competition by reducing the number of smaller players 
and the threat of new entrants to markets.  One of the consequences of this is that in a 
hypo-competitive market environment there is less incentive to innovate, and this is 
certainly a concern for the Russian Duma (Martens 2007). 
The dominance of the business landscape by powerful and often monopolistic companies 
along with the continuing massive power of the organs of national and local government 
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means that navigation of the landscape is fraught with difficulties for smaller players.  Even 
though many of the early problems of transition (such as currency instability, access to 
international markets etc) have now become much less of an obstacle for business in Russia, 
interference in business regulation is still identified as a major problem by Russian 
companies.  This came through strongly in interviews, and is supported by published 
statistical evidence and longitudinal research studies from the World Economic Forum and 
the Economic Freedom Network.(Schwab 2013, Economic Freedom Network 2013). 
5.2.4 THE POWER OF NATIONAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT BODIES 
In addition to their economic role which involves controlling government spending, the 
power of government regulatory bodies in Russia also has two strategic consequences:  
 firstly, local government officials have the power to ease or to hinder the expansion 
of smaller businesses by granting or refusing statutory permissions, and 
 secondly, the continuing operation of the company can be made difficult by the 
attentions of tax authorities and other regulators - to such an extent that SME 
managers in this study stated that remaining small enough to be "off the radar" was 
an important strategic consideration. 
It is easy to see why good relations with the very powerful national and local government 
agencies is so important, particularly for SMEs, and why, therefore, Russian companies in 
this study should stress the importance of strategies aimed at maintaining good relations 
with these bodies.  The government is making stringent efforts to reduce the bureaucratic 
burden on business, with some success, but the power of business regulation remains very 
high in Russia.   
In the latest EFW report (Economic Freedom Network 2013), Russia ranks 122nd of 152 in 
the measure of government regulation of business.  By contrast, the UK's rank for business 
regulation is a relatively favourable 21st of 152 (despite the complaints frequently voiced in 
the media by representatives of British business organisations), and consequently British 
managers interviewed in this study hardly mentioned strategies to maintain good 
relationships with government.  Russian managers, used to the monthly submission of tax 
accounts etc, found the "light touch" regulatory environment experienced by British 
companies difficult to comprehend. 
Although the findings mentioned several forms of maintaining good relationship with 
government agencies, corrupt practices were frequently mentioned, and In this sort of 
environment, the feeling of Russian managers was that the necessity to bribe local officials 
was just a given and did not merit much discussion. 
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5.2.5 THE IMPORTANCE OF NETWORK STRATEGIES AND NETWORKING PRACTICE 
5.2.5.1 WHY NETWORK STRATEGIES MAY PREVAIL IN RUSSIA 
The findings of this research make clear that overall, network strategies are of greater 
importance to Russian managers than they are to British managers.  It is clear from the 
interviews that personal relationships are greatly valued in Russia and considerable efforts 
are made to build and to foster networks of customers and relationships with government 
employees in positions of power. 
I argued in document two that it was likely that the cultural dimensions of universalism vs 
particularism and individualism vs collectivism (Trompenaars, Hampden-Turner 1998, 
Hofstede 2001) would affect the nature of the strategic process within companies and the 
actual competitive strategies which they adopt.  Russia is classed as a highly particularist 
society, characterised by Trompenaars as follows: 
“The Universalist approach is roughly: "what is good and right can be defined and 
always applies."  In particularist cultures far greater attention is given to the 
obligations of relationships and unique circumstances.  For example, instead of 
assuming that the one good way must always be followed, the particularist reasoning 
is that friendship has  special obligations and hence may come first.  Less attention is 
given to abstract so societal codes.”  
One interpretation of this behaviour is that it is culturally bound.  The importance of 
building networks to meet the needs of everyday life and even to ensure survival had roots 
in the harsh Russian environment and in a feudal system with a rigid class system based on a 
traditional aristocracy. The feudal system persisted well into the 19th century.   
These difficult conditions for the ordinary Russian populace continued after Czarist times.  In 
the Soviet era the Stalinist state imposed severe hardship and had an elite ruling 
nomenklatura which used brutalist control methods to impose a political system which, 
ironically, actually had its origins in utilitarianism and egalitarianism, and was based, at least 
in part, on the idealistic philosophies espoused by Jeremy Bentham and Robert Owen.  
Whilst networking strategies are found in other business cultures, it seems that in a 
particularist culture such as that found in Russia, and one with the long history of reliance 
on friends and acquaintances to bypass the non-functioning Soviet distribution model 
(Ledeneva 2009), networking assumes a very important role.   
5.2.5.2 WHY MAINTAINING RELATIONSHIPS WITH GOVERNMENT BODIES MAY BE IMPORTANT IN 
RUSSIA 
Survival in these feudal and subsequently Stalinist conditions probably depended on forging 
relationships which would be vital for mutual support and survival.  Not only would the 
conditions have provided positive reinforcement for these sorts of relationships in order to 
provide the day-to-day necessities of life in the non-functioning economic system, but also, 
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living through the terror of Stalin's totalitarian regime would have encouraged a fear-based 
respect for government bodies (Sebag-Montefiore 2012). 
Much of Soviet society was controlled through fear and the expectation of reprisals if 
demands from authority were not swiftly obeyed, and equally there was a tradition of the 
use of verbal commands and one of the traditional Russian management instruments is the 
"ukaz"-a top-level decision that is not open for discussion. (Wohlfart et al, 2006).  
 I believe that this is likely to have created a "racial memory" based on fear, not just of the 
NKVD and its successors, MVP, KGB, FSB, but also the Justice and enforcement ministries 
and those ministries responsible for the economic functioning of the Soviet union.  Indeed 
this fear of authority does not just stem from the Soviet era; the first post-revolutionary 
secret police -the Cheka, was largely modelled on the Ochrana, its Czarist predecessor. 
Given all these features of the power system in Soviet days, it is easy to understand why 
blat-based networking strategies, and deference to government agencies may be "baked 
into" Russian national culture as a particularist orientation and Trompenaars and Hampden-
Turner (1998) note that corruption and nepotism tend to be features of particularist 
cultures. 
5.2.5.3 WHY THE HISTORICAL IMPORTANCE OF RELATIONSHIP WITH GOVERNMENT BODIES SHOULD 
PERSIST 
An interesting conundrum which I sought to answer concerns the question of why these 
attitudes and behaviours which were born out of the historical political and economic 
systems were still in evidence nearly 20 years after the collapse of the system which 
spawned them.  I had several conversations with academic colleagues at TSU, and observers 
of the Russian scene in Moscow trying to understand the reasons for the robustness of 
these cultural attributes and their persistence into recent times, and two main reasons 
suggest themselves: 
Firstly the economy has evolved in such a way that any of the largest companies are now 
siloviki controlled which means that the Soviet old guard who controlled the system by 
virtue of their positions within the KGB / FSB and the so-called power ministries (judiciary, 
internal security, militia etc) are still in control of the ex SOEs and the remaining SOEs.  
Many are there because of their links to the Kremlin (bearing in mind President Putin’s 
previous roles in the KGB and FSB, they form an important part of "Putin's sistema"). 
Secondly, many of the most senior managers in the Russian Federation, and certainly those 
in their early 40s would not have been employed during the Soviet years (except perhaps in 
the latter phase of the turmoil which was Perestroika).  Nevertheless, they still seem to be 
involved in networking and power groups in much the same way as in the Soviet era.   
One of the answers to this conundrum was suggested by a colleague at TSU who pointed 
out that these younger but nevertheless powerful managers would have been members of 
108 | P a g e  
 
the Komsomol (Communist youth movement membership of which was essential for career 
progression in the Soviet era). 
Paul: “but do you think it's changing - is Russia changing? 
Ludmilla:  “yes of course but I hope....  At the beginning of perestroika, at the top 
of the government there were former Communists people, people who were 
communist party members, but nowadays most people in authority are former 
Komsomol members.  A lot of Komsomol members because they used to be very 
active, energetic a lot of networking which is also very important, which is why it's 
very easy for them to get promotion.” 
Paul:  “but that's a generation ago, when did the Komsomol finish?  Did that also 
finish in 1991/92” 
Ludmilla:  “yes, yes” 
Paul:  “so those people now - if they were in the Komsomol they would have been 
18 or 19,” 
Ludmilla:  “…early 40s [now]” 
Paul :  “so actually now they're the top people in companies?   The most 
interesting thing to me is this idea about the Komsomol and the fact that that 
network, which was really important in communist days anyway, it's still there.  
And I forgotten that.  I knew about the Komsomol but I'd forgotten that. That 
would be really interesting to know wouldn't it-how many general directors are ex-
Komsomol?  “ 
Ludmilla:  “do you think you can make a survey on that?  To find out?  [Laughs] 
I suppose it's not a fact that you can be proud of now nowadays unfortunately.” 
Paul:  “it was a different time” 
Ludmilla:  “yes of course, and it was not so bad in the mid to late 1980s”  
 
It would have been as a result of this Komsomol membership that they have established the 
networks which have led to their powerful positions. 
It seems plausible to argue therefore that the importance of maintaining relationships with 
local and national government bodies still remains important in Russia because as the 
Russian economy has transformed from a centralised planned economy into a market-based 
one, so the political system which controlled the workings of the economy has transformed 
into a new form of system where the economy is controlled by a combination of political 
influence and corruption/informal practices.   
The mechanisms have changed from direct control by ministries under the direction of 
Gosplan to a more nuanced form of control where oligarchs and powerful individuals 
(siloviki) control large sectors of the economy by virtue of their political connections and 
personal relationships with senior members of the government.  The oligarchs are less 
directly influenced by direct political connections but are nonetheless likely to follow 
strategies which are in line with what the government wants for fear of suffering the same 
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sort of reprisals as did Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Russia's wealthiest oligarch (and, incidentally 
deputy head of the Komsomol branch during his university days), when he was convicted on 
tax charges and imprisoned in 2003 following political disputes with the government and 
President Putin.  Amnesty International declared Khodorkovsky a prisoner of conscience in 
2011. 
Although the Khodorkovsky case is an extreme example of the power and workings of the 
Putin Sistema, the importance of keeping in line is widely understood in Russia, even by 
smaller businesses, and the importance of political influence was stressed by one of the 
managers I interviewed: 
 “…. exactly, that's common sense  - that's the rule in Russia.  Don't get involved in 
politics in a big way - you can run your business, have good relations with 
politicians, but don't try to change things”   
 
So it does seem that as long as the Russian economy remains dominated by large companies 
which are owned by oligarchs or controlled by powerful individuals with links to the 
government, businesses both large and small will be compelled to maintain good 
relationships with government bodies and remain politically aware. 
5.3 BRINGING THE THREADS TOGETHER 
This chapter has discussed the issues which have arisen from the findings of the research.  
This is a research topic which is neither simple nor unambiguous, and the discussion of the 
findings often depends on speculation about which of the aspects of the Russian business 
environment and national culture influences the behaviour of managers in their day-to-day 
tasks of strategic management.  Because it is complex and ambiguous the results need to be 
interpreted, a process which, in the end, requires value judgements to be made concerning 
the significance of the various findings and the theories which underpin them.   
In chapter two, as I reviewed all of the literature, I drew some conclusions from the theory 
in order to develop a conceptual framework.  This took the form of a series of 13 
propositions, and at that stage I intended to confirm or refute the propositions using 
quantitative research as parts of documents four and five.  In the event, the document two 
propositions and conceptual framework were not pursued in the way which was originally 
intended because, as discussed elsewhere, the research focus moved to a more qualitative 
approach and away from hypothesis testing.   
However, the research undertaken for documents three four and five does allow a 
retrospective review of the original propositions in the light of the research findings, and I 
think that this should be one component of the gestalt process of interpretation.  
The research undertaken in document four was intended to investigate these propositions 
in a quantitative manner, but the results of that research were rather inconclusive.  This was 
primarily due to the sampling strategy which I was compelled to adopt, (for reasons 
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described in document four), and so although I attempted to extract meaningful 
information from the survey data, the conclusions from document four research are not 
really robust enough to be seen as anything other than background support information.  
However when viewed with the qualitative research from document three and this 
document it is possible to take an holistic view of the original propositions. The review is 
summarised in the following table: 
 
TABLE5.1:  HOW FINDINGS SUPPORT OR REFUTE MY ORIGINAL RESEARCH PROPOSITIONS 
Proposition 
Number 
Proposition Supported 
by this 
research 
 
Comment 
P1 older ex state-owned enterprises (ex 
SOEs) are likely to be dominant in their 
markets 
 These companies are likely to be oligarch 
and/or siloviki controlled 
P2 large Russian companies are more likely 
to be operating in oligopolistic markets,  
 These companies are likely to be oligarch 
and/or siloviki controlled 
P3 managers working in oligopolistic 
business landscapes are likely to be more 
concerned with resource-based 
strategies than market positioning 
strategies, whilst managers working in 
more competitive environments are 
likely to be more concerned with market 
positioning strategies  
 SME managers adopt similar strategies to 
British counterparts whilst 
oligarch/siloviki controlled companies 
(often extractive industries) reportedly 
less concerned with reacting to market 
needs, and more interested in extracting 
the maximum rent from their activities 
P4 Younger managers (say less than 40 
years old) who never worked in the 
Soviet business environment are more 
likely to be outwardly orientated and 
favour reactive competitive strategies 

Not 
Particularly 
Significant
Younger managers appear to have a 
reputation in Russia for being more 
entrepreneurial 
(but this is not a particularly important 
finding) 
P5 Older managers with seniority built in 
the Soviet business environment are 
more likely to be traditional resource 
managers and hence inwardly orientated 
Not  
proven 
No real evidence from interviews or 
triangulation sources to back this up 
P6 Older managers having spent their 
formative years in the Soviet business 
environment are more likely to favour 
network strategies and manipulative 
competitive strategies 
 Not overtly stated in interviews, but can 
be implied by Sistema and the residual 
influence of the Komsomol 
P7 Companies operating in particularist 
cultures will be more likely to 
concentrate on network strategies  
Not 
generalisable 
The research strongly suggests the link, 
but this research is not generalisable 
outside Russia 
P8 Particularist cultures will be more 
accepting of manipulative competitive 
strategies  
Not 
generalisable 
The research strongly suggests the link, 
but this research is not generalisable 
outside Russia 
P9 Network strategies will be important to 
Russian companies  
 Network strategies were found to be 
important for all types of Russian 
company 
P10 Manipulative strategies will be important 
to larger Russian companies  
 This appears to be a true interpretation 
but is based on observations of strategy 
"from afar" 
P11 Russian managers in large firms and ex 
SOEs will be more inwardly orientated 
than small firms  
Not  
proven 
I think this to be true but no real evidence 
from interviews or triangulation sources 
to back this up 
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Proposition 
Number 
Proposition Supported 
by this 
research 
 
Comment 
P12 Russian managers in large firms and ex 
SOEs are likely to attempt to use 
manipulative competitive strategies  
 This appears to be a true interpretation 
but is based on observations of strategy 
"from afar" 
P13 Russian managers in SMEs and younger 
non-oligopolistic  companies will be 
more outwardly orientated  
 The research strongly suggests the link 
 
Overall, this review of the propositions shows that some of the ideas were sound, some 
were rather insignificant (it turns out), and some lacked any support from the findings and 
were therefore unproven.  
The themes which emerged from the grounded theory approach were clearer, and in 
summary concerned:   
 The practice of strategic management and factors affecting strategic management in 
Russia. 
 Competitive strategies and relationships with customers. 
 Coping with the Russian business environment and local and national government 
agencies 
Of course, being grounded in the research, the findings are all supported.  Again, some of 
the themes were less significant than others, but overall, the really significant issues 
concerned the importance of networking, the prevalence of manipulative strategies and the 
endemic nature of corruption.  
A summary of the strategies mentioned by Russian and British interviewees along with my 
interpretation of the strategic intention of the strategy and its classification as reactive or 
manipulative is shown in the following table: 
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TABLE 5.2:  COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES ADOPTED BY RUSSIAN COMPANIES AND THEIR INTENTIONS  
Strategic action Strategic intention 
 
Reactive/ 
manipulative 
strategies 
Russian 
managers 
 
British 
managers 
 
Beat competitors prices 
(predominantly an SME 
strategy) 
Acquire new customers by 
providing a better perceived 
value for money offer than 
competitors 
R 1  
Develop products or 
services with higher 
perceived user value 
Acquire new customers by 
providing a better perceived 
value for money offer than 
competitors 
R 1 
Attempt to block the 
establishment of new 
competitors by use of 
political contacts with 
siloviki 
(strategy followed mostly 
by larger companies) 
Reduce intensity of 
competition by reducing the 
threat of new entrants in the 
market 
 
M   
Attempt to eliminate 
existing small 
competitors by use of 
political contacts with 
siloviki 
(strategy followed mostly 
by larger companies) 
Reduce the number of 
competitors and hence 
competitive rivalry 
M   
Attempt to eliminate 
small & new competitors 
by establishing blat-
based relationships with 
existing customers 
(strategy followed by 
both large and small 
companies) 
Reduce the number of 
competitors and hence 
competitive rivalry 
M   
Establish a cartel to fix 
price levels 
Minimise price competition to 
maintain higher than normal 
prices & profits 
M   
Make corrupt payments 
to secure existing or new 
potential customers: 
(Kormit or Oktat) 
Counteract the price or quality 
advantage of a competitor M   
1= strategy predominantly followed by Russian SMEs rather than large companies 
In my attempts to impute strategic intent from the strategic actions of managers, for 
Russian managers I found it rather difficult to separate the intentions behind network 
strategies from those which I had classified as manipulative.  I think that in a Russian 
context, to all intents and purposes, network strategies are primarily intended to 
manipulate markets.  In a British context, however, I think it would be inaccurate to ascribe 
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a manipulative motive to the majority of the networking actions described by the British 
interviewees.   
There seems to be consistent pattern of strategic intent and strategic action which has 
emerged from the research undertaken for each of the three DBA research based 
documents, and the external third-party evidence mustered to provide triangulation 
supports the research findings unambiguously. 
In document two I attempted to integrate existing strategic typologies proposed by Miles et 
al. (1978) and Grachev and Izyumov (2003), and at the completion of this research it has 
been possible to refine the proposed typology so that it takes account of the research 
findings.  In document two I recognised that the proposed typology, as illustrated in Table 
2.2, might well be incomplete or that some of the categories might not be not particularly 
relevant in the developing Russian business landscape, and this has proved to be the case.   
For example, while Grachev and Izyumov did not identify reactors as a strategic type, it 
seems that this is a readily identifiable strategic grouping in Russia.  It also seems that the 
more extreme forms of predatory entrepreneurship (violent Mafia like activities) are 
declining as the Russian business landscape changes and matures over time.  
Although the research did not confirm my initial views concerning the inward or outward 
orientation of companies, there was some supporting evidence, and the theoretical logic 
remains sound.  
A revised typology describing strategies and organisational characteristics is shown in the 
following table, Table 5.3:
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TABLE 5.3 : A COMPARISON OF STRATEGIC TYPOLOGIES AND ASSOCIATED ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS 
 
Strategic Type 
(from this research) 
Strategic Type 
(after Grachev and 
Izyumov ) 
Strategic 
Type 
(after Miles et al) 
Basis of 
competitive 
strategy 
Strategic 
orientation 
Approach to 
market 
Reaction/ 
manipulation 
Typically represented by 
   1 2 3  
Traditional 
Soviet style 
companies 
Bureaucrat Defender N I M Companies controlled by Oligarchs & 
Siloviki i.e. Large, oligopolistic 
companies, SOEs & ex SOEs, 
companies in strategically important 
sectors 
Predator Predator  
_ 
N O M Oligarch owned larger ex SOEs with 
history of predatory management, 
smaller SMEs with "black market" 
roots 
Western 
mainstream 
Competitive 
entrepreneur 
Analyser/ 
prospector 
P/D/N O R/M SMEs, medium-size companies 
operating in globally competitive 
industries 
Reactor _ Reactor P I R SOEs and Ex-SOEs in declining 
industries 
 
1. Basis of competitive strategy: D= differentiation, P= competing on low price, N= network strategy  
2. Strategic orientation: I= internally orientated (i.e. driven by company’s resources), O= outwardly orientated (i.e. driven by external environment) 
3. Approach to market:  R= reacts to external environment, M= attempts to manipulate market. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS AND REFLECTIONS   
6.1 FINAL CONCLUSIONS  
n the absence of an existing body of research, the theory building in this thesis has 
depended on my interpretation of the research findings, building, wherever possible, on 
existing strategic management theory, but above all within the context of the unique 
characteristics of the Russian business environment and Russian national culture.   
Without setting the results in context, the interpretation would be flawed (Pawson, Tilley 
1997), but in attempting to understand the context, I have had to borrow from sources 
rather wider than conventional work on strategic management would demand.   I have 
found myself seeking information to contextualise my findings from works on recent 
Russian history, philosophy, political science, sociology and anthropology, but I think that 
without this breadth of information, my understanding of the context of the findings, and 
hence my ability to interpret them appropriately would have been much reduced. 
The findings are classified under three broad headings: 
 The practice of strategic management and factors affecting strategic management in 
Russia. 
 Competitive strategies and relationships with customers. 
 Coping with the Russian business environment and local and national government 
agencies 
This research has identified some specific strategies undertaken by Russian businesses and 
in discussion of the findings I have proposed a classification framework (manipulative vs 
reactive competitive strategies) which can be applied to Russian managers.   
I have argued that some of the characteristics of the strategies employed in Russian 
businesses are dictated by particular aspects of Russian national culture, namely the 
particularist and collectivist dimensions. 
Furthermore, the peculiar nature of the Russian business environment, dominated by 
powerful SOEs and ex SOEs, directed by oligarchs and siloviki, also affects strategies by 
encouraging the use of manipulative competitive strategies, and encourages corruption and 
other "informal practices".  In themselves, the corruption and other "informal practices" are 
carried out for one of three major purposes: for personal gain by individuals, to influence 
favourably the ways in which government departments deal with companies and to 
manipulate markets so that companies gain some form of competitive advantage. 
A logical conclusion would be that other societies which are particularist, collectivist and 
subject to political control which is very concentrated in a powerful ruling elite would also 
I 
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exhibit the same sorts of strategic management practices and in particular the adoption of 
manipulative strategies. 
In the course of discussions about my research findings with international colleagues, 
(seeking educative authentication) those from countries which have the same 
characteristics as Russia - particularist, collectivist and with a powerful ruling elite (in other 
words, countries with a hypo-capitalist business environment rather than a mature market-
based economy) - have confirmed that, in their view, my manipulative/reactive strategy 
model is evident in their countries.   
I believe that the research is sufficiently robust to defend the framework in the specific 
context of Russian culture and the Russian business environment.  However, whilst I am 
content to propose this as a theory, and I think that the causality linking culture, political 
power structure and business strategy has been established by the research described in 
this document as far as Russia is concerned, I do not wish to commit a fallacy of composition 
by claiming more from the research than can be justified by the findings concerning Russia.  
In other words, I am not claiming that the findings can be generalised at this stage. 
Nevertheless, although unproven in the wider international context, the theoretical outcome 
of this research is that companies operating in environments which are particularist, 
collectivist and operating in a hypo-capitalist business environment (with political and 
economic power concentrated in relatively few powerful hands) are likely to use 
manipulative competitive strategies.   
In contrast, companies operating in countries which are universalist, individualist and with 
advanced democratic political systems, independent judiciary and well regulated economic 
systems are likely to follow reactive strategies.  The research in Russia supports this view, 
and there is every reason to think that the theory is applicable to other countries with the 
same characteristics. 
6.2 THE VALIDITY OF THIS RESEARCH 
It is important to remember that from the outset the intention of the research was to 
develop theory concerning Russian businesses.  It is interpretive in nature and so seeking 
generalisability is not one of the main criteria which I have claimed for the research 
outcomes.  The more important criterion is that of research validity so that the theories 
which I had developed are seen to be plausible. In chapter 3 I set out the list of criteria 
which I felt should be met in order to demonstrate that this research was valid, trustworthy, 
authentic and had been undertaken in a fair and responsible way. 
At the conclusion of the research I hope that I have demonstrated that I have met these 
criteria, and the following table summarises the measures I have taken to assure this. 
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TABLE 6.1 CHECKLIST OF RESEARCH QUALITY CRITERIA 
Criterion Criterion 
met 
 
Comment/measures taken to ensure 
validity 
• Pose a significant, important 
question that can be investigated 
empirically and that contributes to 
the knowledge base 
 The significance of the research questions 
was discussed in documents one & two: 
• Test questions that are linked to 
relevant theory /theoretical validity 
 Links with existing and developing theory 
were established in document two, 
although as interpretive research using 
grounded theory methodology, to some 
extent theory is being developed rather 
than tested in this work. 
• Apply methods that best address 
the research questions of interest 
 the methods used are justified in section 3 
of this document which puts forward the 
arguments in favour of the methodology 
adopted 
• Base research on clear chains of 
inferential reasoning supported 
and justified by a complete 
coverage of the relevant literature 
 Links with existing and developing theory 
were established in document two, and 
extended in chapter 5 of this document. 
• Provide the necessary 
information to reproduce or 
replicate the study 
 The detail findings of the study are 
included in this document along with the 
analysis.  The research is interpretive in 
nature and seeks to develop theory, and so 
to some extent replicability will depend on 
the stance of the reader. 
• Ensure the study design, 
methods, and procedures are 
sufficiently transparent and ensure 
an independent, balanced, and 
objective approach to the research 
 The study design and procedure is entirely 
consistent with an interpretive ontological 
stance (which is, by definition, to some 
extent subjective) 
 
• Provide sufficient description of 
the sample, the intervention, and 
any comparison groups 
 Discussed in chapter 3 and appendix 1 
• Use appropriate and reliable 
conceptualization and 
measurement of variables 
 The development of theory by rigourous 
application of coding complies with 
grounded theory practice 
 
 
Descriptive validity  Interviews were recorded transcribed and 
analysed in accordance with research 
methods best practice 
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Criterion Criterion 
met 
 
Comment/measures taken to ensure 
validity 
Interpretive validity  Where any doubts arose as to the true 
meaning of interviewees' statements they 
were discussed and queries resolved with 
bilingual, subject aware interpreters 
Theoretical validity  The model developed & described in 
chapter 5 is theoretically defensible and 
can be applied in multiple situations & 
contexts 
Generalisability 


 
Internal generalisability is indicated by 
reaching theoretical saturation in the 
textual analysis and coding process. 
External generalisability remains unproven 
and requires further international 
research, although the international 
generalisability of the research conclusions 
certainly appears to be completely 
plausible. 
Evaluate alternative explanations 
for any findings 
 Covered in chapter 4 Findings and chapter 
5 Discussion 
Derive models which can be 
applied in various situations & 
contexts, which describe and 
explain micro-behaviour and macro 
(industry level) outcomes 
 The applicability of the model is discussed 
at length in chapter 5 
 Assess the possible impact of 
systematic bias 
 Covered in chapter 3, Methodology and 
chapter 5, Discussion 
 Submit research to a peer-review 
process 
 The research described in this document is 
subject to peer review as part of the 
academic assessment process 
Adhere to quality standards for 
reporting (i.e., clear, cogent, 
complete) 
 The reasoning behind the reporting 
approach was largely developed in 
document three and is covered in chapter 
3, Methodology  
Trustworthiness: credibility  Grounded theory methodology ensures 
prolonged & in-depth pursuit of salient 
elements. 
Extensive triangulation is to be found in 
chapters 4 & 5. 
Negative case analysis is included where 
appropriate (see for example 
Wintech/construction industry) 
Trustworthiness: transferability  Thick (rich) data is included in chapter 4, 
findings 
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Criterion Criterion 
met 
 
Comment/measures taken to ensure 
validity 
Trustworthiness: dependability and 
conformability 
 The NBS DBA process is assessed at each 
stage by an external disinterested auditor, 
& the process  is sequential and 
extensively documented, so that it 
provides a comprehensive audit trail 
Fairness  The research has been undertaken in 
compliance with NBS ethical guidelines, 
and I have ensured the anonymity of 
respondents where required. 
Ontological authentication  My reflections and changing ontological 
stance are recorded in document six 
Educative authentication  Research findings have been discussed and 
debated with academic partners and 
colleagues in the UK and Russia 
 
Overall, bearing in mind the inductive nature of the research and the  interpretive approach 
to theory building, my hope is that the measures described above, which I have taken whilst 
undertaking the research, are sufficient to persuade the reader that the research provides 
valid and authentic insights into the strategy building process in Russian companies. 
6.3 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH FINDINGS 
This research has identified some specific strategies undertaken by Russian businesses and 
in my discussion of the findings I have proposed a classification framework (manipulative vs 
reactive competitive strategies) which can be applied to strategies adopted by Russian 
managers.  Furthermore, I believe that the classification framework is sufficiently robust to 
be defensible in the specific context of Russian culture and the Russian business 
environment. 
I have also argued that some of the characteristics of the strategies employed in Russian 
businesses are dictated by particular aspects of Russian national culture, namely the 
particularist and collectivist dimensions.  Furthermore, the peculiar nature of the hypo-
capitalistic Russian business environment -dominated by powerful SOEs and ex SOEs 
directed by oligarchs and siloviki -also affects strategies by encouraging the use of 
manipulative competitive strategies, and encourages corruption and other "informal 
practices". 
A logical conclusion would be that other societies which have similar characteristics to the 
Russian Federation, namely those which are particularist, collectivist and subject to political 
control which is concentrated in a powerful ruling elite, would also exhibit the same sorts of 
strategic management practices and in particular the adoption of manipulative strategies. 
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Virtually all mainstream strategy textbooks discuss competitive strategy in terms of theories 
which appear to be based on the assumption that all business environments will resemble 
mature, market based Anglo-Saxon style market economies.  This is unsurprising as all of the 
seminal works on competitive strategy have been developed in the United States or 
Western Europe and are overwhelmingly based on an economic analysis of competition.  In 
these circumstances the underlying Western business ethics and cultural norms are also 
assumed to be universally applicable. 
However, when one views competitive strategy within its cultural context - as this research 
has attempted to do, and if one adopts a "strategy as practice" viewpoint; - in other words 
in investigating the day-to-day actions and investigating the actual views of managers and 
the ways in which they perceive their actions, it becomes clear that in cultures which are 
less individualistic and more particularist, the traditional Anglo-Saxon theoretical tenets of 
competitive theory do not necessarily hold true. 
Potentially, this has two important outcomes: 
 Firstly, management students from international backgrounds with a home culture 
like Russia's, which is communitarian and particularist, are likely to find traditional 
strategy teaching to some extent irrelevant to their own experience,  
and 
 Secondly, and probably more significantly, management students from an MMBE 
Anglo-Saxon/Western cultural background who subsequently work in a broader 
international environment may well find that the traditional strategies learned in 
business schools are ineffective in practice when implemented in a different cultural 
and politico-economic environment.   
Bearing in mind that in cultures which are predominantly collectivist and particularist, (and 
therefore do not conform to underlying Western preconceptions concerning competitive 
strategy) may well  represent in excess of 75% percent of the total world population5, not to 
raise awareness of this cultural difference as part of business school education would seem 
to me to be quite remiss.   
At present, otherwise well written and comprehensive strategy texts avoid discussion of the 
cultural impact on strategy, perhaps because they see some of the implications (most 
notably those concerning aspects of corruption) as not being fit topics for discussion.   
See, for example, Lynch (2006 p.100) who, when discussing co-operative strategies, writes: 
 
                                                     
5
 authors estimate based on: Countries in the world ranked by 2014 population (Anon ) 
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“[….]  cooperative strategies in which firms seek to share information in order to 
reduce competition and/or raise prices.  […..] Such forms of cooperation are illegal in 
many countries of the world because they are essentially anticompetitive.  They are 
therefore not explored further in this chapter." 
If nothing else, I think that awareness of the cultural dimensions of competitive strategy is 
potentially as important a topic as, say, the impact of national cultural differences on human 
resource management, which is nowadays a central part of HRM teaching. 
To date, the impact of cultural differences on strategy has not been the topic of much 
academic research, and consequently this sparse coverage of the topic in the vast majority 
of strategy texts is perhaps to be expected.  Nevertheless, managers need to be prepared 
for encountering the many informal practices and outright criminality which go to make up 
corruption, and to be helped to understand the implications of these cultural differences so 
that they may develop strategies to deal with the problems which arise.   
Although this research has identified several such informal practices, some of which may be 
seen locally as normal and benign, others may lead to contravention of national or 
international anticorruption laws, and managers need to be aware of the consequences of 
contravening, for example, the American Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (1977), (Churi, 
Finkelstein et al. 2012) or the UK Bribery Act (2010), (Anon 2015)  There are many examples 
of companies contravening the foreign corrupt practices act without apparently realising 
that their actions were subject to United States jurisdiction. (Kleiner 2012) 
6.4 THE LIMITATIONS OF THIS RESEARCH 
Although I have argued in the foregoing section that the research findings described in this 
document are significant for practising managers, particularly those embarking on 
international projects or careers, I recognise that the research itself is subject to some 
limitations.  These are primarily concerned with the sample of interviewees recruited for the 
study.   
As noted in chapter 3, section 3.4.5, although the interviewees were drawn from a fairly 
representative selection of companies, some types of company were somewhat 
underrepresented in the sample.  These were the very large oligarch and siloviki managed 
businesses.  These businesses are important in the overall Russian context because they are 
mainly involved in strategically important extractive industries such as the oil and gas sector, 
or in the important privatised monopolies which dominated the old Soviet system.  
However, managers with strategic decision-making responsibilities in these companies are 
relatively few in number and, to all intents and purposes, inaccessible to Western 
researchers, so an important subgroup of managers (at least in terms of their overall power 
and influence) was not interviewed in the course of this research.  Nevertheless their 
actions are important in shaping the competitive strategies of other players in the same 
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industry and I did attempt to understand their strategic decision making by considering 
what the managers who were interviewed felt about the dominance of these very large 
companies.  I recognise that this is less satisfactory than being able to interview the oligarch 
and siloviki managers directly, but in the circumstances I think it was all that could be 
achieved. 
Like any researcher investigating aspects of Russian business, I was dependent on local 
Russian colleagues to assist in contacting and recruiting interviewees or questionnaire 
respondents.  This did mean that interviews were confined to managers from the Tyumen 
oblast, the Moscow region and, in the case of the interviews undertaken at SUM, two 
managers from other regions - one from St Petersburg and one from Kursk - who were 
undertaking executive training in Moscow.   
As a result all the managers interviewed were from geographically prosperous backgrounds 
and there was no opportunity to interview managers from declining industries or mono-
industry "rustbelt" regions.   
In my interpretation of the findings I have tried to make allowance for these anomalies and 
it is to be hoped that some of these limitations can   be addressed in future research. 
6.5 FURTHER RESEARCH OPPOTUNITIES 
Thorstein Veblen (1857-1929), the Norwegian-American sociologist and economist is quoted 
as saying: 
"The outcome of any serious research can only be to make two questions grow where only one 
grew before.”  
Goddard and Melville (2001),  
I believe that this is a particularly apposite quote for research into Russian Businesses. 
I have not claimed that the theories put forward in this thesis are generalisable beyond 
Russia, although anecdotal evidence suggests that this is very likely.   The theories are 
persuasive and, in my opinion, significant enough to merit further research.  Consequently, 
several research opportunities exist for replicating these findings and to extend them to 
other countries with similar characteristics. It would be interesting, for example, to see 
studies carried out in India, Nigeria, China and other countries with similar cultural and 
politico-economic characteristics to confirm that the same sorts of manipulative strategies 
prevail, but this would, of course, be time-consuming and require several studies. 
Alternatively, it would be possible and interesting to undertake a meta survey to study the 
relationships of existing published data - bringing together information from, for example, 
Transparency International's Bribe Payers Index, the World Economic Forum's data on 
corruption and judicial independence, the Economic Freedom Network's data on the extent 
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of business control and bureaucracy, and the World Values Survey's data on moral and 
ethical issues.   
Although many of the measures published in these works use different numerical scales to 
represent and quantify the extent of a particular cultural or national characteristic - which 
means that statistical measures necessary to combine the findings from the various studies 
will be open to much debate, there is almost certainly an opportunity to use the country 
rankings from the various international studies to create a way of classifying countries in 
terms of their strategic stance.   
It was my original intention to include this sort of ranking review as part of my triangulating 
evidence, but the time required to develop such a list would be excessive bearing in mind 
that there does not appear to be a universally accepted statistical technique for combining 
and reviewing rankings from different studies (Flom 2013), and all the methods for 
combining ranks are rather arbitrary. There exist objective methods but they require the use 
of information not inherent in the existing published data.  In addition, some of the 
information concerning scores and rankings on cultural dimensions are seen by their 
authors as being proprietary information used in consultancy, and consequently not 
available for this sort of exercise. In any event, my developing doubts about the use of 
statistical information in this context are discussed in documents four and six.   
Nevertheless, there is significant interest in positivist research into cultural issues and I am 
sure that an instrument for measuring and comparing the national cultural traits and the 
political and economic characteristics of the business environment could be devised.  
In document two I discussed classification systems based on the work of Miles et al (1978) 
and those of Grachev and Izyumov (2003), and in this study I have developed the concept 
further in the light of the findings.  I think it would be both useful and interesting to develop 
this classification system to the stage where it could be a useful tool for practising 
managers. 
If such a realist approach were to be followed, it could be that rather than undertaking 
several individual country studies, a more efficient way would be to attempt to tack a series 
of questions covering business relationships, bribery, the importance of networking etc. 
onto an existing international study such as the World Values Survey.   
Bearing in mind my own experience of creating unambiguous questions to investigate these 
cultural phenomena in non-Anglophone countries (recounted in document four), the design 
of any questions on this topic will need considerable care and extensive piloting.   
Realistically, it is unlikely that the guardians of major international studies will be willing to 
"tack on" questions concerning national cultural effects on strategy until this research has 
been disseminated in the academic community and been subject to discussion and peer 
comment.  Ultimately I think it would be worthwhile though.  
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1  
TABLE A1: INTERVIEWEES 
Manager 
interviewed 
Transcript 
Analysed 
in doc 3 
or doc  5 
Location of 
company 
Company/industry Enterprise 
Category 
**** 3&5 **** Project management 
consultancy 
Micro 
**** 3&5 **** Airline plus SUM doctoral 
student 
Large  
**** 3&5 **** Steel stockholding Large 
**** 3&5 **** Construction 
(groundworks) 
Medium 
**** 3&5 **** Steel stockholding Large 
**** 3&5 **** Internet & cable TV Medium  
**** 3&5 **** Bathroom fittings & 
sanitaryware distribution 
Small 
**** 5 **** Management consultant Large 
**** 5 **** Bank Large 
**** 5 **** Sports/fitness clubs Medium 
**** 5 **** Construction steel 
supplies 
Medium 
**** 5 **** Specialist valuation 
consultancy 
Small 
**** 5 **** Computer POS systems Small 
**** 5 **** Jewellery retail Small 
**** 5 **** Telecommunications Large 
**** 5 **** Software & computer 
services 
Medium 
**** 5 **** Academic University 
**** 5 **** Marketing consultant Small 
**** 5 **** Academic & commercial 
lawyer 
Small 
**** 5 **** Academic University 
**** 5 **** Trades union official NGO 
**** 5 **** Academic & government 
adviser 
University 
G.N. 5 West Midlands Construction industry 
consultant 
Small 
S.B. 5 West Midlands Construction industry 
consultant 
Small 
R.T. 5 West Midlands Steel stockholder & 
profiler 
Medium 
R.J. 5 West Midlands Consultant to local Small 
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Manager 
interviewed 
Transcript 
Analysed 
in doc 3 
or doc  5 
Location of 
company 
Company/industry Enterprise 
Category 
authority 
P.K. 5 West Midlands Consultant to local 
authority 
Small 
J.F. 5 West Midlands Consultancy 
Administration manager 
Small 
A.C. 5 Moscow International banking Large 
J.M. 5 Moscow NGO Expert advisor NGO 
D.W. 5 Uk / Ekaterinburg Academic Consultancy Micro 
     
 
SOME TABLE CONTENT REDACTED TO ENSURE ANONYMITY OF INTERVIEWEES 
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APPENDIX 2 
TABLE A2: MAIN THEMES IDENTIFIED BY THE INITIAL CODING PASS (FROM DOCUMENT 
THREE) 
Node Title Node Description 
1 Avoiding Taxation Smaller companies can avoid scrutiny by tax authorities
   
2 Awareness of External Environment Entrepreneurial managers do not do formal 
environmental scanning: it's intuitive 
3 Big Companies Internally Orientated Big companies concentrate on internal resources rather 
than developments in the external environment. Much 
easier for smaller companies to be market orientated 
  
4 Big Companies Try to Dominate  Market The strategic aim of big companies is to dominate 
markets and "kill" the competition   
5 Bureaucracy-Taxation The bureaucracy required by tax law is stifling and 
requires a lot of staff   
6 Cash Flow Not a Problem Steel stockholding companies claim cash flow is not a 
significant problem (very unlike UK situation) 
  
7 Characteristics of Older Managers Younger managers are sought after for newer 
companies. Older mature businesses still managed by 
older managers. Demand for entrepreneurial managers?
   
8 Command Style Strategy Formulation Chief executive initiates strategy, but may be modified by 
discussion   
9 Competitive Advantage-Differentiation Customers remain loyal because of quality of service, not 
price   
10 Competitive Advantage from Quality Customers remain loyal because of quality of service, not 
price   
11 Competitive Advantage Good Resources Competitive advantage exists because of superior 
equipment resources   
12 Competitive Advantage-Quick Response Competitive advantage exists because of superior 
response times to customer requests   
14 Cooperative-Low Price Strategy Companies co-operate to achieve buying economies and 
therefore lower prices   
15 Customer Orientation New, smaller businesses are more customer orientated 
than older larger ex-SOEs   
16 Difference between Moscow & Provinces Moscow much more prosperous and competitive than 
provinces   
17 Difficulty Finding Qualified Staff Companies in the provinces find difficulty in finding 
appropriately qualified staff   
18 Diversification Strategy A desire to undertake a product diversification for 
growth and to reduce the risk of narrow markets 
  
19 Emergent Strategies Strategies develop over time. Not easy to plan ahead 
much because of the turbulent business enlightenment
   
20 Emergent Strategies & Informal Procedures Strategies develop over time. Not easy to plan ahead 
much because of the turbulent business enlightenment
   
21 Entrepreneurs Different Psychology Entrepreneurs think differently, have a different 
"psychology" - not always solely motivated by profit 
  
22 External Factors Affecting the Business The business and environment is changing & this affects 
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Node Title Node Description 
the business (primarily changes in the law)   
23 Geographical Expansion in Same Markets Company wishes to expand by doing the same thing in 
more towns in the region   
24 Good Relationship with Administration Maintaining good relationships with the local 
administration is essential for business success 
  
25 Good Service Good customer service is essential for success. Strive to 
meet customer's needs and be flexible   
26 Hasn't Thought about Source of Competitive 
Advantage 
Company has been successful and growing rapidly, but 
no one has analysed why it has been so successful 
  
27 Hierarchical Structures There will always be a small number of people making 
the main decisions: even large ex-SOEs have a small 
decision-making group in the hierarchy   
28 Impact of Bureaucracy Local administration & government can damage growth 
by imposing bureaucracy. An ideal linked with corruption
   
29 Impact of Corruption Examples of corruption affecting businesses   
30 Impact of Unstable Environment Unstable business environment makes planning 
impossible   
31 Importance of Friends-Social Groups Much business depends on relationships with friends and 
social networking  
32 Importance of Networking Much business depends on social networking 
  
33 Importance of Social Approbation Seeking Social approbation maybe necessary for some 
bigger high profile companies   
34 Important to Build a Brand Brand building is important for differentiating 
  
35 Influence with Local Administration A good relationship with someone in the local 
administration can often ensure success, a lack of a good 
relationship can prevent a business setting up 
  
36 Instability of Business Environment The unstable business environment makes planning for 
more than a year impossible 
37 Intuitive Strategic Management Strategising is an intuitive process, not formal and not 
based on research   
38 Lack of Competition Larger, older industries are not very competitive - not 
many competitors   
39 No Formal Strategy Process The company does not operate any formal strategic 
management processes   
40 Poor Quality from Russian Companies Lack of competition in excess SMEs and large companies 
leads to poor quality products and services   
41 Poor Service from Russian Companies Soviet mindset (lack of customer orientation) leads to 
inflexibility and poor service   
42 Realising That Strategy Is Important Company beginning to appreciate that strategic 
management is important   
43 Regional Expansion Regional expansion is possible but not interesting, 
diversification preferred   
44 Repeat Customers Most business comes from existing customers 
  
45 Resource-Based Competitive Advantage Competitive advantage comes from financial resources 
which allow bulk purchases   
46 Resource-Based View: Good Management Competitive advantage comes from having good/highly 
competent management   
47 Risk Averse Attitude Strategic preference is to avoid risk by "sticking to the 
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Node Title Node Description 
knitting"  
48 Russian Companies' Growing Awareness Companies are becoming more aware of the threat from 
competitors and the need for competitive strategy 
  
49 Market Less Demanding Than EU Market Fewer competitors and different industrial structure 
means that the market is less competitive than in 
Western Europe   
50 SME Manager Attention to Details In smaller companies the owner/manager can control 
the quality of day-to-day work more easily   
51 Importance of Social Group Much business is conducted through social networking
   
52 Soviet Market Model Persists The oligopolistic large ex-SOEs still dominate the steel 
market and suppress the need for more competitive 
distribution   
53 Strategising by Entrepreneur The owner manager makes the strategic decisions 
  
54 Trust in Family Members Advice on business strategy is sought from family 
members (father)   
55 Younger Managers Many companies, particularly newer ones, prefer to 
recruit younger managers   
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APPENDIX 3  
TABLE A3: MAIN THEMES IDENTIFIED AT THEORETICAL SATURATION 
Tree nodes  
(axial codes) 
Consolidated free 
nodes identified in the 
initial analysis  
(document three codes) 
Further free nodes 
identified at 
saturation 
(all sources coded) 
Sources 
coded 
References 
coded 
     
 Aspects of the Russian 
business environment 
affecting the company 
external factors affecting the 
business 
  3 3 
  impact of bureaucracy / 
taxation 
  9 11 
   influence of the 
Komsomol 
2 3 
   Mafia like activity 3 3 
   political power 
influences business 
environment 
2 2 
      
      
Existing corporate strategies 
(other than competitive 
strategies)  
diversification strategy   3 6 
  regional expansion   4 5 
  test node   1 1 
      
      
     
      
 Issues concerning the age of 
managers 
characteristics of older 
managers 
  2 5 
 Younger managers   3 6 
  young managers more 
entrepreneurial 
 4 4 
   large companies 
unappealing for young 
entrepreneurial 
managers  
2 3 
   attitudes to corruption 
- young managers 
2 2 
   UK companies often 
value older managers 
2 2 
     
      
 Outliers and significant 
miscellaneous comments 
cash flow not a problem   2 2 
  difficulty finding qualified 
staff 
  2 2 
  importance of social 
approbation 
  2 2 
  risk averse attitude   2 2 
     
      
 The impact of corruption cartel activity   2 2 
   
companies discuss and agree 
prices 
   
3 
 
3 
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Tree nodes  
(axial codes) 
Consolidated free 
nodes identified in the 
initial analysis  
(document three codes) 
Further free nodes 
identified at 
saturation 
(all sources coded) 
Sources 
coded 
References 
coded 
  corruption dealing with 
customers 
  2 3 
  corruption is pervasive   3 5 
    corruption is 
unacceptable to UK 
companies 
2 3 
  criminality   2 2 
  impact of corruption - local 
Administration 
  6 12 
    The nature of 
corruption 
2 2 
   bribery via third 
parties 
2 2 
   business gifts 4 4 
   corruption is 
embedded in Russian 
culture 
2 2 
   examples of attempted 
corruption uk 
3 3 
   unacceptability of 
business gifts uk 
2 3 
   what constitutes 
corruption uk 
2 2 
     
      
The importance of network 
strategies and networking 
practice 
good relationship with 
Administration avoids 
problems 
  5 8 
  good relationship with 
Administration less important 
for small businesses 
  3 4 
  importance of friends  - social 
group 
  4 5 
  importance of networking   10 11 
   importance of local 
contacts to penetrate 
markets 
5 8 
   importance of 
networking to UK 
companies 
2 2 
   manipulating the 
market 
2 3 
   network strategies less 
important for UK 
companies 
1 1 
   networking practice 4 6 
   networking to reduce 
the competition 
2 5 
   importance of 
relationships with UK 
local authorities etc 
2 2 
   influence with local 
administration 
4 5 
    
networking with 
important gatekeepers 
 
2 
 
2 
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Tree nodes  
(axial codes) 
Consolidated free 
nodes identified in the 
initial analysis  
(document three codes) 
Further free nodes 
identified at 
saturation 
(all sources coded) 
Sources 
coded 
References 
coded 
      
      
     
 The process of strategic 
management 
big companies  internally 
orientated 
  3 4 
  big companies have 
centralised strategy 
management 
  3 6 
  emergent strategies 
predominate 
  7 10 
  hierarchical command 
management style 
  3 5 
  impact of Russian culture on 
management 
  2 2 
  instability of  business 
environment 
  3 4 
  intuitive strategic 
management 
  6 9 
  Russian companies' growing 
awareness 
  4 8 
  strategic plan exists, but 
changed as circumstances 
demand 
  3 3 
  strategising confined to 
trusted few 
  8 15 
      
      
The source of the company's 
competitive advantage and its 
current competitive strategies  
big companies try to 
dominate market 
  5 6 
  competitive advantage -
differentiati 
  3 4 
  competitive advantage from 
quality 
  2 2 
  competitive advantage from 
store location 
  2 2 
  competitive advantage good 
resources 
  2 3 
  competitive advantage -quick 
respons 
  3 3 
  competitive advantage 
through innovation 
  1 1 
  competitive advantage-low 
price 
  4 6 
  cooperative -low price 
strategy 
  3 3 
  customer orientation   2 3 
  difference between Moscow 
& province 
  3 3 
  good reputation   2 2 
  good service   6 10 
  importance of tacit 
knowledge 
  1 1 
  important to build a brand   4 4 
  lack of competition   3 4 
  market less demanding than   3 3 
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Tree nodes  
(axial codes) 
Consolidated free 
nodes identified in the 
initial analysis  
(document three codes) 
Further free nodes 
identified at 
saturation 
(all sources coded) 
Sources 
coded 
References 
coded 
EU market 
 resource-based competitive 
advantage 
  4 5 
   luxury goods market 
very demanding - Twin 
Peaks 
2 3 
   younger generation 
demanding world-class 
goods 
2 2 
      
    older, larger Russian 
companies 
uncompetitive 
5 10 
     
   service & high-tech 
sectors more 
competitive 
3 3 
   SMEs successful in 
service sector & high-
tech 
2 2 
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